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Abstract 
This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, 
person and individual. The law of obligations sets the context for this 
examination. One of the important aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy 
has been its move beyond highlighting inconsistencies in political and legal 
theory, in which theoretical frameworks can be shown to rely upon an ambiguous 
treatment of women. The feminist theorists whose work is considered use these 
theoretical weaknesses as a point of departure to propose different conceptual 
frameworks. 
I start by analysing contemporary work on the self from within both 
philosophy of science and feminist metaphysics to draw out common approaches 
from these diverse positions. These themes are then discussed in the context of 
the law. I then critically examine the concept of legal personhood in the work of 
Drucilla Cornell and her proposals for the amendment of tort law. This is 
juxtaposed with an analysis of the practical operation of tort law by adapting 
Fran<;ois Ewald's work on risk and insurance to English law. I concentrate on 
women's ambiguous position with regard to both risk and to the image of the 
individual that is the subject of Ewald's critique. 
This is followed by an examination of the changing position of women 
with regard to 'possessive individualism', 'self-ownership or 'property in the 
person' in relation to contract law and social contract theory. There are a number 
of different social contracts discussed in the thesis: Cornell's reworking of John 
Rawls and the stories of Thomas Hobbes and of Carole Pateman. The final 
'social contract' to be discussed is that of 'new contractualism', the employment 
of contract as a technique of government. I argue that Pateman's critique of 
possessive individualism continues to be relevant at a time when the 
breadwinner/housewife model has broken down. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, 
person or individual in relation to the law of obligations. There is a political issue 
at stake: a concern with the way in which the question of what it is to be a 
woman has been problematised within recent feminist legal theory. In order to 
overcome what appears to be a block in feminist legal theory, I tum to areas of 
philosophy that, with some exceptions, are not usually discussed within feminist 
legal theory. In trying to bring philosophy to bear on law, I draw upon an unusual 
background of spending six years working in civil litigation, as a solicitor for 
trade unions, followed by seven years in a philosophy department, studying 
continental philosophy at masters level and as part of this thesis. This is therefore 
a thesis in philosophy from a feminist perspective with law setting the context for 
the exploration of what it is to be a self, person and individual. 
An important move in feminist philosophy has been to show that the 
supposedly neutral, universal terms: self, person and individual, have actually 
referred to males; male bodies and traditional lifestyles, as the paradigmatic case. 
In legal theory, the fact that these supposedly neutral terms actually took men as 
the norm has given rise to, what has become known as, 'the equality/difference 
debate'. The terms of this debate describe a dilemma that is faced by women 
upon entering political institutions, workplaces and social organisations that were 
initially made by and for men. They can either gain rights by appearing to be like 
men or can argue that they should be treated differently. Luce Irigaray,1 amongst 
other feminist philosophers, has argued that men should not provide the neutral 
measure against whom women are judged. The dilemma posed by the 
1 L. Irigaray, Je, Tu, Nous (London: Routledge, 1993b) p. 12. 
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:quality/difference debate can therefore be understood as operating in practice, 
¥hen women enter the male dominated legal profession for example, and within 
Jhilosophy when theoretical structures are shown to be built upon the assumption 
:hat males represent the universal category of what it is to be a self, person or 
[ndividual. 
The dilemma of equality/difference debate has been explored in ways that 
cut across both theory and practice. 2 Scott/ for example, has traced the way in 
which the equality/difference problem has dogged feminist activists in French 
history. She illustrates how the theoretical terms of the debate have changed. 
Sometimes the faculty of imagination was viewed as important, sometimes it was 
the ability to reason, but whatever was viewed as the defining characteristic of 
personhood, it is males who were deemed to be proficient and women as lacking 
this ability. Scott draws an interesting conclusion, one which provides a 
challenge to feminist theory and marks the starting point for this thesis. It is 
Scott's view that the paradox of women's position, that is summed up within the 
equality/difference debate, is not one that can be resolved; not even by changing 
the conceptual framework in which the debate has arisen. It is implicit within the 
position of feminism as an historical movement. She concludes, 
[I]n the case of feminism, the problem that has been deemed so central (equality 
versus difference) cannot be resolved as it has been posed. But can it be resolved 
otherwise? Would there be a feminism without the discourse of individual rights 
that represses sexual difference? I think not. Can there be a feminist politics that 
exploits that tension without expecting finally to resolve it? I think so; the point of 
this book has been to say that feminists have been doing just that for at least two 
centuries.4 
2 Feminism generally and feminist legal theory in particular has been conscious of the need to 
hold together concerns about both theory and practice. See, for example, C. McGlynn, Legal 
Feminisms: Theory and Practice (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1998); A. Bottomley and J. Conaghan, 
Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
3 J.W. Scott, Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1996). 
4 Scott (1996) pp. 174-175. 
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agree that the equality/difference debate cannot be resolved as it is posed. The 
tuestion of whether this can be resolved by employing different frameworks is 
mrtly what this thesis is about. Whilst both have been described as 
)aradigmatically male, it is necessary to distinguish between the self and legal 
~ersonhood. What it is to be a self is an ontological concept, whereas 
;personhood' denotes a moral and legal concept. Historically, women have been 
denied legal personhood, the ability to sue and be sued in the courts. I want to 
explore different ways of thinking about the self (starting in Chapter 2) and legal 
personhood (starting in Chapter 3) that do not take men as the norm against 
whom women are measured. This involves thinking about a model of selfhood 
that takes the bodies and lives of women as the norm rather than as an aberration. 
I will also examine a model of legal personhood, provided by the work of 
Cornell, that aims to move beyond the equality/difference problem. 
The paradoxical position of women with regard to individualism, and the 
problems with individualism, are examined in Chapters 5 and 6 in the light of 
these earlier chapters. My reference to individualism and 'possessive 
individualism' focuses upon the ontological and political arguments of Thomas 
Hobbes and Robert Nozick. They share a perspective which views the self as the 
owner of his (and her?) abilities and owing nothing to society for them. This 
image of the self is associated with the arguments in political theory about 'self-
ownership' and 'property in the person' which are discussed in the final two 
chapters in relation to employment contracts and marriage contracts. 
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~ecent History of Feminist Legal Studies 
tecent Australian work by Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J. Owens/ Sexing the 
)ubject of Law, initially appears to have some similarities to my project of 
ooking at the question of the self and of the person in a legal context. In their 
ntroduction, Naffine and Owens state, 
This book reflects a central concern of modern social theory, which is the nature of 
identity. What does it mean to be a human subject or self? What is the nature of 
(legal) personhood ? ... The legal person, or legal subject, plays an absolutely 
critical role in law. The attributes accorded by law to its subject serve to justify and 
rationalise law's very forms and priorities. If feminists are to change the law, then, 
it is vital that they deal with the implicit as well as explicit sexing of the legal 
person. The aim of this book, then, is to bring together for the first time a diverse 
group of legal scholars whose task is to engage in a sustained critique of the legal 
person.6 
However, after examination, it is clear that we are employing very different 
theoretical perspectives. As I will discuss below, it is my aim to try to open up 
more promising philosophical frameworks in order to move beyond the 
discomfort about talking about women that pervades Sexing the Subject of Law. 
To situate their work, Naffine and Owens7 trace the following recent history 
of feminist legal theory. They point out that well into the 1980s the discipline of 
law was resistant to feminist theory because of law's history of being viewed as 
'autonomous, self-defining and possessed of its own internal logic'. 8 Legal 
formalists continue to view law as merely a description of rules drawn from cases 
and statutes. When these rules are viewed as autonomous and as abstracted from 
their social context, law is cast as a type of quasi-mathematics that involves the 
search for the right rule.9 
5 N. Naffine and R.J. Owens, Sexing the Subject of Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997). 
6 N affine and Owens ( 1997) pp. 6-7. 
7 Naffine and Owens (1997) pp. 3-14. 
8 Naffine and Owens ( 1997) p. 3. 
9 For a discussion of legal method, see for example, M.J. Mossman, 'Feminism and Legal 
Method: The Difference It Makes' in Australian Journal of Law and Society Vol. 3, 1986, pp. 30-
52. Reprinted in M.A. Fineman and N.S. Thomadsen, eds., At the Boundaries of the Law: Feminism 
and Legal Theory (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 287-388. 
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Although Naffine and Owens are writing from an Australian perspective 
the points that they make about the background of feminist legal theory have 
general application. Inevitably any attempt to draw out a brief history of feminist 
legal theory is contentious. I will continue to follow Naffine and Owens' account 
because it is written with a view to thinking about the self, person and individual, 
which is the focus of my own project, but will point to particularly English 
concerns where relevant. 
When feminism did have an impact upon legal theory it took the form of 
liberal feminism, which Naffine and Owens link with an acceptance of the 
nature/culture divide: 
Humanity was regarded as naturally and self-evidently divided into two sexes: the 
ordering of human life into men and women was part of nature, not culture, and so 
the concern of feminists was necessarily limited to the treatment of women once 
they had entered the cultural order. 10 
They sketch this version of 'liberal feminism' as taking for granted a split 
between nature and culture. The sex/gender distinction - one that has been 
undermined in recent years 11 - was mapped onto this split such that 'gender' was 
viewed as a social construct whereas 'sex' was viewed as biological. Here 
'biology' was viewed as something that could not easily be altered- a point that 
is now contentious, as illustrated by the work of Susan Oyama discussed in 
Chapter 2. Similarly, in the UK, early feminist legal theory highlighted some of 
the problems women encountered with the operation of the law. 12 
10 N. Naffine and R.J. Owens, 'Sexing Law' in Naffme and Owens (1997) p. 4. 
11 For the way in which this nature/culture split has been challenged by poststructuralism with the 
argument that the way that we think about nature is also socially constructed, see J. Butler, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990); J. Butler, 
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (London: Routledge, 1993); J. Butler, The 
Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). This nature/culture split has 
also been subject to a more compelling challenge from within the philosophy of biology, see S. 
Oyama, Evolution's Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide (Durham: Duke 
University, 2000a); S. Oyama, The Ontology of Information: Developmental Systems and 
Evolution (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000b ). 
12 See for example, A. Sachs and J.H. Wilson, Sexism and the Law: A Study of Male Beliefs and 
Judicial Bias (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978); S. Atkins and B. Hoggett, Women and the Law 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); J. Brophy and C. Smart, eds., Women in Law (London: Routledge and 
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Naffine and Owens 13 detect a major shift away from the dominance of 
)eral feminist legal theory in the 1980s with the influence of the US lawyer. 
atherine MacKinnon. MacKinnon's radical feminism has also been an 
aportant influence upon English feminist legal theory. Central to her argument 
, an analogy with Marxism that, 
sexuality is to feminism what work is to marxism: that which is most one's own yet 
most taken away. 14 
or MacKinnon, sexuality was central to identity such that the way to reconstruct 
vhat it means to be a 'woman' was to use 'consciousness raising' to show the 
vay in which women are oppressed. Despite the fact that MacKinnon's work 
Lppears to position women as always exploited, she has taken legal cases and 
nfluenced the development of the law in areas such as sexual harassment 15 and, 
nore contentiously amongst US feminists, 16 the regulation of pornography .17 
MacKinnon's inclusion in Naffine and Owens' outline of the recent history 
Jf feminist legal theory works to pinpoint areas of particular concern for their 
position. They argue that MacKinnon produces a shift in thinking about 
sex/gender, or nature/culture, by viewing the category of 'woman' as a matter of 
social construction. 
There was nothing natural or positive about the female sex: the meaning of woman 
was very much the cultural work of men who had crafted women according to their 
sexual interests. 18 
Kegan Paul, 1985). In the area of sexuality, see for example: S. Edwards, Female Sexuality and 
the Law (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981); Z. Adler, Rape on Trial (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1987). 
13 Naffine and Owens (1997) pp. 5-6. 
14 C.A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory' in 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 7, No.3, 1982, pp. 515-544. See also C.A. 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence in Signs: 
Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 8, No.4, 1983, pp. 635-658. 
15 C.A. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1979). 
16 For the debate about pornography see, for example, D. Cornell, ed., Feminism and 
Pornography (Oxford University Press, 2000b ). 
17 A. Dworkin and C.A. MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women's 
Equality (Minneapolis: Organising Against Pornography, 1988). 
18 Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 5. 
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s they point out, this is subject to the criticism that it reduces women to a 
~based sex. 19 This criticism has been linked with a further attack upon 
lac Kinnon: that she produces a 'universal' view of women. It is this point that is 
~ntral to much of contemporary feminist legal theory. I will return to this 
rgument in the next section. 
Naffine and Owens argue that MacKinnon's work questioned the 
rraturalness and fixity of the idea of sexual identity. ' 20 They then cite the work of 
JS feminist legal theorist Cornell, as 'producing a deeper fracture' in the 
:ategory of 'woman'. The reference to 'fracture' presumably means that there is a 
urther attack on the idea that there can be a universally accepted view of what it 
s to be a woman - as Cornell does not view what it is to be a self or a person as 
J-actured. Cornell is described as influenced by Derrida. She is characterised as 
making the move that, 
The masculine language, through which women were constructed, was always open 
to subversion because it was, of its very nature, metaphorical, contingent and fluid. 
It did not have the power to encapsulate women because it could always be 
undermined and manipulated by such strategies as irony, satire and mimesis. 21 
It is understandable that Cornell's engagement with Derrida and with Lacan 
should mean that she is characterised as poststructuralist, particularly in 1997. 
Whilst this was written after Cornell had published The Imaginary Domain, 22 in 
which she develops her own theoretical framework from which her legal 
principles are derived, it was written before her further development of this 
approach in her later books.23 Cornell's developed conceptual framework is more 
19 For UK criticisms of MacKinnon, see for example S.L. Roach Anleu, 'Critiquing the Law: 
Themes and Dilemmas in Anglo-American Feminist Legal Theory' in Journal of Law and 
Society, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1992, pp. 423-440; E. Jackson, 'Catherine MacKinnon and Feminist 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Appraisal' in Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1992, pp. 
195-213. 
20 Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 6. 
21 Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 6. 
22 D. Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
23 D. Cornell, At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex and Equality (Chichester: Princeton 
University Press, 1998); D. Cornell, Just Cause: Freedom, Identity and Rights (Oxford: Rowman 
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mplex and original than is implied in the above quotation. She also produces 
:my more practical arguments than are captured by the reference to strategies of 
'Ony, satire and mimesis'. Despite the fact that Cornell engages at length with 
~rrida and Lacan, she avoids being confined by them. On the contrary, Cornell 
also in conversation with many of her other contemporaries, including Ronald 
workin and John Rawls. She takes what she wants from her contemporaries, 
Nare of their conflicting positions, in order to create a unique philosophical 
amework. In Chapter 3, in which I discuss Cornell's legal proposals drawn from 
er framework developed from Imaginary Domain onwards, I argue that the 
tandard description of Cornell as 'poststructuralist' or 'psychoanalytic' does not 
apture the clearly acknowledged debt that she has to Hegei.24 However, this 
hould not be overstated. As I will discuss below, she is anxious not to be viewed 
.s a 'follower of a particular man' .25 She accounts for her eclectic approach as 
,ossibly a way of avoiding such identification whilst recognising that her work 
ms come out of German Idealism. 26 
In their historical sketch, Naffine and Owens then point to the influence of 
Luce Irigaray. Irigaray's radical reworking of Lacan and her work as an analyst 
~learly position her within a psychoanalytic tradition. I believe that Irigaray, at 
least in her earlier work, also overcame this Lacanian influence. I am interested 
in one aspect of her work, drawn from Speculum of the Other Woman: 27 the way 
in which she radically rethinks the relationship between self and other, such that 
and Littlefield, 2000a). 
24 'I identified myself as a left Hegelian with strong socialist commitments from the time I was a 
teenager. .. ' Cornell (2000a) p. 2. 
25 P. Florence, 'Towards the Domain of Freedom: Interview with Drucilla Cornell' Women's 
Philosophy Review, No. 17, 1997, p. 24. 
26 Florence ( 1997) p. 25. 
27 L. Irigaray, Speculum ofthe Other Woman (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985d). 
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: self is not defined by what is not-self. I will return to explain this point in 
>re detail in Chapter 2. 
A history of the literature would not be complete without mentioning the 
:hies of care' that has developed from the influential work of Carol Gilligan.28 
tis work has been used to attack perspectives that view social relations in terms 
·contract, both social contract theory and actual contracts, in favour of thinking 
1out the relationship between mother and child as a potential model for social 
teraction.29 Gilligan links empathy and caring with the 'feminine'. She tries to 
lVert the priority attributed to traditionally 'female' and 'male' positions, as 
elational' and 'isolated' selves, respectively. The process of separating self and 
ther is viewed as taking place within childhood to produce these 'relational' or 
solated' selves. This can be contrasted with the theoretical frameworks that I 
vill be looking at in Chapter 2.30 
One work that is not mentioned by Naffine and Owens is the work of Carol 
)mart. In the UK, the influential work of Carol Smart/ 1 draws upon her reading 
1f Foucault to illustrate how women are 'constructed' by the way in which they 
tre discussed in legal cases. Smart raises two different theoretical issues: whether 
t is worth feminists trying to engage with law at all and whether there should be 
mch a discipline as feminist jurisprudence. Smart's analysis has some common 
features with that ofNaffine and Owens and I will respond to these points below. 
Naffine and Owens' emphasis upon language and upon, what they describe 
as, the 'open' meaning of what it is to be a 'woman' brings them up to date and is 
28 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
29 V. Held 'Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View' in S.M. Okin and J. Mansbridge, eds, 
Feminism: Volume One (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1994). 
30 See also C. Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of 
Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 1998a) pp. 206-208. 
31 C. Smart, Feminism and the Power ofthe Law (London: Routledge, 1989). 
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:d to situate their own work: they are concerned with 'the meamng or 
1struction of law's subject- the legal person. ' 32 Throughout their book there is 
~nsion between: ( 1) what they call 'sexing the law', the phrase used to describe 
:ir 'method' of recognising the way in which sexist assumptions about women 
rmeate the operation of law; and (2) ensuring that, in employing this 'method', 
~y do not perpetuate sexism by reinforcing such stereotyping in their analysis. 
Problem with the dominant approach to Feminist Legal 
heory 
her review of the current state of feminist legal theory, Joanne Conaghan 
~presses concern about the influence of poststructuralism.33 She argued that, 
The political implications of what has become known as 'the critique of 
essentialism' in feminism are potentially far-reaching. Not only does it produce 
disillusionment within feminism with what has proved to be a valuable political 
asset, woman-centredness, it also threatens to strip feminism of its political 
constituency because it appears that no shared identity exists to unifY women and 
justifY their political grouping.34 
his echoes some earlier responses to poststructuralism within feminist theory. 35 
1 contrast with the theoretical positions I want to discuss, I do not believe that 
,acaman psychoanalysis or Derridean deconstruction, in particular, offers 
ufficient resources to open up the way in which the self can be thought. 36 
fowever, it is interesting to note how often feminist legal theorists who employ 
hese perspectives manage to circumvent their constraints. This has been 
2 Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 6. 
3 This is a broad term that includes a number of different theoretical perspectives. My aim is not 
o focus upon different positions that come under this umbrella term. 
4 J. Conaghan, 'Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law' in Journal of Law and 
>ociety Vol. 27, No.3, 2000, p. 367. 
5 See for example, C. Di Stefano, 'Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity and 
)ostmodemism' in L.J. Nicolson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990); S. 
3ordo, Feminism, Postmodemism and Gender-Scepticism' in Nicolson (1990) pp. 133-156. For a 
1seful analysis of these perspectives see A. Phillips, Democracy and Difference (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1993). 
16 See, for example, Jardine who argues that the position of 'Woman' is employed as a metaphor 
in a manner that colonises the position of actual women. A.A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of 
Woman and Modernity (Cornell University Press, 1985). My aim is not to assess 
poststructuralisrn but to use a different point of departure to examine other ways of thinking about 
the self and personhood and to critically examine individualism. 
13 
lieved by the adoption of the following strategies: firstly, some writers 
1tinue with some very useful work - for example, analyses of legal cases 
ich show injustice to women - whilst simply couching their arguments in the 
lguage of poststructuralism, with warnings that the term "women' is used 
ategically. 37 In particular, there has been some fascinating analysis of the way 
which the sexed body is treated within law that does not rely upon its broadly 
tted philosophical position.38 Secondly, there are theorists who engage with 
tcan and Derrida and who radically reuse their work to produce original 
1sitions of their own. I would maintain that both Cornell and Irigaray, in 
fferent ways, fall within this category and I will be considering Cornell's 
sponse to the equality/difference debate in detail in Chapter 3. 
The main theme of many of the chapters in Naffine and Owens' book take 
Le form of the worry that Conaghan detects in other work: that when they 
escribe women's interaction with law they will be read as perpetuating a 
articular view of women as a category or committing the sin of essentialism. 
Jaffine and Owens express this central theme in the following way: 
many of these essays are explicitly concerned about feminism's apparent 
limitations, especially its tendency to work with simple oppositions (male and 
female; masculine and feminine) which feminism often condemns and yet 
reproduces in the very act of condemnation. 39 
\s I will explain in the next section, I do not believe that this is a necessary 
imitation, neither within feminism nor within philosophy. I think that it is a trap 
hat occurs because of the adoption of a particular theoretical perspective derived 
rom deconstruction. This can be illustrated by looking at O'Donovan's40 uneasy 
iistinction between the feminist method of 'sexing the law'- i.e. by showing the 
17 For example, K. O'Donovan, 'With Sense, Consent or Just Con: Legal Subjects in the 
Discourse of Autonomy' in Naffine and Owens (1997) pp. 47-64. 
18 For example, A. Hyde, Bodies of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
19 Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 7. 
40 O'Donovan (1997) pp. 47-64. 
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umptions about men and women that are made within legal cases - and the 
lorsement of these categories of male and female as natural and fixed. 
Donovan produces an interesting analysis of the meaning of 'consent' in legal 
:elaw by examining a paradox: under the doctrine of coverture, women were 
:wed as able to consent to enter into the marriage contract which then removed 
~ir ability to refuse to consent to have sex with their husbands. She links this to 
:onsideration of contemporary medical case law in which women's consent was 
emed to be unnecessary by the courts. 
This consideration of the way in which consent has been viewed as 
oblematic with regard to women has much in common with Carole Pateman · s 
.rlier analysis of women's position within contemporary liberalism,41 which I 
scuss in Chapters 5 and 6. However, O'Donovan frames this useful analysis 
ith the cautious note that, 
My substantive position is that a methodology of distinguishing ['sex' and 'gender'] 
may be useful for certain purposes. I accept, however, the views of theorists who 
refuse such a distinction and argue that persons, regardless of biology, are cultural 
products.42 
1'Donovan cites a paper by Nicola Lacey,43 who similarly describes herself as 
rishing to contribute to, 
a feminism which recognises the problematic status of the category 'woman' 
without making her disappear; which engages with the feminine as a construct, yet 
as a construct which has enormous social power.44 
1 Pateman has addressed the issue of consent in much of her work. She addresses O'Donovan's 
oncems in an earlier paper, C. Pateman, 'Women and Consent' in Political Theory, Vol. 8, 1980, 
'P· 149-168. Reprinted in C. Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Stanford: Stanford University 
•ress, 1989a) pp. 71-89. . 
z O'Donovan (1997) p. 49. It is this approach to 'biology' and 'culture' that Oyama takes Issue 
vith, to be discussed in the next chapter. 
3 N. Lacey, 'Feminist Legal Theory Beyond Neutrality' in Current Legal Problems, Vol. 48, 
995, pp. 1-38. 
4 N. Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart 
>ublishing, 1998) p. 14. 
15 
separating 'feminist method' from her substantive arguments O'Donovan 
ces a move that is effectively the same as that of Gayatri Spivak. 45 Spivak 
ues for the employment of 'strategic essence'. This is the assumption that it is 
essary to talk about women as a category in order to make claims on behalf of 
men, whilst recognising that there is no fixed identity that can be described as 
taining to 'woman'. In an interview46 she describes a conflict between wanting 
be a 'pure deconstructionist' and to attack sexism. In other words, the only 
,y that she felt that she could attack sexism was to put aside her theoretical 
rity. I do not believe that this choice is a necessary one. Philosophy holds more 
;ources than deconstruction in order to address this problem. 
1y Response 
is important to separate the different strands of the argument, that there is a 
mger in discussing women as a group, because the less convincing positions are 
tielded from criticism by inclusion with more compelling arguments, which 
1rry with them less drastic implications for thinking about women as a category. 
irstly, I want to outline the uncontentious argument. Naffine and Owens point 
ut that feminists, such as Angela Harris47 and Patricia Williams48, argue that this 
1niversal' view of women does not recognise the experience of black women. 
'his is a powerful critique, not least because it employs the same argument - that 
be universal position marginalises difference - that feminists have used to 
:ritique both law and philosophy. From the 1980s, the concern has been that the 
5 G.C. Spivak 'Criticism, Feminism and the Institution' in S. Harasym, ed., The Post-Colonial 
~ritic (London: Routledge, 1990) pp. 1-16. Spivak's position has subsequently changed, see G.C. 
;pivak, 'In a Word' in G.C. Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (London: Routledge, 1993) 
>p. 1-23. 
6 Spivak (1990). 
7 A. Harris, 'Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory' in Stanford Law Review Vol. 42, 
l990, pp. 581-616. 
8 p. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1991 ). 
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~riences of white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual women have been 
ved as the paradigm case within feminism, just as men have been viewed as 
universal example of selfhood. It was argued that this has the effect of closing 
m the space in which women's differences can be expressed. I think that this 
compelling argument but that it tends to be confused with arguments that do 
follow from it. For example, Naffine and Owens run a number of arguments 
ether when they comment that 'Such feminists destabilise the category of 
oman". ' 49 I will argue that there are alternative models, from diverse areas of 
1temporary philosophy, that avoid the current concerns about talking about 
1men as a group. This does not mean that sensitivity to women's differences is 
t important when discussing women, merely that there are some concerns that 
>men have in common at a particular time. 5° 
In Chapter 2, I will expand upon the argument that it is unnecessary to 
~ve from a position in which only the universal category of selves/ humans/ 
:rsons can be discussed, of which men are the best example, to the view that it 
impossible to talk of any category. Again, it is necessary to stress that this does 
)t mean that the marginalisation of differences does not remain potentially 
~oblematic. However, the response to this problem must be one of historical 
~nsitivity to the question of which differences are politically relevant in a 
articular practical situation. This cannot be predicted theoretically before hand. 
A similar point can be made with regard to Carol Smart's arguments, 
erived from her reading of Foucault. She argues that feminist effort to reform 
1e law may be misplaced. This follows from Smart's analysis of the discourse 
'Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 5. 
1 For the argument that the insights of second wave feminism, such as the challenge to the 
ublic/private distinction and the insistence that housework is real work, are useful despite the 
oncems about difference that are emphasised by feminists who are worried by talk of women's 
essence' see, S.M. Okin, 'Families and Feminist Theory: Some Past and Present Issues· in H.L 
~elson, ed., Feminism and Families (London: Routledge, 1997) pp. 13-26. 
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Lit, and treatment of, women within legal judgments and within the broader 
ll process, for example by lawyers and police. She argues that these are so 
imental to women that caution is needed when seeking a legal solution and 
. it may be more constructive to focus upon direct action. 51 Again, I believe 
:this problem is not one that can be dictated in advance by theory. 
This is the position of Bottomley and Conaghan,S2 who also employ the 
rk of FoucauW3 but draw a different conclusion from that of Smart. They 
.ue that sometimes it is impossible to theorise further about a political issue 
l that the only way forward is action. Whilst the way in which law operates 
lY make it difficult to institute change,S4 this is something that can only be 
derstood 'on the ground' and is not static. Similarly, I agree with Ralph 
ndland's55 response to Smart when he argues that it is necessary to be strategic 
out the engagement with law. 
~minists in Philosophy 
:minist philosophers work within a traditional which has been hostile to 
omen, a fact that is equally true in law and in the sciences. Within the discipline 
~philosophy today, feminist theory is more marginal and controversial than it is 
ithin other disciplines in the social sciences. The response to this cannot be to 
we women refuse to take part in philosophy after years of exclusion, nor can 
For example, Women's Aid supports battered women in practical ways rather than appealing to 
w. This is because of contingent problems with the English law. There are empirical studies to 
dicate how law could be improved, see for example, H. Johnson, 'Rethinking Survey Research' 
R.E. Dobash and R. Dobash, eds., Rethinking Violence Against Women (London: Sage, 1998) 
). 23-51. This is not the same as precluding the use of law on the basis of a theoretical position. 
A. Bottomley and J. Conaghan 'Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy' in Bottomley and 
onaghan (1993) pp. 1-5. 
M. Foucault and G. Deleuze, 'Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between Michel 
oucault and Gilles Deleuze' in D.F. Bouchard, ed., Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
elected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault (London: Cornell University Press, 1980) pp. 
05-217. 
Mossman ( 1986) pp. 30-52. 
R. Sandland, 'Between "Truth" and "Difference": Poststructuralism, Law and the Power of 
eminism' in Feminist Legal Studies Vol. 3, No.1, 1995, pp. 3-47. 
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1en philosophers once involved in the discipline ignore the way in which 
aen have been positioned within philosophical frameworks. Feminist 
osophy has had to work within this tradition whilst undermining, and moving 
)rward, from within. It is impossible to stand outside a culture and to start 
in. Failure to address philosophical questions would not mean that we could 
: without theoretical assumptions because practice cannot avoid the use of 
cepts. To reject philosophy would simply mean that these theoretical beliefs 
~e not being questioned. 
One way in which women have been marginalised within philosophy has 
ived from the way in which they have been positioned as commentators on 
ne masters' work rather than as theorists working within and yet reworking 
s tradition. Penelope Deutscher56 has traced the way in which particular 
1men philosophers, such as Clemence Ramnoux and Sara Kofman, were 
scribed as commentators upon a man's work. She points to a further twist. 
ven that the women discussed actually produced their own original work, they 
~re then described as 'bad commentators' rather than recognised as original. As 
)mell comments, 
I think part of what we are up against is the historical fact of the exclusion of 
women from philosophy, which has nothing to do in my mind with any natural 
characteristics of the feminine mind, but simply with imposed, brutally imposed, 
exclusion. As we get to the point - if we are getting to the point - where women can 
place themselves in philosophy, then what we would hopefully see is more women 
engaging enough in disidentification, so that we will no longer have to spend our 
whole life labelled as a follower of a particular man. 57 
defend the view that both continental and analytic political/ legal philosophy 
m provide resources for feminism- just as both need feminist theory to show 
J historical (and contingent) blind spots within their theoretical frameworks. In 
P. Deutscher, '"Imperfect Discretion": Interventions into the History of Philosophy by 
wentieth-Century French Women Philosophers' in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 
ol. 15, No.2, 2000b, pp. 160-180. 
Florence (1997) p. 24. 
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respect, I agree with the view of Fricker and Homsby,58 as expressed in their 
)duction of an anthology of analytic philosophy, 
People sometimes suppose that 'feminist philosophy' must either name a subject 
area - as, say, 'political philosophy' does - or else stand for something that is 
meant to supplant philosophy. But at least as we understand 'feminist philosophy', 
it stands for philosophy informed by feminism; and feminism has different sorts of 
relevance as it impinges on different philosophical subject areas.59 
I will illustrate by examining contemporary theory, the fact that the position 
.vomen produces a blind spot for a number of theoretical frameworks can be 
wed constructively. The question: 'what would it be to think of the self in 
ys which do not view women as an aberration?' can open up new ways of 
1king. In other words, I believe that feminist philosophers can improve 
llosophy, not simply by highlighting the way in which women provide a weak 
int for certain views of ourselves and law, but by producing better concepts 
::l better models. This does not merely involve adding women into already 
isting frameworks. This is not possible if the framework depends upon either 
~ exclusion or the ambivalent treatment of women. It is also necessary to avoid 
~ opposite error: producing an image of a self or of personhood that renders 
ale bodies as monstrous or unintelligible. This would be to invert the mistake 
'those perspectives which has viewed women in such a way . 
. hapter Summaries 
start by discussing the concept of self, by bringing together the work of three 
tlilosophers from different areas of contemporary philosophy: Oyama, Clark and 
attersby. This allows me to draw out common threads which I view as useful to 
1ink about the self. I return to these broad themes in later chapters to compare 
1em with other views of self. In addition, I examine the meaning of 
M. Fricker and J. Hornsby, 'Introduction' in M. Fricker and J. Hornsby, The Cambridge 
'ompanion to Feminism in Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Fricker and Hornsby (2000) p. 4. 
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~ntialism' to consider potentially more productive frameworks for feminist 
1 theory than that of poststructuralism. 
In Chapter 3, I tum from ontological views of self to legal personhood, in 
icular the work of Cornell. This is considered in the context of her arguments 
trding tort law, the civil obligations that we are deemed to owe each other. 
ilst Cornell has been classified as a poststructuralist, her conceptual 
nework, which radically reworks Kant and Rawls, incorporates the work of 
:an whilst not relying upon it. Cornell suggests an answer to the problem of 
mlity/difference, arguing that women must be added into law as persons with 
hts. To avoid the problem that this 'person' will be viewed as traditionally 
lle she argues that what it is to be a person should be left open. 
The starting point for Cornell's work is the use of rights, which has been 
acked by a number of feminists. 60 I do not focus upon this objection but draw 
t the implications of her work for a legal test. I agree with Cornell, rather than 
garay, that women should not be added into law as women, a move which I 
ew as potentially regressive. 
In Chapter 4, I continue the discussion of tort law, by employing the work 
~ Ewald. I argue that, despite the fact that his work is focused upon the 
1plications of insurance within France, his broader analysis of the techniques 
nployed in the management of risk and use of the Foucauldian concept of 
)Vemmentality (the 'conduct of conduct')61 provide important ways to think 
For example, E. Kingdom, What's Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law 
~dinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991); Smart (1989) pp. 138-159. Cornell recognises 
1at, 'rights are only as good as the people who enforce them', Florence (1997) p. 14. 
M. Foucault, 'The Subject and Power' in H.L Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, eds., Michel Foucault: 
eyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982) pp. 220-221. 
>erhaps the equivocal nature ofthe term conduct is one ofthe best aids for coming to terms with 
1e specificity of power relations. For to 'conduct' is at the same time to 'lead' others (according 
> mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a 
tore or less open field of possibilities. The translator notes that 'Foucault is playing on the 
ouble meaning of conduire- to lead or to drive and se conduire- to behave or conduct oneself, 
rhence Ia conduite, conduct or behaviour. Foucault (1982) p.220. 
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t the actual operation of English tort law. I adapt Ewald's work to the 
mon law and examine it from a feminist perspective. Again, the paradoxical 
tion of women can be used constructively. I draw a link between 'possessive 
vi dualism' - the view of the self as initially separate from others, owner of 
1er abilities and owing nothing to society for these abilities - and the image 
he self that Ewald criticises. I then return to consider the extent to which 
nell can avoid assimilation into this view of personhood, such that her 'open' 
N of personhood is understood merely as the possessive individual. 
The historically paradoxical position of women with regard to possessive 
ividualism is then considered in more detail in the rest of the thesis. In 
:tpter 5, I focus upon Carole Pateman's reading of Hobbes in The Sexual 
ntract, 62 which brings together an analysis of the social contract, the marriage 
1tract and employment contracts. I want to take up Pateman's concerns with 
: 'traditional' marriage contract, which she characterises as operating between 
40-1970, in order to consider the contemporary position of marriage contracts, 
Lployment contracts and welfare. Pateman's critique takes on a contemporary 
evance in the context of feminist calls for the extension of contractualism63 and 
~ development of further medical opportunities for the use of parts of women's 
This discussion is continued in Chapter 6 which looks in more detail at the 
eaning of possessive individualism (self-ownership or property in the person). 
Chapter 6, I place Pateman's work alongside Marxist concerns about 
C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988). 
For example, D. Dickenson, Property, Women and Politics: Subjects or Objects? (Cambridge: 
)lity, 1997); D. Dickenson, 'The New Contractualism?' in Women's Philosophy Review No. 20, 
)98, pp. 108-111; A. Yeatman, 'Contract, Status and Personhood' in G. Davis, B. Sullivan, A. 
eatman, The New Contractualism? (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1997) pp. 39-56; A. Yeatman, 
nterpreting Contemporary Contractualism' in M. Dean and B. Hindess, Governing Australia: 
'udies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
~98) pp. 227-241. 
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essive individualism. The historical reason for women· s paradoxical position 
respect to possessive individualism is examined. Again, the aim is to use 
1en' s ambivalent position productively at a time when the government is 
ussing the 'work/life balance' 64 and the traditional models of employment 
:racts and marriage contracts have broken down. 
Finally, I draw upon previous chapters to think about the future 
elopment of the 'sexual contract' in the context of the proposed 'new 
tractualism', the employment of 'contract' as a technique of government, and 
relationship between women and the welfare state. I return to the link that 
; drawn between possessive individualism and the image of what it is to be a 
]person envisaged within Ewald's work on risk. This entails an examination 
the ways in which women's tradition position fails to fit, neither within 
;sessive individualism nor within Ewald's analysis of it. I consider the extent 
which women are now treated as possessive individuals and whether their 
ditional position allows for the rejection of this model, for example by being 
istant to treatment as a commodity. 
utting Across Disciplines 
uch of this work cuts across different subject boundaries, not simply those of 
ilosophy and law, in order to discuss the self, person and individual in the 
ntext of the law of obligations. This is a move which I defend on the grounds 
at it is productive to be able to transplant a problem in order to think about it 
fferently. Whilst this does hold the potential danger of misreading a tradition or 
· drawing together broad terms that have different meanings within those 
fferent approaches, I think that it is worth the risk. As Oyama65 points out, in 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/faimess/fore.htm 
See for example, Oyama (2000b) p. 2. 
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analysis of the key terms employed in the nature/culture debate within the 
)Sophy of biology, the ability to talk at cross purposes is not confined to 
rdisciplinary theory. 
Within Chapter 2, the relationship between self/other arises from within the 
itions of continental philosophy but is also discussed employing arguments 
n philosophy of science. This in tum can be subdivided in the philosophy of 
ogy (Oyama) and philosophy of cognition (Clark). In Chapter 3, Cornell's 
1plex analysis of personhood itself engages with both continental philosophy 
contemporary Anglo-American political theory. In Chapter 4, Ewald's 
1cauldian analysis is employed to think about tort law, Cornell's work and 
:sessive individualism. 
Issues of possessive individualism raise concerns that have been widely 
'ated within the Anglo-American tradition. In Chapter 5, Pateman's reading of 
bbes is considered in the rich context of the contemporary feminist theory 
m Australia66 and, in Chapter 6, this continues to be discussed in the context of 
tglo-American debates between analytic Marxism and libertarianism, in the 
,rk of Cohen and that ofNozick. 
The legal process involved in the law of obligations sets the context for this 
amination of the self, person and individual. The focus is initially upon tort law 
d then upon contract law; upon the practical impact of the operation of 
ntemporary English law. Many of the theorists whose work is used have 
scussed law from the perspective of other jurisdictions: the US, in the case of 
)ffiell, and France, in the work of Ewald. I discuss their insights and the extent 
which they are applicable to English law. 
For a collection of, and discussion on, contemporary Australian feminist philosophy, see 
;patia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, Special Issue: Going Australian Reconfiguring 
~minism and Philosophy, Vol. 15, No 2, 2000. 
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To concentrate upon an area that has been classified as 'private~ law, the 
of tort and contract~ I have ignored traditional legal subject demarcations 
:re I have found it fruitful to do so. For example, I have highlighted some of 
curiosities that emerge when comparing the marriage contract with the 
'loyment contract. 67 I am lead by my theoretical discussion of selves, persons 
individuals, with law merely setting the context. My aim has not been to 
te a thesis in law and to produce particular recommendations for legislation. 
tead, I want to intervene in a theoretical debate. Given that practice is always 
ory laden, my aim has been to find resources within philosophy that are 
1ductive of better ways of thinking about the self and legal subject and to 
1ck individualism. 
I have not discussed in detail the potential overlap between tort law and 
1tract law,68 nor the law of restitution.69 Tort law70 is concerned with those 
ties that persons are deemed to owe each other, whereas contract law is 
ncemed with obligations to which the parties have agreed, or to which the 
rties are deemed to have consented. There are often obligations that overlap 
tween tort and contract. So, for example, the parents in so-called 'wrongful 
rth' cases, in which a faulty sterilisation operation leads to the birth of a child, 
LVe sued using the tort of negligence. However, when the operation took place 
a private hospital, there has been litigation for breach of contract arising out of 
e same circumstances. 
A special issue of Feminist Legal Studies on the law of obligations drew a similarly broad view 
·what were involved in obligations. Feminist Legal Studies Special Issue: Law of Obligations, 
ol. 8, No. 1, 2000. 
See, J. Wightman, Contract: A Critical Commentary (London: Pluto Press, 1996) pp. 137-142. 
Restitution is concerned with the reversal of undue enrichment, for example if someone is paid 
ore money than they should have received. For arguments regarding the division between tort, 
mtract and restitution see AS. Burrows, 'Contract, Tort and Restitution: A Satisfactory Division 
·Not?' in Law Quarterly Review Vol. 99, pp. 217-267. For a critical discussion of Burrows' 
Jsition see Wightman ( 1996) pp. 25-26. 
1 have employed the term 'tort law' rather than the 'law of torts' for ease of reference. I am not 
1scussing the question of which term is more appropriate. 
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In Chapter, 3, it is clear that Cornell's legal principles, that are derived 
L her theoretical position, imply more legal changes than those discussed in 
1rea of tort law. However, these can be understood by using the example of 
law without altering her theoretical framework from which they are derived. I 
~ focused upon Cornell's proposals for tort law, to be able to position them 
1in a particular context, in Chapter 4. This opens up a different understanding 
he practical operation of the law, in order to consider Cornell's principles, 
ch are intended to have practical effect. 
Pateman draws a link between the social/sexual contract and her 
~ussions of marriage contracts and employment contracts. I follow her in this 
ard, particularly because I think it is useful to juxtapose these contracts. It is 
:essary to view them as interrelated in order to think about the ways in which 
y are changing after the breakdown of the breadwinner/wife model. 
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Chapter 2: Emergence, Dynamic Systems and 
Identity 
js chapter I want to illustrate what is at stake in Christine Battersby's view of 
:;elf by juxtaposing her contemporary feminist philosophy with work that is 
o.g place within the philosophy of science, in particular the work of Andy 
~k and of Susan Oyama. This does not purport to be a definitive account of 
1 debates but is used simply to draw out some of general approaches to the 
·that I think these theorists have in common, despite the fact that they do not 
age with each others work. I highlight those themes which are potentially 
ful for feminist legal theory. 
To contextualise this aspect of Battersby's work has some parallels with 
own discussion of contemporary science within her book, Phenomenal 
'man: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity. In the chapter 'Her 
dy/Her Boundaries' ,71 she asks why she does not experience herself as being 
e a container, with clear boundaries between her body and the outside world.72 
lis question arises because this way of looking at oneself as a container with 
)Uts and outputs into the separate external world continues to be taken for 
anted, as illustrated by those working within the field of 'cognitive 
mantics' .73 
Battersby considers a number of possible explanations. Amongst these, she 
scusses the idea that her experience reflects a change in attitudes and 
cperience of the self that took place in the West in the twentieth century. This 
Battersby (1998a) pp. 38-60. 
This is a framework evoked by Kant's description of the sublime in which the boundaries ofthe 
1ale) self are threatened by the might of nature but are then re-established by the use of reason. 
Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W.S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) pp. 97-140. 
M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); G. Lakoff, 
'omen, Fire and Dangerous Things (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) both cited in 
attersby (1998a) pp. 40-43. 
27 
trisen, she speculates, because our views of ourselves have been influenced 
move away from reductionism within contemporary science. She points out 
since the 1 914 - 1918 war, there has been a shift away from the privilege 
n to solidity and also from the view of space as a container. The mathematics 
luidity has become more central to the scientific tradition.74 In particular, 
ersby cites the development of the mathematics of topology as precipitating a 
tnking of the distinction between matter and form. This is in keeping with her 
~k on the traditional assumption that can be traced back to Plato, of matter 
is inactive, unable to change itself unless imprinted upon by form. 
:ersby's concern is with the metaphysics that underlies many of these recent 
)logical models, which allows us to think of forms, not as fixed things but as 
porarily stable points in a continuous flow. So, she gives the example of a 
k falling on the ground as being temporally stable because the ground acts as 
attractor' within the topographical field. The book will stay there unless there 
nother attractor (such as me picking it up) or unless the first attractor goes (for 
.mple, the floor collapses). 
The topological model allows us to view fixed forms as only temporarily 
Jle and as interrelated. This allows Battersby to rethink the boundaries of her 
ly in a way that is not that of the standard model and more in keeping with her 
>enence: 
If we think about boundaries, then, from the point of view of the new sciences, the 
boundaries of our bodies need not be thought of as 'three dimensional containers 
into which we put certain things ... and out of which other things emerge'. The 
boundary of my body can be thought of as an event-horizon, in which one form 
(myself) meets its potentiality for transforming itself into another form or forms (the 
not-selt). 75 
is is a self that emerges with otherness and is not cut off from it. She goes on 
attack the image of the self with fixed boundaries, defined against otherness. 
~attersby (1998a) p. 50. 
~attersby ( 1998a) p. 52. 
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Firstly, I want to compare her work with some of the work of Andy Clark, a 
:trcher in the area of 'philosophy/ neuroscience/ psychology' at Sussex 
versity and then with that of Susan Oyama, researcher in psychology in the 
ege of Criminal Justice, New York University. The implications of this for 
will also be drawn out both during the comparison and in more detail at the 
ofthe chapter. 
~ing There' 
ly Clark is concerned with the area of cognition rather than the self. 76 There is 
important distinction here, which will be discussed more fully below. To 
,id confusion, it is worth underlining at this stage that Battersby's project is to 
1ink the self in a way that treats the body and traditional lives of women as the 
m rather than as an aberration. It is not some 'essential' underlying self that is 
covered. The way that we view ourselves emerges within different cultures.77 
discussed in the last chapter, contemporary feminists, including Battersby, 
re detailed the ways in which Western history has taken male bodies and 
~styles as the norm. However, by reading history 'against the grain' it is 
ssible to reveal, revalue and use, other ways of viewing ourselves. 
One of the central themes of Clark's work is resonant with Battersby's 
¥orking of the subject/object divide. To sum up some subtle arguments very 
1dely, he argues that cognition is not 'all in the head'. He describes an 
1ergence of cognitive processes in which it is no longer appropriate to talk 
See, for example, A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again 
"assachusetts: MIT, 1997); A. Clark, Mindware: An Introduction to Philosophy of Cognitive 
fence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 ). 
For discussion of the reworking of the nature/culture debate see 'Feminism, Essentialism and 
w' later in this chapter. 
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1t a mind/environment split. In an article written with David Chalmers, he 
es the following argument: 
Where does the mind stop and the rest ofthe world begin? The question invites two 
standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what 
is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments 
suggesting that the meaning of our words 'just ain't in the head', and hold that this 
externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We 
propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: 
an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving 
cognitive processes.78 (Italics are in the original.) 
illustrates his argument by examining the way in which successful players of 
omputer game (Tetris) manipulate their environment in order to think faster. 
[s approach can be compared to that of Battersby. For Battersby, the 
portance of the fact that the self is embodied foregrounds sexual difference. 
r Clark, concerned with cognition, embodiment is important in producing 
-
:ssy real-time solutions to problems. Counting on your fingers, manipulating 
ur environment to play scrabble - rather than having to spend time imagining 
ange in your head - are all important and yet traditionally ignored aspects of 
lr cognition. 
First and foremost, we must recognize the brain for what it is. Ours are not the 
brains of disembodied spirits conveniently glued into ambulant, corporeal shells of 
flesh and blood. Rather, they are essentially the brains of embodied agents capable 
of creating and exploiting structure in the world.79 (Italics are in the original.) 
h.e fact that Clark is concerned with an organ that has evolved to produce real-
me messy solutions to problems, rather than disembodied rational thought, 
Leans that we rely heavily upon what he calls 'scaffolding', our ability to use the 
~xternal' world so that it is integral to our ability to think. He draws an analogy 
rith dolphins. Dolphins are not physically strong enough to swim at the speeds 
mt they can in fact reach. The trick is that they exploit aquatic eddies, and 
urther, that they actually create pressure gradients in order to do so. This 
lescription should not be read as a description of a controlling subject who 
1 http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/clark.html 
) Clark (1997) p. 220. 
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ly manipulates an external object. It is clear that Clark wants to think about a 
.mic system~ which does not involve such a straightforward separation of 
1 and environment (or~ in other words, subject and object). 
By analogy with the dolphin, people who suffer from Alzheimer's disease 
lage to exist in environments in which they should not, in theory, be able to 
~. They rely upon external prompts to memory such as diaries and 
tographs. This suggests that they are not merely being reminded about the 
~s of meetings but are also reminded 'who they are~- or their place within an 
ternal' system that is not straightforwardly separate from themselves - by 
,tographs of friends etc. In this context, when there is a permanent available 
to memory that is relied upon, Clark supports a remark of Daniel Dennett, 80 
t to steal a diary which acts as part of someone' s memory has more in 
nmon with offences against the person than against property. 
In a more ambitious move, Clark extends this view of 'scaffolding' to 
nsider the broader institutions in which we work. This raises questions about 
~ extent to which he can legitimately move from a discussion about the 
:mipulation of the immediate environment (for immediate problem solving) to 
1at appears to be, in Clark's framework, a potentially politically neutral- or at 
ast undeveloped- approach to institutions. Nevertheless, to be fair, this is not 
e central focus of his work, which is worth considering in detail because of the 
(tent to which it resonates with that of Battersby. 
I have drawn out the following points to show, very broadly, the areas of 
verlap between Clark's analysis of cognition and Battersby's radical reworking 
fthe Kantian self: 
A. Clark, 'Where Brain, Body and World Collide' in Journal of Cognitive Systems Research 
'ol. 1, 1999, p. 14 
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both approaches emphasise the embedded,81 embodied nature of 
ognition/self; 
this results in an image of cognition or behaviour/self that tends to focus 
tpon their emergent properties;82 
linked with this, both are concerned with thinking of cognition/the self as 
lynamic rather than fixed. The idea of dynamic, temporary stability is 
.llustrated by Battersby's analogy of the self/other in dynamic equilibrium as 
being like the water level in a sieve that is dynamically stable because the 
amount of water that runs out is equal to that running into it; 
there is an attack upon the subject/object divide (in Clark's work this is a 
cognition/ environment split) as traditionally conceived and a move to 
characterise the emergent process as one which involves rethinking this 
divide· 83 
' 
within the work of both theorists there is a shift away from the importance of 
envisaging cognition, or the self, in terms of centralised control. This is 
illustrated in Battersby's84 reference to the emergence of self through patterns, 
through repeated habits, for example. It is explicitly implicated in Clark's 
view of the messy real-time solutions that we produce in response to 
['he term 'embedded' should not be confused with the use of the term by communitarians, 
hin recent Anglo-American political theory, who talk about individuals being 'embedded' in 
ture and tradition, generally produced by and for white men. Clark, in contrast, is working 
hin the philosophy of science to discuss the relationship between self and environment in 
tblem solving. For a discussion of the 'liberal communitarian debate' from a feminist 
·spective see E. Frazer and N. Lacey, The Politics ofCommunity: A Feminist Critique ofthe 
'eral-Communitarian Debate (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). Battersby's work can be 
ierstood as thinking about embeddedness that brings in social context but does not lead to 
nmunitarian conclusions. This is discussed below in the section on agency. 
~lark argues that 'the notion of emergence is itself still ill understood' in Clark (2001) p. 112. I 
employing the term as Battersby uses it to evoke the idea of self and other coming into being 
tdually through patterns of relationality that do not occur simply as a result of a split between 
fand other. 
fhis move is also central to Oyama's attack upon the nature/culture divide, to be discuss below. 
~ee for example Battersby (1998a) p. 184. 
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roblems that involve using the environment to such as extent that it cannot 
e separated from the thought process itself. 
These five points are interconnected within the work of both writers. 
('s emphasis upon the way in which cognition should be viewed as ·real-
embodied cognition' leads him to emphasise our use of the environment to 
~problems. His analysis undermines the idea of a distinct boundary between 
:bought processes and our environment. He illustrates his argument about the 
l to consider cognition as 'embedded and embodied' by a scathing attack 
1 attempts to teach robots to think by simply giving them huge amounts of 
rmation. He argues that our (men' s?)85 traditional image of ourselves, as 
biting disembodied reason, has been misguided and is to blame for such an 
~oach to robotics. His alternative approach is to try to produce 'thinking' 86 
)ts by getting them to try to find real-time solutions to embodied problems. 
; move prompts a different approach both to the way in which problems are 
red and to the way that cognition is understood. 
He considers three different ways of thinking about cognition: what he calls 
>mponential approach; the 'catch and toss' approach; and, finally, the one that 
prompted by embodied, embedded thinking, that of 'emergence'. The 
1ponential approach is the traditional way of thinking about cognition, which 
~mpts to understand the complex whole of cognition by looking at its parts to 
,mine how they work. He does not reject this approach on the pragmatic basis 
t he would attempt to use any approach to see what results it will yield. The 
tch and toss' approach goes some way to recognising that cognition is 
bodied and that it takes place within an environment. However, it continues to 
'or the argument that reason was traditionally viewed as male, see G. Lloyd, The Man of 
rson: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1984). 
am not concerned with the question of whether robots can actually think. 
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sider this in a traditional way by focusing upon 'inner processing, inner 
1putation and representations. ' 87 The 'catch and toss' approach continues to 
isage a firm and fixed boundary between the brain and the world. So, the 
rld throws up problems and we catch and throw them back. Clark argues that 
; only makes sense when considering very simple feedback situations. As soon 
the number of feedback processes increase, as in our messy real world when 
need immediate solutions to problems, then this model breaks down. 
He then turns to an 'emergent explanation' of cognition which he illustrates 
ng an example from robotics from Steels. 88 To consider a sexless robot may 
:m some way removed from thinking about Battersby's reworking of Kant to 
nk of a view of self that considers woman as the norm rather than an 
~rration. Indeed, the example of the robot is useful in illustrating what is 
ssing. Robots do not share those aspects of embodiment that Battersby seeks to 
~eground: those that have been historically linked with the female and both 
graded and viewed as superfluous. There is nothing fleshy, for example, about 
·obot. It does not have the 'flab' that Battersby wants to mobilise to think about 
1bodiment in our culture and within the history of Western philosophy; to start 
view women as typical rather than an aberration. 89 
However, I think that there are some useful comparisons to be made in this 
ea of 'emergence'. To illustrate this, consider Clark's use of Steels' work, cited 
•ove. Steels is concerned with the problem of a robot that needs to position 
;elf between two poles in order to recharge itself. The poles are both lit. The 
m-emergent solution would be to give the robot light sensors that can measure 
;; position relative to the poles and a programme to tell it to stand between them. 
Clark ( 1997) p. 106. 
L. Steels, 'The Artificial Life Roots of Artificial Intelligence' in Artificial Life, Vol. 1, No. 1-2. 
•94, pp. 75-110 cited Clark (1997) p. 108. 
Battersby (1998a) p. 14. 
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:mergent solution would be to programme it with the following two 
lViour systems': 1) a phototaxis system that yields a zigzag approach to any 
source; 2) an obstacle avoidance system that makes it tum away from 
Ling it hits. With this in place then the required behaviour simply emerges 
f the program after a few tries. 
To characterise 'emergence', Steels suggests that what is required is the use 
'Ocabulary that does not look at components but at the behaviour of 
egates of these components. This is rejected by Clark on the grounds that this 
ld include the feedback of a hi-fi when this system would be better 
·oached by a componential explanation. In his attempt to characterise 
ergence', Clark substitutes a definition that relies upon the distinction 
veen: (1) 'controlled variables' which track behaviours that can be directly 
tipulated and which represent the componential approach or 'catch and toss' 
roaches to the system; and (2) 'uncontrolled variables' which track 
aviours or propensities that arise from the interaction of multiple parameters 
tend to resist direct and simple manipulation and represent the emergent 
1roach.90 
This move away from the 'catch and toss' model to an image of emergence, 
ich acknowledges the complexity of the dynamic systems, has parallels with 
way in which Battersby shifts the Kantian image of the self. A distinction 
lst be drawn between this analysis of cognition and of the self. It is important 
.t, whilst these positions do produce similarities, they are not confused. It is 
~essary to be careful about the overlap in vocabulary, coming as it does from 
thin different areas of philosophy. In the example drawn from Steels' work in 
Jotics, Clark is talking about the emergence of a particular form of behaviour. 
=lark (1997) p. 110. 
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rsby employs the term (,emergence' to describe a self that emerges out of 
:s of relationality. Battersby's self is described as emerging out of patterns of 
ons and mutual or interlocking dependencies which, over time, come to 
. out the boundary between self and non-self. This involves a rejection of the 
~ that we define ourselves against others (or otherness). What we are, as a 
emerges out of repetition or habits in which the boundary between self and 
r (including other selves but also anything that is not-self) is not fixed; yet a 
net self emerges from this process. Clark's model is also dynamic, to be 
ussed in more detail below. 
Clark does ask the question: 
Does the putative spread of mental and cognitive processes out into the world imply 
some correlative (and surely unsettling) leakage of the self into the local 
surroundings?91 
e, Clark appears to assume the existence of a pre-existent self that then 
·ges with its environment rather than Battersby's image of a self that emerges 
ag with otherness, by patterns of relationality (rather than by a direct split). To 
fair to Clark, he is not focusing upon the concept of self in detail. This can 
) be read as a humorous choice of phrase. 
It is worth considering the difference between Battersby and Clark on this 
lnt in more detail. As Battersby is reworking Kant's analysis of the 
nscendental self from within the Kantian framework, to explain this point it is 
~essary to return to Kant's framework itself. For Kant, the transcendental self 
not a psychological description. The transcendental self is that which persists 
·ough time from moment to moment. For Kant, the transcendental self must be 
~sumed to exist along with the transcendental object, as the (,I' that orders the 
)rid in Euclidean space and linear time. So, to suppose that we have a 
=:lark (1997) p. 216 
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endental self is a logical move rather than a psychological description. 
·sby attacks the kind of disembodied, persistent 'r that Kanf s philosophy 
·es by showing that the position of women provides a weak point within this 
n. Kant's assumption that matter is inactive, permanent and no more than 
mnterpole to the transcendental self, makes it impossible to think of matter 
~an actively reproduce itself. She uses this weakness as the point of 
ture from which to rethink the opposition between the transcendental self 
ranscendental object so as to undermine the image of the body as dead 
ve matter. She envisages an embodied self that persists through time but is 
onstructed in a top-down manner by an 'I' that imposes a space-time 
ure on matter and the world. Linked with this is the image of an emergence 
s self with its other, the boundaries of which are not fixed. 
Clark seems to ask an analogous kind of question about the relationship 
~en self and not -self: 
Does the putative spread of mental and cognitive processes out into the world imply 
some correlative (and surely unsettling) leakage of the self into the local 
surroundings?92 
nswer to his own question is as follows: 
... 'Yes and No.' No, because (as has already been conceded) conscious contents 
supervene on individual brains. But Yes, because such conscious episodes are at 
best snapshots of the self considered as an evolving psychological profile. 
Thoughts, considered only as snapshots of our conscious mental activity, are fully 
explained, I am willing to say, by the current state of the brain. But the flow of 
reason and thoughts, and the temporal evolution of ideas and attitudes, are 
determined and explained by the intimate, complex, continued interplay of brain, 
body and world. 93 
superficial level, the reference to the self as a 'psychological profile' would 
v those, like Nikolas Rose,94 who draw upon Foucault to historically situate 
·k (1997) p. 216 
·k (1997) p. 216 
. for example, N. Rose, 'Assembling the Modem Self in R. Porter, ed., Rewriting the Self: 
·ies from the Renaissance to the Present (London: Routledge, 1997) pp. 224-248 and the 
ript in N. Rose Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free 
iation Books, 1999a) pp. 263-272. 
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terminology. In keeping with the anti-psychiatry movement, Rose is cynical 
: the role of psychology in shaping the way that we view ourselves. 
=>ying psychological terms and analysis. However, it is important to focus 
the point of Clark's argument, which in the last sentence, resonates with 
rsby's position in its rethinking of the traditional subject/object boundary. 
munarise, Clark argues that in complex real world situations, we use the 
onment to such an extent that it is part of the thinking process. It becomes 
of ourselves' as illustrated by his view that its theft should be viewed as 
to an offence against the person. The circumstances involve having to 'use 
tefact' that is 'reliable, present, frequently used and deeply trusted. ' 95 This is 
chological description of how we think which then challenges conventional 
es of what it means to be a self. In contrast, Battersby works with a logical 
m to show that Kant cashes out his framework in such a way as to make the 
~endental self stable but which renders him incapable of thinking an 'I' that 
tbodied - and selves that are born (to women) in a material (fleshy) way. 
~ver, in keeping with Clark's view of cognition, Battersby's reworking of 
~If also involves rethinking the boundaries between what is to be classed as 
::>f the self and what is other to the self. A distinct self does emerge but 
gh patterns of relationality rather than in opposition from its other. Battersby 
what would happen if we thought identity in terms that did not make it always 
spatially and temporally oppositional to other entities?96 
: argues that the best way of viewing emergent phenomena is through the 
f Dynamical Systems theory. This is an approach which treats any source of 
11ce (here, the environment and the organism) together as one system and 
k (1997) p. 217. 
ersby (1998a) p. 2. 
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at their mutual evolution. It is this approach, that mathematically describes 
ns of actual and potential unfolding, that Battersby discusses in her 
:nee to topology. 
Clark discusses the best way of thinking about the question of emergent 
tion, in which the subject/object boundary is problematized, in the 
Ning way: 
In such cases [of emergence] ... we ideally require an explanatory framework that 
( 1) is well suited to modeling both organismic and environmental parameters and 
(2) models them both in a uniform vocabulary and framework, thus facilitating an 
understanding of the complex interactions between the two. A framework that 
invokes computationally characterized, information-processing homunculi is not, 
on the face of it, an ideal means of satisfying these demands.97 
emphasis upon the creation of a uniform vocabulary and framework, m 
h to discuss the thinking self and environment, starts with the assumption 
a subject/object split is not useful. It radically undermines the notion of a 
l boundary between subject and object and between self and its other. Whilst 
:rsby' s image of the self does have boundaries, these emerge, along with the 
and its other, from patterns of relationality. As part of the same move, 
~rsby attacks the image of a self with the body as a container providing a 
l boundary against its environment. 
Although she is not cited by Battersby, this move can be illustrated by 
idering the work of Polly Matzinger.98 Matzinger is a biologist whose work 
mmunology has successfully undermined the simple idea that there is a 
other boundary that is policed by the immune system. Such a straightforward 
would have to explain how the body could change, for example, in 
escence, and still recognise what is to be classified as 'self. Instead, 
?:inger has argued for a model in which the immune system responds to 
lrk (1997) p. 113. 
Matzinger. 'The Real Function of the Immune System: or Tolerance and the Four Ds 
ger, Death, Destruction and Distress)' http://cmmg.biosci.wayne.edu/asg/polly.html 
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:ural cell death. This model does not depend upon a rigid self/other 
dary, whilst recognising that there is such a thing as the self that emerges, 
~ with its other. This is analogous to Battersby's move in refusing to view 
embodied) self as something that has fixed boundaries that are defined by 
is excluded. From this perspective both Kant and Lacan are attacked for 
1g up models in which the self can only emerge by setting boundaries against 
)Utside world, or by rejection of the mother/other. This approach is also 
ed in Oyama's work in the context of her radical reworking of the 
re/culture debate, to be discussed below. 
:tersby and Oyama 
1re discussing Oyama's work, it is useful to return to the points that Battersby 
Clark have in common, whilst repeating the health warning that they are 
sing upon different things: the self and cognition respectively. I argued that, 
:Ollowing points represent broadly common themes within Clark's analysis of 
uti on and Battersby's reworking of the Kantian self: 
there is an emphasis upon the embedded, embodied nature of cognition/self; 
this results in an image of cognition/self that tends to focus upon their 
emergent properties; 
linked with this, both are concerned with thinking of cognition/the self as 
dynamic rather than fixed; 
there is an attack upon the subject/object divide (in Clark's work this is 
cognition/ environment split) as traditionally conceived and a move to 
characterise the emergent process as one which involves rethinking this 
divide; 
there is a shift away from the importance of centralised control. 
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To discuss the relationship between Battersby's approach to the self and 
. of Oyama to the radical rethinking of the nature/culture debate, it is useful to 
r in mind these general points of overlap in approach. Oyama shares a broadly 
ilar framework, in a different area of concern. This can be characterised as an 
lCk upon the boundaries between subject and object; a move which involves 
linking this relationship in a way that is attentive to the emergence of a self 
d a subject)99 whose boundaries are not defined by what is outside it. This 
>roach attempts to produce a theoretical framework in which due weight is 
en to the complexity of the emergence of the self. 
Further, both Battersby and Oyama share an explicit rejection of 
omorphism and the form/matter distinction. They make the point that the 
age of 'form' as the active ingredient that works upon 'matter' - which has 
~n viewed as passive and unable to change itself- has been linked with sexual 
ference and images of women's passivity from the start. Battersby100 critiques 
)tinus' Aristotelian reading of Plato in which the chora is (female) passive 
Ltter that can only be imprinted by the male form. 
Oyama argues that the terms in which the nature/culture debate has been 
1yed out have been misconceived. The opponents within the debate have 
1ded to counter genetic determinism with environmental determinism. Oyama 
~ues that the subtlety of development of any organism over time cannot be 
derstood by simply viewing nature as a fixed entity represented by genes that 
ve built in instructions for development. The novelty of her approach, which 
1\.s outlined in Chapter 1, I want to keep apart the terms self, subject, person and individual 
;ause they are used in different contexts. 
Battersby (1998a) pp. 108-109. This is also developed by Butler: Butler (1993) p. 14. For my 
.cussion on the relationship between Butler and Cavarero on this point see, J. Richardson, 
eyond Equality or Difference: Sexual Difference in the work of Adriana Cavarero' in Feminist 
gal Studies Vol. VI, No. 1, 1998b, p. 117. For a detailed discussion of the nuances of 
istotle's biology and feminist critiques, see C.A. Freeland, 'Nourishing Speculation: A Feminist 
ading of Aristotelian Science' in B.A. Bar On, ed., Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist 
a(iings in Plato and Aristotle (New York: State University ofNew York, 1994) pp. 145-187. 
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~scribes as 'developmental systems theory', is that she is also critical of 
who argue that the environment, and not nature. causes our behaviour. She 
s for a more radical understanding of the debate and a different 
standing of what is meant by 'nature'. 
Recall that Clark makes the following point with regard to the best way of 
ng about the question of emergent cognition in which the subject/object 
lary is problematized: 
In such cases [of emergence] ... we ideally require an explanatory framework that 
(1) is well suited to modeling both organismic and environmental parameters and 
(2) models them both in a uniform vocabulary and framework, thus facilitating an 
understanding of the complex interactions between the two. A framework that 
invokes computationally characterized, information-processing homunculi is not, 
on the face of it, an ideal means of satisfYing these demands. 101 
ugh she is not concentrating upon cognition but upon development in 
al, Oyama also considers the ways in which the reworking of the boundaries 
)ject and object (self and environment) result in a reconceptualisation of the 
~ent process. Strikingly, she speaks in similar terms, rejecting the image of a 
tlised control system - in this context envisaged by the genes (or even, 
gh what is envisaged as a 'different channel': memes). She asks, 
Why should there be such striking parallels between the problem of the subject in 
developmental psychology and the problem of conceptualizing biological, 
especially genetic, processes? In both cases, a single source of organizing 
(information-processing) power seems necessary, so that the cognitivist subject and 
the homunculoid gene play similar roles in the dramas of cognitive and ontogenetic 
formation. 102 
acking both models, she undermines both the notion of centralised control 
hylomorphic approach that envisages the top-down imprinting of selves by 
genes or by society. This model of genes, as producing a top-down imprint 
the only model of genes available. In her recent edited collection Cycles of 
k (1997) p. 113. 
rna (2000a) pp. 172-173. 
42 
ingency, 103 Oyama brings together papers from geneticists and others who 
broadly within 'developmental systems theory' and reject the idea that 
:ics concerns the passing on of 'master molecules' .104 Again, she points out 
there are multiple causes for development, the subtleties of which are not 
Lred by drawing a distinction between genes and everything else, which is 
1ed together as 'environment'. In different ways, Eva Neumann-Held105 and 
.y Moss 106 discuss the change in the way in which the gene is understood in 
1gy and the philosophy of biology. Both, in different ways, provide accounts 
h move the debate forward by rejecting the image of the gene as a 
mnism of top-down imprinting that is necessary to give form to matter, a 
~ that is unnecessary when matter is no longer viewed as inert. 
!ncy 
lst not wishing to neglect the fact that Battersby, Oyama and Clark are 
essing different issues in different areas of philosophy, and whilst not 
ing to collapse the distinctions between them, I think that they share a very 
d, generalised approach - as indicated by the list of five central themes 
in this framework. This suggests a useful perspective on the legal practice of 
~ations that I want to discuss. The question of agency is relevant here. 107 
~rsby and Oyama explicitly deal with this question in similar ways. This 
res from their concern to think of the emergence of the self that questions 
t has previously been designated as 'inside and outside', self and non-self or 
Oyama, P.E. Griffiths and R.D. Grey, eds., Cycles a/Contingency: Developmental Systems 
~volution (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001 ). 
rama et al (200 1) p. 1. 
M. Neumann-Held, 'Let's Talk about Genes: The Process Molecular Gene Concept and Its 
~xt' in Oyama et al (200 1) pp. 69-84. 
Moss, 'Deconstructing the Gene and Reconstructing Molecular Developmental Systems' in 
1a et al (200 1) pp. 85-97. 
1r arguments that agency may become less relevant to the law of tort as a result of potential 
s to no fault compensation, see Chapter 4. 
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1n and environment. This challenge to these generally accepted boundaries 
1ces a different way of conceptualising the question of agency, amongst 
·s. It is linked to the rejection of the form/matter distinction and the image of 
ltralised command structure. 
One of the central arguments made by critical legal theorists has been to 
rmine the way in which lawyers have employed the technique of abstracting 
ndividual from their social circumstances. Alan Norrie, 108 for example, has 
ted to the way in which the criminal law has operated so as to exclude 
1ssion of the social context by, for example, separating 'direct intention to 
)fill an act' from 'the motivation to perform if. This means that the court is 
:emed only with the question of whether or not the defendant 'intended' to 
i.e. that it was not an accident. It rules out any discussion of the social 
ext which motivated the accused, for example stealing bread because of 
~er. This social context is only considered relevant to the question of 
gation of punishment and not of whether or not the offence was committed. 
rie, drawing upon work ofE.P. Thompson109 and Douglas Hay, 110 traces this to 
~ole of the courts in trying to stifle - or at least avoid inciting - civil unrest in 
eighteenth century. He argues for a reworking of a Kantian framework in 
~r to discuss social context without simply dismissing personal agency or 
ne. 
My concern is not with crime but with the law of obligations. Nevertheless, 
question of agency is relevant. The refusal to delineate fixed boundaries 
. Norrie, 'Criminal Law' in I. Grigg-Spall and P. Ireland, The Critical Lawyers' Handbook 
don: Pluto Press, 1992) pp. 76-83; A. Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and Justice: A 
tiona! Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) . 
. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
'). 
1. Hay, 'Property, Authority and Criminal Law' in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J.G. Rule, E.P. 
npson and C. Winslow, eds., Albion's Fatal Tree (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977). 
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en the self and its supposed 'outside' offers a new approach to the law of 
ttions. It is therefore worth considering how the relationship between the 
n and his/her social circumstances can be reframed using this perspective. 
rsby describes agency in terms of feedback structures. She argues that it is 
Jle to think of agency within her model. This is no longer to be considered 
~ will of the subject (at least if 'will' is conceived of as autonomous) but 
ves thinking of a 'feedback loop' between the self and environment, such 
hey are considered as open systems. She clearly envisages this as complex 
apable of producing unpredictable changes. 
Oyama focuses upon the relationship between nature/culture that addresses 
uestion of agency and of the politics involved in the attribution of behaviour 
nes or to the environment. One point to come out of this work is an attack 
1e idea that there is a centralised command structure in the brain that 
1ces images and co-ordinates our responses. This attack upon a centralised 
nand structure is central to recent debates within developmental and 
Itionary science. As Oyama puts it, 
To see the organism-niche complex as both source and product of its own 
development is to acknowledge the role of activity in the life process -not genes 
organising raw materials into beings, and not environments shaping or selecting 
passive bodies and minds, but organisms assimilating, seeking, manipulating their 
worlds, even as they accommodate and respond to them. 111 
is similar to the way in which Battersby talks about feedback loops: 
The subject that I will posit is neither completely free nor autonomous, but is also 
not simply passive. It is both marked -'scored' -into specificity by its relationship 
with 'otherness', and yet is itself also capable of agency and of resisting modes of 
domination. This self is not only shaped by 'the other', it is also self-shaping as 
potentiality is transformed into actuality via echo and the feedback-loops of 
memory. 112 
. are concerned to think about agency in a manner that takes into account the 
)died nature of the self and the way that agency does not simply involve a 
·ama (2000a) p. 95. 
ttersby (1998a) p. 12. 
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toval or abstraction from the particular circumstances in which the self finds 
/himself. This derives from the five general points that these theorists have in 
nmon. In particular, it involves thinking through the implications of matter not 
ng inert. A corollary to this is the rejection of the image of a centralised 
~anising structure, such as that envisaged as the self that decides upon her/his 
ions in a vacuum. As Oyama puts it, 
If matter is inert, then organized processes can be explained only by reference to a 
structuring intelligence. But if it is interactive (think of any chemical reaction) 
under changing, interdependent constraints, such outside direction is not needed. 113 
gal judgments in the law of obligations depend upon attributions of the causes 
human behaviour. This is familiar territory for feminists who have challenged 
~ many crass assumptions about the inevitable nature of women that continue 
be used to justify a status quo in which women are subordinate. What is 
10vative about Oyama's approach is that, like Battersby in the context of 
~taphysics, she responds by changing the framework in which the debate is 
rried out. Using the example of a type of genetic disorder which can be 
ntrolled by environmental changes, she points out that it is not the case that 
lS should be understood only as genetically caused - employing a traditional 
Jdel of genetics. She is critical of biologists who ignore the environment 
nply because it appears to be constant. 
It is possible to illustrate this with an analogy from political, or critical 
5al, theory. Oyama's move is analogous to that of Marx, 114 who argued that the 
1int of departure for political theory should not be to consider the nature of 
lves or individuals but of the society which produces such an emphasis upon 
dividualism. It is impossible to study an individual outside of society. It is the 
Oyama (2000a) p. 173. 
K. Marx, 'Thesis on Feuerbach' in K. Marx, The German Ideology (New York: Prometheus 
1oks, 1988) p. 573. He states, 'But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
lividual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.' 
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Ire of this society that allows the study of individuals, in a vacuum, to appear 
a natural point of departure. It is precisely this image of a rigid, fixed 
ndary, between the 'outside' environment both physical and social, and the 
:ide' self that is challenged in the work of both Oyama, Battersby and Clark. 
Similarly, Oyama attacks a simplistic view of 'biology' as an external force 
t structures, and permanently fixes, inert matter. Oyama attacks the root of the 
itical argument, that women's subordination, for example, is inevitable if it 
l be shown to be 'natural' or 'biological'. She argues that, even if a type of 
mviour previously had some evolutionary value in certain circumstances then 
re is no reason why this should continue to be the case. 
Battersby's metaphor, derived from Kierkegaard, IS of the wind that IS 
~cted by and yet also shapes the landscape, 
Self-shaping (or becoming an individual) is like an alien wind that gradually takes 
on a familiar pattern as it blows across an unfamiliar landscape .... 
Although in the end, a pattern emerges and the wind plays a melody that remains 
'unaltered day after day', this sequence only emerges slowly. 115 
ttersby suggests a similar move to Oyama, here. Oyama points to the 
ldequacies of the metaphors of transmission - in the sense of genetic or 
tural transmission which, she argues, do not capture the subtlety of the 
velopmental process. They fail to show the ways in which the embedded 
~anism is able to rework, what is viewed as, both biological and social 
heritance'. Oyama is also sensitive to the ways in which this use of the term 
heritance' is also deeply problematic. There is a link between this view of 
1eritance and the way in which property was seen as a thing that could be 
rned and transmitted. 
Battersby (1998a) p. 184. I will return to discuss this further in Chapter 3 in the context of 
al theory. 
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The Marxist historian, E.P. Thompson'' 6 analyses the history of this view of 
~perty which dovetails with the image of genetic property that Oyama attacks. 
points out that in feudal societies it is difficult to think of land ownership as 
rthing other than involving relations between people. People were born to a 
tain position, within a hierarchy based upon different rights and obligations 
1und land. Thompson argues that it is only with the Enclosure Acts. and the 
:inguishing of feudal rights below copyhold, as in Gatewards Case' 17 that a 
,perty owner could think of his land as his object, a commodity, rather than as 
1resenting rights against other persons. In different ways, a number of 
1temporary feminist legal theorists"8 have explored the link between 
c/gender and sexuality, the image of a bounded self and the ability of property 
7Jlers to exclude others. This ceases to be simply a metaphor when the term 
heritance' is used to describe the passing on of both genetic and 
vironmental material. As discussed above, Oyama attacks this usage (for both 
,es of material) along with its implication that there is a fixed, stable object, a 
ae or part of the environment, that is passed between generations.''9 Her aim is 
t to argue that the environment alters how we develop, as much as do genes, 
t to move away from this approach to development altogether. This is achieved 
looking at interacting systems and processes, many aspects of which are 
E.P. Thompson, 'Custom, Law and Common Right' in E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common 
mdon: Penguin, 1991 ). See also C.B. Macpherson, ed., Property: Mainstream and Critical 
~it ions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978b ). 
Gateward's Case (1603) 6 Co. Rep. 
Dickenson (1997); J. Nedelsky 'Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self in R. Post, ed., Law 
i the Order of Culture (California: California University Press, 1991) pp. 162-189; N. Naffine, 
le Legal Structure of Self-Ownership: Or the Self-Possessed Man and the Woman Possessed' in 
trnal of Law and Society, Vol. 25, No.2, 1998, pp. 198-212; M. Davies, 'The Proper: Discourses 
Purity' in Law and Critique, Vol. IX, No.2, 1998, pp. 141-173; M. Davies, 'Queer Property, 
eer Persons: Self-Ownership and Beyond' in Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1999, pp. 
7-352. 
8yama (2000a) p. 194. 
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)red simply because they are stable enough to allow such development to take 
:e. 
minism, Essentialism and Law 
~ question of ~essentialism' has been widely debated within the feminist 
~vement and has been described by Schor= as a defining feature of feminism 
the 1980s. Within feminist legal theory it continues to be debated. 1=1 As 
.cussed in Chapter 1, there has been a perceived contradiction between the vvay 
which the feminist movement has challenged the Yie-vv that women have a 
rticular nature (which has been used to justify the status quo) and the Yiew that 
~re is some property (or quality) that all women have in common that forms the 
sis of the feminist movement itself. There has also been a strong challenge to 
~ distinction, drawn by second wave feminism, between sex - said to represent 
.tural and fixed attributes - and gender - which was employed by second wave 
minists to emphasise that many behaviours were learned and not fixed. It is 
ecisely this latter approach that Oyama seeks to undermine by arguing against 
e idea that 'biology· is fixed in the first place. As discussed above, she also 
tallenges the idea that either enYironment or genetics can be analysed as 
screte, centralised, control mechanisms. 
A more influential challenge to the sex/gender distinction, within the 
~minist movement, has come from 'postmodem' or ~poststructuralist' feminism. 
oweYer. it is important not to lump together all approaches that draw from 
)ntemporary continental philosophy. Poststructuralists, such as Judith Butler. 122 
J N. Schor 'Introduction· inN. Schor and E. Weed, The Essential Difference (Indiana University 
ress, 1994) p. vii. 
1 For example, A. Barron, 'Feminism. Aestheticism and the Limits of the Law' in Feminist 
ega/ Studies Vol. 8, 2000, pp. 275-317; M. Drakopoulou, ·The Ethic of Care; Female 
ubjectivity and Feminist Legal Scholarship' in Feminist Legal Studies Vol. 8,:2000, 199-226. 
= Butler (1990): Butler (1993); Butler (1997). 
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e pointed to the way in which biology is viewed as something that is pre-
:ursive and yet can only be understood in terms of language. At its least 
ttically useful, poststructuralist feminism has been characterised as assuming 
t women's political claims cannot be discussed; that they represent merely a 
,ition of difference within a psychoanalytic or deconstructive framework. In 
area of feminist legal theory, Barron describes the central theme of 
;tmodern legal theory in the following terms: 
Postmodemist legal theory, including postmodernist-feminist legal theory, imagines 
law to be founded on a repression of the desiring, embodied, particular (female) 
other, thus bringing into view what is excluded or denied in the elevation of this 
abstract reason as the source oflaw's authority. 123 
discussed in Chapter 1, a suspicion of 'essentialism' has lead to the argument 
tt there can be no voice of the women's movement because the only voice that 
heard tends to be that of white, middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual 
>men. This is analogous to the feminist criticism of the way in which a 
iversal image of selfuood has subsumed women within an image which has 
~wed men as the norm. In legal terms this can be illustrated using a couple of 
amples taken from the law of obligations. Firstly, the law of tort relies upon 
tablishing negligence by the adoption of the 'reasonable man test', which in 
cent years has been renamed as the 'reasonable person' test. In practice, this 
mains the same because the judges adopt the test of what they view is 
asonable, irrespective of the fiction of the man, or person, on the 'Clapham 
nnibus', whose view they are supposedly expressing. The question of whether 
e person's behaviour has fallen below that of the reasonable person does raise 
sues about personal differences. For example, how a 'reasonable person' 
~rceives the behaviour of another is relevant in sexual harassment cases. 
Barron (2000) p. 276. Here Barron registers the way in which the question of women's 
bjectivity has been linked with an 'ethic of care' within legal theory. 
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men tend to perceive a threat - in situations when men do not think such 
ception is reasonable- because women in our culture are taught to fear rape 
l are concerned that a situation could escalate, whereas men are often 
ensitive to this interpretation of events. The argument is that male judges 
uld not be able to view the situation through women's eyes and would 
refore employ a male standard from which to judge the situation. In R v A 
WI) 124 the (all male) House of Lords was asked to weigh up the rights of 
1men rape victims not to have evidence of their sex lives introduced within a 
'e trial (as stated in Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s. 41) 
ainst the rights of the male defendant to a fair trial (under Human Rights Act 
98 Sch. 1). They found in favour of the male defendant, leaving the decision of 
1ether on not to admit this evidence to the trial judge in individual cases, 
~reby doing nothing to undermine concerns of bias. 
Another example raises similar issues. The question of who should sit on a 
ry and whether race or sex should be taken into account has been argued with 
gard to both race and sex cases. Although the Runciman Royal Commission on 
riminal Justice125 recommended that there should be some representation from 
hnic minorities on the jury when race is an issue, the position has not been 
nended since the Court of Appeal turned down the objection of a black 
~fendant tried by an all white jury. 126 
In both the above examples, the legal system relies upon the assumption 
lat it should be possible for judges to imagine themselves in the position of 
· R. v A (Complainant's Sexual History); also known as: R. v Y (Sexual Offence: Complainant's 
~xual History ) HL (2001) 2 W.L.R. 1546; (2001) 3 All ER 1. The Lords found in favour of 
·otection of the male defendant. 
; Lord Runciman (chair) Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Cmnd 2263 (London: HMSO, 
)93) 
; R v Ford (1989) 3 WLR 762. 
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~rs. However, Gatens, 127 drawing upon Spinoza, undermines this assumption 
arguing that imagination derives from bodily experience. Spinoza uses the 
mple of our perception of the sun as seeming close to us. Even when it is 
:overed that this is false, the initial bodily experience does not disappear but 
tinues to have an effect. Gatens applies this to her feminist concerns about the 
iciary. Given that most male judges are unlikely to have experience of women 
oles other than those of a subservient position then, she reasons, they are less 
~ly to be able to even recognise this as an important issue let alone attempt to 
w themselves within the position of women. I will return to this question in 
next chapter. 
These examples appear, at first blush, to pose a problem for the feminist 
vement which has been sensitive to the way in which men purport to represent 
miversal position which silences women's perspective. Given that this has 
~n extended to the question of differences between women, such as class, race, 
ability and sexuality, the question is asked, how can feminists ground claims 
behalf of women without committing the same mistake? As we have seen, 
ivak, 128 although she has moved away from this position, once suggested that 
ninists should take the desperate measure of adopting a "strategic 
:entialism'. This involves both accepting the claim that there is no essential 
nale quality from which to make feminist demands, but that we should act as if 
~re is such a thing in order to ground political claims. I want to argue that 
ttersby offers a way out of this problem, which is in keeping with the general 
proach of Oyama. 
M. Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality (London: Routledge, 1996) pp. 
)-141. 
Spivak (1990) p. 12. 
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To introduce this reworking of essentialism, Battersby starts by historically 
ating the meaning of the term 'essence' which she seeks to reframe. It is 
rth considering her method, at this stage, before looking at her analysis of 
~ntialism. Her approach to the question of essentialism employs a similar 
tmique to the way in which she considers the work of female artists and poets, 
h as Karoline von Gi.inderode. 129 She demonstrates that these artists' work can 
reactivated within a contemporary feminist context. This can feedback to 
efine the artistic traditions which had initially excluded these artists. 
ailarly, Battersby's search for a better way of conceptualising the essentialist 
mte for feminism involves a recognition that this concept has a history, the 
ierside of which can provide resources for feminism. 
This method or approach to history is itself implicated in the way that she 
nks about essentialism. It draws from, and alters, Adorno's image of an object, 
;h as an art object, that can shock the subject into a different conceptual 
mework. Further, for Adorno, objects that do not fit within the frame of 
erence of the subject do not fall outside any possible view, as in Kant's 
mework. They might be seen (or be seen differently) at a later date when the 
Jject has a different frame of reference. Adorno, as a Marxist, envisaged this 
itch in terms of a change in the mode of production. In Battersby's work, it is 
: social change and questions raised by the feminist movement that allow the 
,rk of the female artists to be viewed differently. In this way, her work 
::ounts for its own position. 
C. Battersby, 'Unblocking the Oedipal: Karoline von Giinderode and the Female Sublime' in 
Ledger, J. McDonagh and J. Spencer Political Gender: Texts and Contexts (London: Harvester 
1eatsheaf, 1994b) pp. 129-43. 
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Considered in this way, it has some similarities with the project of another 
~temporary feminist philosopher, Adriana Cavarero, 130 who aims to rework 
torical narratives to show how the position of women undermines their 
oretical framework from within. Both are concerned with the ways in which 
men's bodies and traditional lifestyle disrupt different 'modem' and 
1stmodem' views of the self. However, whilst their method of attack may have 
1ilarities, the important constructive aspects of their work differ. Cavarero's 
rk draws more from Hannah Arendt to describe the importance of the telling 
one's story whereas Battersby is more focused upon bodily habit and the daily 
lbiguities of power relations through which the self emerges. 
Battersby makes two important points that are central to her work. Firstly, 
Gender and Genius131 she distinguishes between the meaning of the 'feminine' 
:1 'female'. It is clear from her historical analysis that men who were classed as 
:ing the definition of the romantic genius could be classified as 'feminine', as 
ving feminine attributes. However, they were valued in a way that women, 
1ether viewed as having feminine or masculine attributes, were not. It was 
~refore possible to call a man 'feminine', but to call him 'female' would be a 
tegory mistake - with the possible exception of post-operation transsexuals. 
1, it was the state of being female (and not the possession of 'feminine' 
ributes) that was degraded. 
Secondly, Battersby concentrates upon thinking what it would mean to take 
~.female subject position as norm rather than as an aberration. She develops 
[s to provide a philosophical answer to the feminist problems of essentialism 
A. Cavarero, In Spite of Plato (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); A. Cavarero, Rethinking Oedipus: 
·aling a Patriarchal Text. Paper at the UK Society of Women in Philosophy Conference 1996; A. 
varero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Seljhood (London: Routledge, 2000). 
C. Battersby, Gender and Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (London: The Women's Press, 
89) pp. 10-15. 
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:ussed above. This is done by challenging the assumption that the only way to 
about essence is as a fixed, unchanging, underlying characteristic. As 
tersby points out, this interpretation of Aristotle is subject to disagreement 
what is relevant is the definition of essence that has influenced Western 
losophy. 132 The Aristotelian view of essence is such that the essence of x is 
t property which all examples of x have in common. This involves ignoring 
particularity of something and looking for common features which are said to 
ine the essence of the universal category or species. This model therefore 
1cks any attempt to discuss a female essence because it is only at the level of 
: species that an essence can be discerned. 
This can be illustrated in more detail by discussing the way in which 
istotle then instantiates his view of essence in biology, such that both men and 
)men have human essence. However, according to Aristotle's biology, women 
~ viewed as failed males - who would have developed into males had they not 
en subject to cold and damp conditions in the womb. So, in this strangely 
Cluential model, although women have human essence, they are not the perfect 
ample of this essence. In other words, there is a universal species essence, of 
1ich the male is the best example. The female is viewed as failing to reach her 
11 potential (to be male). 
Given that this makes Aristotelian essentialism an inauspicious place to 
1rt to think of the specificity of women, Battersby turns to alternative views of 
sence within the history of philosophy. In particular, she considers Locke'S133 
stinction between 'nominal essence' and 'real essences', the latter of which he 
:sociated with Aristotle. Nominalists maintain that names are simply that which 
Battersby (1998a) p. 211 
J. Locke, 'Of the Names of Substances' in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
,ondon: Collins, 1969) pp. 283-296. 
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ple give to things and that these things have nothing else in common. The 
ninal essence' is the abstract idea of things of that sort. The universal 
·efore attaches to the name of the thing in language rather than to the thing 
lf. 134 It is the way in which we label the thing, rather than any property within 
thing itself, that counts as its 'nominal essence'. These things are linked by 
way in which the ideas are built up by a process of abstraction, using simple 
:ts to derive complex ideas, rather than by some internal property. Locke 
:cts Aristotle's view of essence by arguing that we cannot categorise things in 
ns of their real essence because we simply do not know what its 'real essence' 
15 
Battersby employs a Kantian framework in order to improve Locke's 
ount of essentialism. Rather than rely upon a top-down approach in which 
guage is viewed as labelling things in the world, she uses the Kantian 
Lemata to describe a process in which the data about x impinges upon the way 
which they are labelled. The empirical image of x is then understood within a 
of rules in which it is classified. However, this set of rules can alter within 
ferent cultures and at different times. This allows the term 'women', to be 
cussed in terms of its meaning at a particular point in history in a particular 
ture. This is informed, not only by the way in which the term is used, but also 
the way in which the world of which we are a part imposes itself upon us. In 
ter words, Battersby employs a Kantian framework to find an alternative to 
ckean nominalism on one side and Aristotelian essentialism on the other. 
Battersby's argument can be illustrated further by addressing some 
tic isms of Battersby made by Linda Alcoff. 136 Alcoff argues that there is a 
Battersby (1998a) p. 29. 
Locke (1969) p. 287. 
L.M. Alcoff, 'Review Essay: Philosophy Matters, A Review of Recent Work in Feminist 
losophy' in Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 25, No.3, 2000 p. 856. 
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,ion in Battersby's work between: 1) the materially real and 2) the image or 
·esentation of women as objects. Alcoff ignores the post-Kantian framework 
ch informs Battersby's work, a point that is clear in the way in which she 
:usses the influences upon Battersby earlier in the paper. 137 Hence, Alcoff 
~ribes Battersby in the following terms, 
Battersby, like other feminists, looks to Benedict Spinoza ... Nietzsche and John 
Dewey; more originally and surprisingly, she also looks to S0ren Kierkegaard, in 
whose aesthetic works she finds a conception of selves as ambiguous and relational, 
patterned by habits and 'repetitions' rather than a inner stable core. 138 
a result of ignoring the central role of Kant in Battersby's work, Alcoff 
mgly characterises Battersby as viewing women as 'objects of representation' 
l as hence emphasising language, putting her into the 'postmodem feminist' 
1p. As described above, Battersby uses a Kantian move to view essence - not 
Lply as the way in which something is talked about (which she discusses in 
n of Lockean nominalism) - but as something that is informed by the way in 
ich the world impinges itself upon our senses, viewed through sets of rules 
ich can alter in response to, for example, different ways of viewing the world 
1duced by the empirical sciences. 
As outlined above, this does not collapse into Aristotelian essentialism 
:ause essence is not viewed as an immutable underlying characteristic of a 
rrg. It changes with cultural understanding which is itself informed by 
pirical science but, as I will discuss below, always involves power. 
Further, Battersby cannot be viewed as ignoring materiality because it is 
:cisely an attempt to think of matter as active that is pivotal to her reworking of 
nt. In Battersby's later discussion of the transcendental self and transcendental 
:ect, she uses the question of what it would be to think of the female body as 
\lcoff (2000) p. 856. 
\lcoff (2000) p. 856. 
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cal, to show how the Kantian framework makes it impossible to think of 
ve matter- for example, of bodies that can become two. 
Battersby uses this reworking of essence, from the 'underside of 
losophy' to return to her question of thinking female specificity. It is possible 
hink about the 'essence' of woman when it is no longer assumed that essence 
~rs to a fixed underlying characteristic that defines the group. Neither is the 
ence of woman simply a name attached to 'women', without any bottom-up 
ut from the data, for example, from biological research. In addition, there is no 
1tral value-free analysis. It is worth quoting Battersby on this point to show 
N she carves out a definition of essentialism that differs from both Aristotle 
i from Locke: 
For the supporter of extreme nominalism, the question is only which characteristics 
in our culture act as linguistic definers. However, for paradigms of human sexual 
difference to evolve there have to be perceived similarities - and discrepancies -
between the class of entities compared. To maintain this is 'just' linguistic and 
social plays down the capacity of data to disturb the definition in a 'bottom-up' 
way. To allow that empirical 'evidence' might play a role in dislocating and 
redrawing current paradigms of sexual difference does not entail that linguistic and 
social practices do not also enter into the current definitions. Nor does it entail that 
there might not also be social reasons why the markers for sexually differentiated 
bodies should change. Opposing extreme nominalism does not entail positing 
underlying, unchanging, 'real truths' about female bodies and forms. 139 
tere is also an acknowledged debt to Foucault in Battersby's work at this point. 
[s clear that there is no neutral description of a female essence, in her use of the 
m. What is classed as essential in the definition of the female differs at 
fferent times. This may be influenced by the 'data' about sexual difference but 
is never 'neutral'. Power is always involved in this view of essence, even 
~:mgh it is acknowledged that, not any story will do. 
To return to the problem within feminist legal theory of making claims on 
:half of women - claims that then silence the voices of racial, sexual and other 
inorities - this does offer an approach that is more pragmatic. There is no fixed 
Battersby (1998a) p. 30. 
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nition of women at stake because the possibility of such a move is closed by 
emphasis upon an essence that is subject to change. As Battersby puts it 
Remodelling identity in terms of a metaphysics of becoming allows us to register 
differences and changes occurring within a single category, and allows us to 
register power differentials and differences amongst women themselves. As such, 
an identity politics need not entail homogenizing 'woman' or 'women' .... Instead, 
we will need to ally a metaphysics of becoming with an account of the historical 
and cultural factors that help configure the female subject-position in its diverse 
specificities. 140 
Clark and Oyama, with their particular concerns, it is obvious that not any 
-:y will do and neither will the image of an underlying Aristotelian essence. It 
)recisely this Aristotelian approach that Oyama attacks in her rethinking of 
relopment. Battersby's insistence on thinking both sexual difference and 'the 
f' may appear an odd pursuit when compared to the more 'scientific' aims of 
Llysis of cognition or development. This rethinking of 'essence' suggests an 
:wer to this objection. The meaning of what it is to have, or be, a self- or to be 
>erson - in our culture will continue to affect the way in which we live, 
luding the practical operation of law of obligations. It is not that we can 
1ply change the stories about ourselves at will. They emerge from complex 
:ial histories. However, these histories are not without an underside that can 
JW the meaning of what it is to live as a woman to be discussed. Importantly, 
s does not mean that there is only a top-down imposition of images of 
~selves. Oyama's attack upon the reduction of complex interactions into 
>arate canals of 'social' and 'biological' is useful here. 
As Irigarayi 41 has argued, to refuse to discuss sexual difference would be to 
ve it unthought. There is an argument here that is akin to Battersby's142 
3attersby (1998a) p. 124. 
'Sexual difference is probably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we 
ught it through.' L. Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (London: Athlone Press, 1993a) p. 
~or discussion ofthis point see J. Richardson, 'Jamming the Machines: ''Woman" in the Work 
rigaray and Deleuze' in Law and Critique, Vol. IX, No. I, 1998a, p. 90. 
3attersby (1989) p. 225. 
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1ment for the need to rework, rather than simply abandon, the notion of 
ius in her earlier work. In both cases, we will continue to employ the term, or 
1e equivalent, because it is actually doing some work in practice. The way to 
llenge it is to reveal the assumptions that go with it and to try to rework its 
aning from within. Similarly, to exchange Aristotle's definition of human 
ence for a position that does no more than reject all images of the self would 
to fail to register the way that the meaning of what it is to be a self works in 
LCtice, including in legal practice. It would be to block a discussion of what it 
:ans to be a woman, a move that has produced the current problems within 
ninist legal theory. 
I will return to the broad framework of the self that I have drawn out of the 
>rk of these contemporary theorists, Battersby, Clark and Oyama working 
thin different areas of philosophy. In the next chapter, I want to consider what 
is to be a person, or be or have a self within the law. In particular, I will focus 
10n the legal theorist Drucilla Cornell, whose work can more easily be 
aracterised as imposing top-down stories upon the world but in a manner that 
distinct from Alcoffs misreading of Battersby. 
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Chapter 3: Cornell's 'Imaginary Domain' 
s chapter focuses upon the legal framework proposed by feminist legal 
)fist Drucilla Cornell, whose practical proposals for changes in law are 
[ved from her theoretical analysis of personhood. Cornell's work has a wide 
~lication but I will focus upon her contribution to the law of tort. Whilst 
:nell is writing in the US, her legal claim for particular rights based upon 
sonhood is intended to have universal application. In particular, she provides 
wers to the equality/difference debate and to feminist concerns that in making 
[ms for (or analysing the position of) women as a group they may thereby 
1force stereotypes of women. These were the worries that prompted ideas 
und strategic essentialism, that were introduced in Chapter 1. 
In the last chapter, I looked at different ways of thinking about the self, 
.wn from diverse areas of contemporary philosophy in order to argue against 
need for 'strategic essentialism'. In this chapter I consider personhood, a legal 
b.er than an ontological concept. Whilst Cornell discusses personhood, linked 
:h a claim for legal rights to be explained below, her view of personhood 
·ives from her view of what it means to be a self and from her broader view of 
e project of becoming a person', in which what it means to be a self is linked 
torically with the law. 
Before discussing Cornell's view of personhood it is worth considering the 
~al context of the term person, in the UK. The meaning of the term 'person' has 
~gal, as well as a philosophical, history. Women were not classified as persons 
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until the 'Persons Case': Edwards v Attorney -General of Canada (1930JI 43 m 
which Lord Sankey said, 
The word [person] is ambiguous and in its original meaning would undoubtedly 
embrace members of either sex. On the other hand, supposing in an Act of 
Parliament several centuries ago it had been enacted that any person should be 
entitled to be elected to a particular office it would have been understood that the 
word only referred to males, but the cause of this was not because the word 
'person' could not include females but because at common law a woman was 
incapable of serving a public office.144 (Italics are added.) 
This was viewed as a breakthrough, as previously women had not been viewed as 
personS.145 In a, now classic, feminist analysis of this case, Sachs and Wilson146 
describe how the newspapers actually congratulated women on the progress they 
were making in becoming persons! This assumption, that law simply reflects 
social change, will not really surprise lawyers. It is common for judges to talk as 
if no case had ever been wrongly decided. Within their inverted world, if the 
courts had previously thought that women were not classifiable as persons then, 
by definition, they were not persons. This position resonates with that of Hegel, 147 
for whom recognition by the law represented recognition by the community 
itself. Given that the courts had changed their opinion, then, by definition, 
women had attained personhood. This approach takes seriously the claims that 
'law' makes for itself: to be able to dictate reality. 
Cornell also takes seriously law's claim to dictate reality in ways that relate 
to personhood - but, this time, with a feminist aim. Cornell wants to draw upon 
the assumption that, at this point in time in the West, we see ourselves as being 
143 Edwards v Attorney General of Canada (1930) A.C. 124 at 128. For a discussion of the case 
see J. Bridgeman and S. Mills, Feminist Perspectives on Law: Law's Engagement with the 
Female Body (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) p. 18. 
144 Edwards v Attorney General ofCanada (1930) A.C. 124 at 128. 
145 See, for example, Bebb v Law Society (1914) 1 Ch. 286. Despite the existence of legislation 
referring to the term 'person', a woman was refused permission to sit Law Society preliminary 
examinations on the grounds that later she would not be allowed to practice as a solicitor. Jex-
Blake v Senatus of Edinburgh University (1873) 11 M. 784; Charlton v Lin gus (1886) 4 C.P 3 7 4. 
146 Sachs and Wilson (1978). 
147 G.W. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1967). 
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born with legal rights. In other words, what it means to be a person now includes 
an ability to go to law to claim rights. There is therefore much at stake in her 
work. According to this framework, it is possible to create a just society by 
formulating the correct legal tests. She has even gone so far as to make the 
difficult claim that capitalism could be undermined by the use of these rights. Her 
project is therefore aimed at fully extending these rights to women by thinking 
about ways in which the law can give expression to practical feminist concerns. 
For example, in tort law she has made proposals for employment rights (a tort of 
wrongful discharge), 148 protection from sexual harassment149 and Spanish 
language rights. 150 She has also applied her framework to the redefinition of the 
family, adoption, 151 and in support of abortion rights. 152 
In addition, she suggests a legal test to replace the 'reasonable man test' 
that is central in tort law. I will therefore outline the reasonable man test, 
mentioned in the last chapter, and then tum to Cornell's proposals to replace it 
and the way in which she links together a philosophical system with a practical 
legal principle. These are positions that she has developed since 1995, starting 
with The Imaginary Domain, 153 
The Reasonable Man 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the 'reasonable man' is a central concept in tort 
law. To decide if someone has been negligent judges must decide whether the 
148 D. Cornell, 'Worker's rights and the Defence of Just-Cause Statutes' in Cornell (2000a) pp. 
83-117. 
149 D. Cornell, 'Sexual Freedom and the Unleashing of Women's Desire' in Cornell (1995) pp. 
167-227. 
150 D. Cornell, 'Spanish Language Rights: Identification, Freedom and the Imaginary Domain' in 
Cornell (2000a) pp. 129-153. 
151 D. Cornell, 'Adoption and its Progeny: Rethinking Family, Gender and Sexual Difference' in 
(1998) pp. 96-130; D. Cornell 'What and How Maketh a Father: Equality Versus Conscription' in 
Cornell (1998) pp. 131-149. 
152 D. Cornell, 'Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs' in Cornell (1995) pp. 31-91. 
153 Cornell (1995); Cornell (1998); Cornell (2000a). 
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defendant's actions fall below the standard of the hypothetical 'reasonable man'. 
As Conaghan and Mansell point out, 
Traditionally, the reasonable man has been invoked to represent an objective 
standard of care against which all are measured. He is thus devoid of all 
characteristics which make him human. By so denuding him of those 
'idiosyncrasies of the particular person whose conduct is in question' (Glasgow 
Corporation v Muir (1943), per Lord MacMillan at 457) the reasonable man poses 
as the average man, thereby providing a single and universal standard purporting to 
correspond with reasonable behaviour. 154 
There have been a number of feminist arguments155 that the reasonable man test 
relies upon a male perspective which differs from women's attitudes, particularly 
in areas such as sexual harassment and provocation. The feminist debate about 
the reasonable man test is therefore a version of the equality/difference debate-
that women either have to appear to be like men in order to gain the same rights 
(thereby problematising pregnancy, for example) or they have to appear different 
from men and risk affirming traditional oppression. This is a topic introduced in 
the first chapter and discussed further in the next section. In the area of sexual 
harassment, for example, it has been argued that sensitivity between the sexes 
differs and therefore a universal test as to how the 'reasonable man' would 
behave is inappropriate. 156 Cornell's critique of the reasonable man test leads her 
154 J. Conaghan and W. Mansell, The Wrongs ofTort, 2nd edition, (London: Pluto Press, 1999) pp. 
52-53. 
155 For example, R. Martin, 'A Feminist View of the Reasonable Man: An Alternative Approach 
to Liability in Negligence for Personal Injury' in Anglo-American Law Review Vol. 23, 1994, pp. 
334-374. For a summary of the arguments regarding tort law, see Conaghan and Mansell (1999) 
pp. 52-53. There is also work on the way in which the reasonable man is raced. For an historical 
analysis of the way that the rise of the 'reasonable man' coincided with the heyday of British 
Imperialism (and how the meaning of 'reasonable man' test was adapted so the 'primitive 
reasonable man' was not viewed as having the same sense of restraint as British men) see the 
Sindh Criminal appeal case of Ghulam Mustafa Gahno (1939) AIR Sind 182, cited and discussed 
in K. Laster and P. Raman, 'Law for One and One for All: An Intersectional Legal Subject' in 
Naffine and Owens (1997) pp. 193-212. 
156 The EU Code of Practice includes reference to 'conduct that is unwanted, unreasonable and 
offence to the recipient': Recommendation 92/C 27/04. For a discussion see M. Rubenstein, 
'Sexual Harassment: European Commission Recommendation and Code of Practice' in Industrial 
Law Journal Vol. 21, 1992, p. 70; J. Dine and B. Watt 'Sexual Harassment: Moving Away From 
Discrimination' in Modern Law Review Vol. 58, 1995, pp. 355-362. The possibility of the 
development of tort law to provide a remedy for sexual harassment more generally has been 
traced by Joanne Conaghan. See, J. Conaghan, 'Enhancing Civil Remedies for (Sexual) 
Harassment: s3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997' in Feminist Legal Studies Vol. 7, 
1999a, pp. 203-214; J. Conaghan, 'Equity Rushes in Where Tort Fears to Tread: The Court of 
Appeal Decision in Burris v Asadani' in Feminist Legal Studies Vol. IV, No.2, 1996, pp. 221-
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to argue that it should be replaced by her own test, 157 and that, more broadly, her 
approach to personhood resolves the paradox of the equality/difference debate in 
its many guises. 
Cornell's Approach to Tort: Free and Equal Persons 
Cornell's analyses of different torts - as well as her broader arguments about law 
- all work by concentrating on the idea of freedom. She wants to keep in play the 
question, 'would free and equal persons agree to this decision?' and this question 
is to act as a legal principle. She proposes that this question should be asked 
whenever legislation is passed or a judicial decision made. She argues that, 
We judge public law by the 'as if of a postulated original contract. The rightfulness 
of a law is one that all citizens, regarded as free and equal, could have agreed to if 
they were in a position to consent within the general will. The contract is an idea of 
reason with practical effect in that it can guide legislators with a test for 
rightfulness .... Like both Rawls and Kant, I also defend the idea of reasonableness 
and public reason. Reasonableness and public reason depend upon the demand of 
the 'as if itself. Judges and legislators are called upon to proceed through the 'as if 
because this is the test for the rightfulness of the law consistent with the evaluation 
of each one of us as a free and equal person. 158 
In a footnote, Cornell159 points out that she is using as a device the hypothetical 
position of persons siting round a table deciding what laws to agree upon. I will 
discuss in more detail below the way in which her position differs from that of 
Rawls. The image of what it means (or could mean) to be a person is therefore 
central to her work. 
So far, it appears that Cornell's legal test merely replaces the 'reasonable 
man test' with the 'free and equal persons test'. However, these operate very 
differently, as can be illustrated by the problem of sexual harassment, mentioned 
above. The equality/difference problem, when transposed into sexual harassment 
228; J. Conaghan, 'Harassment and the Law of Torts: Khorasandjian v Bush' in Feminist Legal 
Studies Vol. I, No.2, 1993, pp. 189-197. 
157 See, Cornell (1995) pp. 14-16 for her discussion of the reasonable man test. 
158 Cornell (1995) pp. 12-13. 
159 Cornell (1995) p. 242, fn.l6. 
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law, is concerned with the question of what the 'reasonable man' would view as 
acceptable behaviour. Cornell offers a different approach in which women are 
not viewed as seeking protection but as claiming their worthiness as persons. 160 
She therefore derives this position from her original philosophical analysis to 
argue that it is important to recognise, 
the way in which the devaluation of one's sex curtails freedom by imposing 
standards of behaviour which fails to accord with equal personhood .... Thus, to 
protect the space for free play of one's sexual imaginary demands the recognition of 
the primary good of self-respect for each one of us as sexuate beings. Again, when 
women demand the space to be sexual in their own way and still be accorded 
respect for their worthiness as persons, they are demanding the equal chance to seek 
sexual happiness, not protection. 161 (Italics are in the original.) 
She argues that the replacement of the 'reasonable man' test with a 'reasonable 
woman' standard is inadequate because it continues to divide women into those 
who take sexual harassment cases and those who 'keep a stiff upper lip' about 
male behaviour. Cornell's aim is to shift the court's attention from whether or not 
the woman was reasonable in claiming sexual harassment to an examination of 
the workplace by focusing upon 'whether or not the workplace itself enforced 
sexual shame so as to effectively undermine the social basis of self-respect' .162 
I have much sympathy with the aims of Cornell's project and think that 
there is merit in any pragmatic use of law. 163 However, Cornell's work moves 
beyond a pragmatic position to embrace the view that we really are constituted as 
subjects with rights. She argues, 
Perhaps in the end I am Hegelian enough to think that we are actually constituted in 
modernity as subjects of right and so, in a sense, we cannot step outside this sphere 
oflaw. 164 
16° Cornell (1995) p. 172. 
161 Cornell (1995) p. 172. 
162 Cornell (1995) p. 206. 
163 I have argued that there are pragmatic problems with this approach to a legal test. Not only can 
its subtly be easily misinterpreted by judges but it ignores the practical considerations, such as the 
length of proceedings, the endless documentation and cross examination, that make applicants 
feel like victims, even whilst they simply claim 'personhood'. J. Richardson, 'A Burglar in the 
House of Philosophy: Theodor Adorno, Drucilla Cornell and Hate Speech' in Feminist Legal 
Studies Vol. 1, No. 1, 1999, pp. 3-31. I want to leave this objection aside to exploring the broader 
implications of Cornell's view ofpersonhood. 
164 Florence (1997) p. 15. 
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Similarly~ in Just Cause: Freedom, Identity and Rights, she acknowledges her 
debt to Hegel, 
Of course, the idea that the concept of right is constitutive of the person takes us 
back to Hegel. 165 
She assumes that human sociability~ and the recognition that we give each other, 
must now be attributed to (or~ at least~ channelled through) the law. This is far 
more important to Cornell~ s analysis of contemporary legal debates than is her 
employment of Lacan - a fact that the common description of Cornell as 
producing 'psychoanalytic feminism~ 166 fails to register. In particular~ Cornell 
views herself as having produced a solution to the equality/difference debate. 167 I 
will concentrate upon this debate and the way in which Cornell's approach 
provides an interesting response to the Person~s Case. 
As discussed above, women were initially deemed not to be classifiable as 
'persons'. This was changed as a result of the Person~s Case~ thereby paving the 
way for allowing women to have some of the same rights as men. This scenario 
raises the well-worn equality/difference debate discussed above, as to whether 
women should be classified, in law, as 'just like men~ in order to obtain the same 
rights as men or whether particular rights should pertain to women~ as women. 
This debate can be illustrated further by considering an area of law that has 
historically suffered from an assumption that men are the norm~ against which 
women should be judged. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 sl states that it is 
unlawful to treat a woman 'less favourably that a man~ (and vice versa). It was 
therefore argued in the English Employment Appeal Tribunal168 that the Act could 
not be used to prevent discrimination against a pregnant woman because she 
165 Cornell (2000a) p. 19. 
166 This common description is understandable given her reference to Lacan and Irigaray in her 
work. see, for example, N. Naffine and R.J. Owens, 'Sexing Law' in Naffine and Owens (1997) p. 
6. 
167 D. Cornell (2000a) p. 17. 
168 Haynes v Malleable Working Men's Club (1985) ICR, 705, EAT. 
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could not show that a comparable pregnant man would not have been dismissed. 
As the Act could only operate by comparing women with men, the courts then 
decided to compare the employer's treatment of pregnant women with their 
treatment of sick men. The European Court of Justice169 later effectively 
overruled this approach to argue that dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy 
constituted direct sex discrimination. The earlier approach makes perfect sense if 
you are focused upon the question of how an employee who is not at work is to 
be treated. The problem is that, within this frame of reference, women's ability to 
give birth is seen as an aberration rather than a norm. 
An important move within feminist philosophy - as well as within the law 
- is to show how, within certain belief structures, the position of women cannot 
simply be added into models without disrupting the whole framework. It 
therefore becomes difficult to argue that the position of women in the framework 
is a marginal issue. It can become a fault line that undermines the legal or 
theoretical structure from within. So, in this practical legal example, a focus on 
sexual difference raises the following question: what falls out of our analysis 
when workers are viewed purely in terms of their ability to work? This example 
opens up broader questions of social organisation, including our attitudes to birth 
and to work. 
Cornell's conception of what it means to be a person responds to the debate 
as to whether women should be viewed as having particular rights as women. 170 
169 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum Voor Jonge Volwassen (VJV- Centrum) Plus C-177/88 
(1991) IRLR, 27, ECJ. 
170 This is Irigaray's position in L. Irigaray, I love to You: Sketch of a Possible Felicity in History 
(London: Routledge, 1996); L. lrigaray, 'Why Define Sexuate Rights' in Irigaray (1993b) pp. 81-
92. For Cornell's concerns about Irigaray's later work see, P. Cheah and E. Grosz, The Future of 
Sexual Difference: An Interview with Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell' in Diacritics, Vol. 28, 
No. I, 1998, p. 21. Cornell describes her development of the 'imaginary domain' as a reaction to 
Butler's argument that to symbolise the imaginary as feminine entails a conservative move. See 
Butler (1997). Butler does not engage with Irigaray in Butler (1997) but Cornell refers to Butler's 
general arguments and a personal discussion with Butler in 1995 which 'pushed her quite hard on 
the ontologization inherent in Irigaray', P. Cheah and E. Grosz (1998) p. 21. I will trace the 
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She argues that women should be 'added in' (viewed as subject to legal rights) as 
persons (not as women). So, rights are to be viewed as attaching to the idea of 
being a person. However, she aims to avoid the problem of women simply being 
subsumed under the neutral term, 'person'- and as such being viewed as having 
a male body and traditional lifestyle - by her unusual definition of the term 
'person'. This can be illustrated by the way she talks about 'the project of 
becoming a person': 
What we think of as 'individuality' and 'the person' are not assumed as a given but 
respected as part of a project, one that must be open to each one of us on an 
equivalent basis. 171 
There is an image of overcoming what you have been- or rejecting stereotypes-
in an act of personal transformation, which is protected by law, described as 
'going beyond the limit' .172 She does not envisage that we change individually, 
through an act of will, but that there is a collective transformation, an 'acting out' 
of different ways of living, facilitated by the law. In order that we should have 
any hope of being successful in this 'project of becoming a person', Cornell cites 
three conditions that should be protected by law: 
1) bodily integrity; 2) access to symbolic forms sufficient to achieve linguistic skills 
permitting the differentiation of oneself from others and; 3) the protection of the 
imaginary domain. 173 
In this context, it is important to note that Cornell's concern that we should be 
able to 'differentiate ourselves from others' is intimately linked with Cornell's 
'project of becoming a person'. Differentiation from others is to be safeguarded 
by allowing access to symbolic forms and linguistic skills. Presumably, she has in 
mind an ability to define oneself - rather than to view oneself as, for example, 
position Cornell develops in response more slowly, below. 
171 Cornell (1995) p 4. 
172 For a discussion ofthe personal transformation involved in personhood, see Cornell (1995) pp. 
4-5. For a discussion of the difference between 'parameters and limits' see Cornell (2000a) pp. 
140-141. Inheritance of culture, language and country sets parameters but cannot impose limits 
'that so rigidly define us that we cannot develop a personal response to the particularity of the 
situation'. Cornell (2000a) p. 140. 
173 Cornell (1995) p 4. 
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only a wife/partner/mother etc. with respect to others. This could be contrasted 
with a position in which 'differentiation from others' involves being able to 
throw them out of your house. Her emphasis upon symbolic form and 
imagination is in keeping with Cornell's whole system. Her model prioritises the 
imagination. It is this, collective imaginary (both conscious and unconscious) that 
she refers to by the term 'imaginary domain'. Again, this is to be protected by 
law. She proposes that the protection of the 'imaginary domain' should operate as 
a very broad legal principle. As discussed above, a woman who is subject to 
sexual harassment is to make a legal claim that the harassment interferes with her 
self-image and hence her project of becoming a person. 
Cornell is rightly concerned about the way in which those claiming sexual 
harassment are viewed as victims, appealing to law for protection. She argues 
that the claim to be able to protect one's imaginary domain means that one is not 
set up as a victim but as claiming personhood. This ties in with her argument that 
whenever a legal decision is made then the question addressed by the judges 
should be 'would free and equal persons agree to this?' Given the choice, persons 
would not agree to a legal decision that would undermine their imaginary domain 
which would include an image of themselves. 
For Cornell, the project of becoming a person involves being able to act out 
our sexual identity in ways that derive from 'how we imagine ourselves to be'. 
The stress on the imagination means that her model appears to conceive of social 
change as occurring as a result of our ability to think about ourselves differently. 
It is possible to reverse her model, so that it is the collective acting out of identity 
that becomes the impetus for changes in self-image. Generally, however, her 
stress is upon a 'top-down' change. This is emphasised by her plea that we try to 
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'create psychic maps from outer space' ,174 to encourage the rejection of 
stereotypes. This is also illustrated by her description of the imaginary domain in 
Heart of Freedom, 
The imaginary domain is the space ofthe 'as if in which we imagine who we might 
be ifwe made ourselves our own end and claimed ourselves as our own person. 175 
I sympathise with Cornell's aims but am worried by this abstraction. We cannot 
remove ourselves from the way in which we are treated in our everyday lives but 
that does not prevent social change. For example, it may be that a legal secretary 
can have an interesting social life in which she acts out her identity in any 
number of different ways. However, if at work she is treated as an emotional 
punch ball and as having low status on a repeated daily basis, it would be 
difficult to sustain this self-image. It is the daily ambiguities, for example as to 
what is a reasonable request at work, and how these are negotiated (without 
necessarily being thought through), that are an important part of common 
experience. Cornell's emphasis upon the imaginary, as the domain of ideas that 
effect our lives, shifts attention away from the importance of mundane, repeated 
tasks and habits; the negotiation of power differences; and ambiguity as to what 
constitutes abuse. 
To draw out this point, it is possible to compare Cornell's view of the 
imaginary with an alternative view of imagination proposed by Gatens. 176 As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, Gatens argues that it is difficult for the mainly male, 
white, upper middle-class judiciary simply to imagine themselves in the position 
of women. Her view of imagination, derived from her reading of Spinoza, is that 
it emerges from bodily experience. This makes Gatens much more pessimistic 
about the ability of the judiciary to make the 'mental leap' outside their own 
174 Florence (1997) p. 20. 
175 Cornell (1998) p. 8. 
176 M. Gatens, 'Power, Ethics and Sexual Imaginaries' in Gatens (1996) pp. 125-145. 
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bodily experience that is required of them by Cornell. She does not engage with 
Cornell but warns against reliance upon racism and sexism training-days for a 
judiciary who see women, for example, only in subservient roles. In other words, 
she denies that they are able to make the public use of reason required of them by 
Cornell.' 77 
Cornell would argue that defeatism is unnecessary, that Gatens simply 
produces an argument for a change in the selection of judiciary rather than an 
abandonment of Cornell's legal test. However, I use the example merely to 
illustrate a conceptual point about Cornell's vision of the imagination, which 
appears 'top-down' - removed from bodily experience. Cornell makes an 
analogous 'top-down' move in relation to the role of law. Law is positioned as 
acting down upon the person, facilitating his/her 'project of becoming a person'-
just as social change is understood to occur as a result of changes in the 
imagination. For Cornell, there is a realm that works from above to alter 
something else. However, there is also a closer link between these 'realms' of the 
'imaginary domain' and of law, than this analogy would suggest. The law is 
called upon to protect our collective imagination ('the imaginary domain') and 
yet the law is actually a creation of the imaginary domain itself. In other words, 
Cornell's argument that we are subjects with rights relies upon the argument that, 
in modernity, we imagine ourselves to be subjects with rights. She is an astute 
political campaigner, and not na'ive about the conservatism of actual court 
decisions, but understandably wants to make women's rights permanent. She 
wants us to think of a time when the fight for women's rights has been won and, 
177 This is akin to Foucault's 'anxiety about judging' that it always involves the idea that the judge 
is removed from the circumstances. M. Foucault, 'On Popular Justice: A Conversation with 
Maoists' in M. Foucault, Selected interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, C. Gordon, ed. 
(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980) p. 30; M. Foucault, 'The Anxiety of Judging' in M. Foucault, 
Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961-1984 (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996b) pp. 241-254. 
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for example, women in every country have gained the right to abortion. This 
determined optimism does, I think, lead her to take too seriously law's claim to 
dictate reality. She wants to give us scope to define ourselves anew rather than 
offering a definition of what it is to be a person, so that her model emphasises 
transcendence of our current position and the possibility of collective change. 
However, the one thing that is already defined is that being a person means being 
subject to law. This not only undercuts her emphasis upon our ability to define 
ourselves; it makes law integral to our self-definition from the start. 
Cornell's position is complex with regard to the relationship between 
theory and practice. There appear to be two Cornells. One operates within a 
liberal framework and proposes the imaginary domain; the other is the radical 
socialist feminist activist. I suspect that what lies behind this apparent 
schizophrenia is a commitment to radical politics that views her theoretical 
position as a practical engagement with liberals. To put it into the language 
preferred by liberals, she is saying to them, 'if you buy the arguments of Dworkin 
and Rawls then you must accept this feminist analysis'. On the other hand, she is 
clearly convinced by her arguments - they are not adopted just for pragmatic 
purposes. It is thus tempting to try to account for her more radical activism by 
viewing her theoretical work as strategic. This paradox can be accounted for by 
considering her Hegelian position. Just as Adorno was concerned to analyse the 
work of his contemporaries as an indication of 'where we are now' so Cornell 
deals practically with US liberals. It is not merely a strategy, but neither is it the 
last word that can be said about her theoretical position. This would account for 
her eclectic use of contemporary theorists. 
The problem then becomes: if her stress is upon practical reason, does her 
suggestion work? Below, I want to argue that her engagement with the US 
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liberals, in particular Rawls and Dworkin, could undermine the more radical aims 
of her project. Central to this problem is her innovative use of Rawls to produce 
the legal test: would free and equal persons agree to this legislation/judgment? I 
will briefly outline the way in which she reworks Rawls and then discuss the 
extent to which Cornell's test leaves her open to an unwanted libertarian 
response. This is used to illustrate how Cornell's reworking of Rawls leads her 
into a dilemma regarding the extent to which she can leave open the meaning of 
what it is to be a person, within her legal test itself. 
Rawls and the Imaginary Domain 
Cornell points out, 
Although I am relying on Kant's postulation of an original contract as an idea of 
reason, my formulation is not strictly 'contractarian', if one means, by 
contractarian, the use of a contract theory in a liberal way as a 'moral or justice 
proof procedure'. I am explicitly using the idea of the original contract as a 
heuristic device. 178 
This can be illustrated by considering Kant's comments about the original 
contract, which he also employs as a heuristic device: 
The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly 
speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone 
we can think ofthe legitimacy of a state. 179 (Italics are in the original.) 
Cornell's work also derives from Kant's position that to be a person is linked 
with the moral imperative: to treat oneself and others as if one were free. 
In A Theory of Justice, 180 Rawls also draws from Kant to set up a thought 
experiment. He asks the question that Cornell wants to keep in play: 'what would 
free and equal persons agree to?' Rawls uses this thought experiment to derive 
fixed answers as to how society should be organised based upon what 'heads of 
178 Cornell (1995) p. 242. 
179 I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. M.J. Gregor. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996) pp. 92-93. 
1&0 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972); J. Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement (Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
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household' would agree to if they did not know what position they would hold in 
society, i.e. they are under a 'veil of ignorance'. This is to avoid, for example, 
those who knew they would be rich arguing against redistribution of wealth. He 
argues that persons under the veil of ignorance would produce a 'general 
conception of justice' with the central idea that, 
all social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
bases of self-respect- are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. 181 
These are ordered in terms of priority, such that the protection of civil liberties 
cannot be undermined for other reasons, such as redistribution of wealth. In this 
way Rawls gives content to what 'free and equal persons' would decide under the 
veil of ignorance. 
Political philosopher, Susan Moller Okin points out that Rawls initially 
envisaged the (male) 'heads of household' as meeting under the veil of 
ignorance, 182 a move which unwittingly undercuts his aim to exclude bias in his 
thought experiment. Okin183 argues that if 'free and equal persons' risked entering 
into society positioned as women then a more radical reinterpretation is required 
than is given in Rawls' analysis. Nobody who risked being treated as a woman 
would leave unchallenged the unequal division of labour within the family, for 
example. Further, Okin184 illustrates that Rawls ignores injustice within the 
family and even relies upon the assumption that the family is a just institution 
when he discusses the development of a sense of justice in Part Three of A 
Theory of Justice. 185 
181 Rawls (1972) p. 303. 
182 Rawls (1972) p. 128 and p. 146 cited S.M. Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989) p. 196. See also Okin (1989) pp. 89-109; Rawls' response to Okin is in Rawls 
(2001) pp. 162-168. 
183 Okin (1989) pp. 89-109. 
184 Okin (1989) pp. 97-101. 
185 In drawing up principles of moral psychology he states 'First Law: given that family 
institutions are just ... ' Rawls ( 1972) p. 490. 
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In contrast, Cornell, with her different conception of personhood from 
Rawls and from Okin, wants to avoid deriving fixed arguments as to what would 
be agreed by free and equal persons. She wants to keep this question in play as a 
legal test, to be considered whenever a legal decision is to be reached. 
Thought Experiment: Nozick's Application of Cornell's 
Legal Test 
At this point, I will refer to Nozick's libertarian work to draw out one of my 
concerns with Cornell's legal test and to further examine her conception of 
personhood. I will defer detailed discussion of 'self-ownership' to Chapter 6. 
Cornell argues that whenever a piece of legislation is to be passed, and whenever 
judges have to make a legal decision, as a guide they should ask themselves: 
would free and equal persons agree to this? This does not assume that persons 
start from a position of equality and freedom and Cornell is clear that they do not. 
However, it is intended to be a radical reworking of Rawls' work because it 
keeps in play and repeats the question of freedom and equality. The test 'would 
free and equal persons agree to this legislation or this legal judgment?' does not 
dictate what would be decided, neither does it produce one answer that is to be 
fixed for all time. This is because Cornell wants the person, and not the state, to 
define what it means to be a person. She is concerned that everyone is given an 
equivalent chance to develop their 'project of becoming a person.'' 86 
This can be compared with Nozick's conception of what it is to be a person 
in what is for him an ideal, the 'minimal state': 
186 Cornell (2000a) p. 18. 
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The minimal state treats us as inviolate individuals, who may not be used in certain 
ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons 
having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes. Treating us with respect by 
representing our rights, it allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to 
choose our life and to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, insofar as 
we can, aided by the voluntary co-operation of other individuals possessing the 
same dignity. 187 (Italics are added.) 
Although Cornell's conclusions are very different from those ofNozick, and he is 
not a writer with whom she has engaged, there is a similarity between his 
reference to our 'conception of ourselves' and Cornell's emphasis upon the 
imaginary domain. Both are linked with personhood which is to be protected, 
with rights against competing claims. In Cornell's work, it must be remembered 
that the idea of the imaginary domain is intimately linked with her legal test: free 
and equal persons would not agree to any decision that would harm their image 
of themselves. For example, employing Cornell's test, she argues that the right 
not to be sexually harassed, or the right to have an abortion, are fundamental 
legal rights necessary to treat women as free and equal persons. 188 To fail to allow 
these rights would damage the woman's imaginary domain, her self-image, and 
therefore it would damage her project of becoming a person. As her test is 
actually intended to be used by judges and legislators, this is an assumption that 
must be made when deciding what free and equal persons would agree to. 
I want to think about the possible response ofNozick to Cornell's work in 
order to draw out Cornell's view of personhood. As he has not engaged with her I 
will base my arguments upon his clearly stated position in Anarchy, State and 
Utopia. 189 Imagine Nozick as a legislator faced with a decision to increase 
taxation to pay for the justice system to enforce the legal rights that Cornell 
proposes, such as the tort of sexual harassment, employee rights, Spanish 
language rights. These are torts, i.e. they give persons rights against others, but 
187 Nozick (1974) pp. 333-334. 
188 This is restated in Cornell (2000a) p. 3; Cornell (1995) pp. 31-91 . 
189 Nozick (1974). 
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they are to be enforced by the state. which must be paid for from taxation. 
Nozick, as legislator, is asked to employ Cornelrs test: "would free and equal 
persons agree to this?'. For Nozick, to be treated as if you were free is to be 
treated as if you own all rights over yourself that would be owned by a chattel-
slave owner in a slave society. As owners of their labour, free persons have the 
right to keep anything they earn by the use of their labour. To be taxed above the 
level required to produce a minimal state190 is therefore the equivalent of coerced 
labour, for Nozick. Nozick would argue that free persons should not be forced to 
pay taxes. Nozick can easily respond to Cornell's test because his position is 
based upon his own very different understanding of how 'free persons' would 
want to be treated by the state. 
The 'equality' clause in the question is only slightly less straightforward 
because Nozick views free persons as 'equal'. Nozick's arguments for self-
ownership do not result in a society in which there is equality of income and this 
is not part of his 'ideal'. However, Cornell's test does not address this point. It 
simply asks the judges and the legislature to speculate upon what free and equal 
persons would do and to legislate or judge accordingly. Nozick could argue that 
just as free persons would not be forced to pay taxes above those required for a 
minimal state, so equal persons -not subject to command by a superior body, 
neither the state nor a feudal master - would also have the right to keep the 
product of their labour. It is consistent with Nozick's position to assume that he 
would construe 'equality' in the context of Cornell's test, as entailing the rights 
of workers in a capitalist society as contrasted with those of a feudal serf, for 
example. By appealing to the idea of self-ownership and freedom, Nozick could 
argue that he was viewing persons as both free and as equal and that this fulfilled 
19° For a summary of his position see, Nozick (1974) pp. 52-53. 
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Cornell's test. Therefore as legislator he could argue that, applying Cornell's test. 
'free and equal persons' would not agree to an increase in taxation to finance 
anything beyond a minimal state. 
This argument could be viewed as unfair to Cornell because it tears away 
this legal test from her explanation of the development of personhood. I have 
artificially broken down Cornell's arguments in order to examine them. At this 
stage it is clear that Cornell cannot answer Nozick's hypothetical argument by 
limiting herself to the question of 'would free and equal persons agree to this?' 
because both have in play different views of freedom and equality. I will deal 
with a number of her potential responses, below. 
Cornell's test is set up to compare different competing claims of persons in 
court and arguments to the legislature. Arguments about the framework of 
taxation laws, as opposed to their application, would have to take place in front 
of the legislature. As I have argued, there is nothing in Cornell's test that would 
prevent Nozick from arguing that free and equal persons would not agree to the 
taxation required to finance her proposed changes in tort law. To oppose this 
argument, Cornell could resort to the 'Rawlsian' move of expanding her 
definition of what free and equal persons would want. As outlined above, Rawls 
expands upon this to produce arguments that are not perfectionist, i.e. they do not 
dictate what it to live a good life. However, he provides an answer to the question 
of what free and equal persons would agree to in a manner that Cornell expressly 
avoids. I will return to this point in the next section. Alternatively, Cornell could 
say that it would be Nozick's right to make this argument to his fellow 
legislators, but that others, with opposing views of what is necessary for their 
project of being a person, could offer alternative arguments. She could support 
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those arguments on other grounds, but my point is that these could not be deriYed 
from her test alone. 
The move of speculating what 'free and equal persons' would agree to-
which Cornell want to keep open - is very similar to speculations about life in 
the state of nature, to be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 191 In both cases, there is a 
thought experiment, an appeal to a different sphere, that supposedly empties the 
empirical world of some of its content. Later, I will discuss how Macpherson192 
and Pateman193 both show how Hobbes imports an image of how persons behaved 
in his own culture into his state of nature. Similarly, CornelP94 and Okin195 have 
demonstrated how Rawls imports stereotyped images of the relationship between 
the sexes into his discussion of the 'heads of household' making decisions under 
his veil of ignorance. I want to extend this argument and think about this problem 
in the context of Cornell's own work. 
Whenever theorists produce rules discovered under a veil of ignorance - by 
speculating, or asking what 'free and equal persons would agree to', or 'how 
persons would behave in a state of nature' -they have to import some existing 
views of persons. Failure to do so simply deprives their thought experiment of 
content. Cornell is conscious of this criticism, especially as she applies the point 
so effectively against Rawls. She argues that her test keeps open the question of 
what it is to be a person (and the possibility of change), because the answer is not 
to be settled for all time but the test is to be repeated as a legal test. In other 
words, she is not dictating what image of a person would be produced - by 
191 Cornell describes herself as using the idea of an original contract as a 'heuristic device'. See 
above p. 74 and Cornell (1995) p. 242. 
192 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1962). 
193 Pateman ( 1988). 
194 Cornell ( 1995) pp. 12-20. 
195 Okin (1989) pp. 89-109. 
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deciding what would be said under the veil of ignorance (or, by analogy, in the 
state of nature). However, her test is set up to be applied by the judges and 
legislature, who would import their own version of what free and equal persons 
would want, using her test. Whilst Cornell does refuse to imply, in a Rawlsian 
fashion, a fixed answer to the question of what free and equal persons would 
agree to, it may be that Cornell does this by the back door. 
I want to argue that Cornell does import her image of what it is to be a 
person. She does this in two ways: firstly, she chooses examples to cash out how 
the test should be used; and secondly, and more broadly, to make her test work 
she needs to argue for a particular view of the process of 'individuation' (or how 
one becomes a person). Cornell has a choice: either she can resist filling in the 
gaps and importing her views of what free and equal persons would agree to; or 
she can provide examples of how it should work. If she chooses the former then 
she must put up with the fact that others such as Nozick can cash out her test to 
produce results that, as a socialist feminist, she could not endorse. This is 
inevitable because left without examples the test is so broad. Elsewhere, 196 I have 
argued that the judges, who have proved themselves as extremely accomplished 
at interpreting existing case law in ways that give expression to their own 
views,197 would not have their discretion limited by such a broad test. The other 
alternative (of importing her view of free and equal persons into the test) would 
involve Cornell making the move that she criticises in Rawls. 
Before looking at this in more detail, I want to examine why she may be 
concerned to avoid this second move by recalling the feminist concerns that are 
addressed by Cornell's arguments. Cornell's approach - of arguing that women 
should demand to be treated as free and equal persons by the operation of law -
196 Richardson (1999) pp. 3-31. 
197 J.A.G. Griffiths, The Politics of the Judiciary, 5th edition (London: Fontana, 1997). 
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avoids the constraint imposed upon feminist thinking in the face of 
poststructuralist concerns about the category 'women', as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Cornell faces the problem that simply viewing women as persons has resulted in 
the treatment of women as if they were men, viewing male bodies and lifestyles 
as the norm against which women are compared. This is the case, for example, in 
the operation of the English Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which makes it 
unlawful to treat a woman 'less favourably than a man'. Cornell's answer to this 
problem is that the definition of what it is to be a person is not to be viewed as 
paradigmatically male in her test because the definition of person is to be kept 
open by the repeated use of her test. It is therefore central to Cornell's argument 
that she does not fill in the meaning of what it is to be a person. It should also be 
noted that the way in which her test is proposed, as a practical legal principle, 
means that it is not to be filled in by persons themselves but by the legislature 
and by the judiciary, acting on their behalf. Hence my practical concerns about 
such a broad test. 
Cornell, Autonomy and Self-Ownership 
In this section, I will expand upon Cornell's image of persons, compared to that 
ofNozick. Recall that, in order that we should have any hope of being successful 
in this 'project of becoming a person', Cornell cites three conditions that should 
be protected by law: 
1) bodily integrity; 2) access to symbolic forms sufficient to achieve linguistic skills 
permitting the differentiation of oneself from others and; 3) the protection of the 
imaginary domain. 198 
The differentiation of oneself from others indicates Cornell's vision of 
'autonomy'. She does not like the term, preferring to talk of 'individuation' 
198 Cornell (1995) p. 4. 
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rather than "autonomy' and "individual·. She wants the law to protect the process 
of individuation, by protecting persons' rights by the use of her test. Nozick. in 
contrast, starts with rights-bearing individuals, not a process of individuation; an 
entirely different move. Nozick is mentioned in a footnote, in which Cornell is 
critical of libertarian theories which, 
rest on an atomistic view of the self that is incompatible with an adequate account 
ofhow selves come to be persons with their individual identities. 199 
Nozick argues that self-ownership is necessary if persons are to be treated as 
autonomous. Nozick's persons are already 'individuals' from birth and the 
question is therefore addressed as to what duties they owe each other. In contrast, 
Cornell argues for greater legal safeguards than a minimal state could offer so 
that the law can protect the process of individuation (by which she means the 
attainment of personhood).200 She describes this in terms of the law allowing 
persons space in which to develop. She does not want the law to encourage a 
particular conception of the good but to defend a person's project of 
individuation. 
Cornell's position is closer to that of the analytic Marxist Gerald Cohen 
than N ozick. As part of a number of arguments aimed at undermining the 
attractiveness of Nozick's argument based upon the assumption of self-
ownership, Cohen201 attacks Nozick's link between self-ownership and autonomy. 
Cohen defines self-ownership as the premise that we should be treated as if we 
had the rights of chattel-slave owners over ourselves.202 Cohen's argument is that 
199 D. Cornell (2000a) p. 167 fn.ll. For an analysis of the meaning of 'atomistic' Cornell cites 
with approval C. Taylor, 'Atomism' in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 187-210. Taylor attributes 
'atomism' to both Hobbes, in Taylor (1985) p. 187 and Nozick, in Taylor (1985) p. 188, amongst 
others, describing them as sharing 'a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals 
for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual' Taylor ( 1985) p. 187. 
200 See Cornell (1995) pp. 4-5. 
201 Cohen ( 1995). 
202 Cohen (1995) p. 68. 
83 
Nozick's principles of self-ownership produce a society in which fewer persons 
have actual autonomy than in other potential societies. For example, the losers in 
such a society- based upon the unrestrained capitalism that Nozick derives from 
self-ownership - would have to work for others in unregulated conditions, which 
Cohen argues, undercuts common ideas of what autonomy involves.203 
Cornell could adopt a similar argument to that of Cohen, in a manner that is 
generally consistent with her position, by arguing that her test must be 
understood to contain her conception of individuation. This works because the 
society produced according to Nozick's rights of self-ownership would be a 
society in which Cornell's process of individuation ('the project of becoming a 
person') would be compromised. 
Cohen, like Nozick, is fundamentally concerned with class and with the 
question of distribution of resources, whereas Cornell is concerned with broader 
questions of personhood and 'individuation', and focuses upon race and 'sexuate 
rights' - a term she employs to indicate that she is unwilling to sacrifice issues of 
sexuality and queer politics to issues of sex/gender. However, Cornell would 
agree that it is a prerequisite to the process of individuation that persons have 
access to the minimum material conditions of life for everyone to get off the 
ground their 'project of becoming a person'. These are not the conditions 
pertaining in the society that Nozick defends. So, Cornell could argue that her 
test does not stand alone; that when she states that the law must protect the 
imaginary domain she implies into her legal test her own understanding of 
personhood. 
To summarise, Cornell could argue that her test 'would free and equal 
persons agree to this legislation/judgment?' must be read as giving expression to 
203 Cohen (1995) pp. 236-238. I return to Cohen's arguments against self-ownership in Chapter 6. 
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these conditions. This would mean that Nozick (as legislator in my thought 
experiment) could not read her test 'would free and equal persons agree to this?' 
by employing his view of what is meant be a 'free and equal person'. Cornell 
could then maintain that when her test is read so as to give effect to her view of 
personhood the legislature could assume that 'free and equal persons' would 
approve taxation statutes to enact and enforce the torts she proposes. 
Further, Cornell's test is proposed with the intention that it can be used to 
consider competing rights between individuals. She could envisage that the 'free 
and equal persons' whom the legislature should consider would be those in 
poverty, rather than persons generally. It could be argued that these persons 
would not agree to living in a capitalist society (or, at the very least would not 
agree to a society without a welfare state) because such a society would 
jeopardise their project of becoming a person. The fact that there is no clear 
answer illustrates the problem of having to fill in Cornell's test, discussed above. 
Cornell could also argue that any free and equal persons, including those not in 
poverty, would agree to taxation for welfare. Living in a society that would be 
produced by Nozick's libertarian capitalism could be viewed as a situation which 
would jeopardise anyone's project of becoming a person, irrespective of poverty, 
because of the selfish values that are inculcated, for example.204 
Can Cornell make this move and still claim that she is not defining the 
content of what it is to be a person, thereby getting round the dilemma I proposed 
above? In other words, could she argue that her process of individuation is 
distinct from giving content to personhood? It is my view that the same dilemma 
does apply. This can be seen by considering which version of a society she would 
204 For a discussion of the relationship between such 'personal' values and political theory, see 
G.A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 2001 ). 
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want the legislature to consider. This has to be filled in at some point. Either it is 
filled in by Cornell, which she explicitly wants to avoid, or it is filled in by the 
legislature/judge who may be open to a number of arguments as to what free and 
equal persons would agree to. 
Comparison with Themes from Chapter 2 
Both Nozick and Cornell are concerned with 'our conception of ourselves'. For 
Cornell our 'imaginary domain' should be protected by law. I want to give a 
more detailed account of Cornell's image of what it is to be a person, and the 
process of individuation, by comparing this with the general points about the self 
discussed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2, I drew out the following common properties 
from contemporary views of the self, as an ontological concept (as contrasted 
with a person as a legal concept, as a self that is subject to law) by Oyama, Clark 
and Battersby: 
1. there is an emphasis upon the embedded, embodied nature of cognition/self; 
2. this results in an image of cognition/self that tends to focus upon their 
emergent properties; 
3. linked with this, they are concerned with thinking of cognition/the self as 
dynamic rather than fixed; 
4. there is an attack upon the subject/object divide (in Clark's work this is 
cognition! environment split) as traditionally conceived and a move to 
characterise the emergent process as one which involves rethinking this 
divide; 
5. there is a shift away from the importance of centralised control. 
How does Cornell's image of personhood and 'individuation' differ from this 
broad approach? Considering point 1, she has an image of personhood that is 
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embodied and sexed. Sexuality is central to the project of becoming a person. 
She argues that, 
Since, psychoanalytically, the imaginary is inseparable from one's sexual imago, it 
demands that no one be forced to have another's imaginary imposed upon him or 
herself in such a way as to rob him or her of respect for his or her sexuate being. 
!hus, wha~ John Rawls has argued is a primary good, namely self-respect, is 
mtegrated mto the very idea of the imaginary domain itself.2°5 
This allows her to talk about the need for "sexuate rights' as necessary for the 
laws' protection of this project, an argument that she supports without the need to 
depend upon psychoanalysis. It can be derived from the view that sexual identity 
is important to our image of who we are in our culture. 
There are potential arguments about the extent to which her image of a 
person is embedded. It is not "embedded' in the same way as discussed in 
Chapter 2 because Cornell emphasises the imaginary domain and attempts to 
think 'as if from outer space' 206 in order to produce social change, and this 
methodology differs from the stress placed upon the emergence of change by 
changes in bodily habit, discussed in Chapter 2. 
However, Cornell's view of personhood is culturally embedded. This can 
be illustrated by the way in which she compares her work, derived from Hegel, to 
that of libertarians, discussed above. In her chapter 'Worker's Rights and the 
Defense of Just-Cause Statutes' 207 Cornell distinguishes her position from those 
influenced by Hobbes, and from theorists who start with the individual rather 
than a process of individuation of oneself from others. I will return to the work of 
Hobbes and self-ownership in chapters 5 and 6. 
205 Cornell (1995) p. 8. 
206 Florence (1997) p. 15. 
207 Cornell (2000a) pp. 83-117. A just-cause statute demands that employers apply justice to their 
reasons for a worker's dismissal and can be called upon to explain them. In England the common 
law ·of employment at will, which Cornell attacks, has been superseded by legislation granting 
workers rights against 'unfair dismissal'. This applies a reasonableness test. Similarly, Cornell 
advocates a 'rational cause' rather than a 'just cause' to avoid speculations about justice, Cornell 
(2000a) p. 84. 
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Turning to point 2, Cornell's view of personhood as a project certainly 
implies the idea of the emergence of a person. Further, 
A person is not something 'there' on this understanding, but a possibility, an 
aspiration which, because it is that, can never be fulfilled once and for all. The 
person is, in other words, implicated in an endless process of working through 
personae. On this definition, the person is neither identical with the self or the 
traditional philosophical subject.2°8 
Point 3 is linked with this. The person in Cornell is not fixed. She envisages a 
process of transformation that is never complete. 
Turning to point 4, Cornell starts with an image of individuals who are not 
separate from each other but then have to work at this separation between self 
and other. This split from the other is viewed in Lacanian terms, with an 
emphasis upon the symbolic. The law is called upon to protect, 
access to symbolic forms sufficient to achieve linguistic skills permitting the 
differentiation of oneself from others. 209 
The question about the relationship between subject and object in Cornell's work 
is derived from Hegel. In her later work, her emphasis is upon intersubjectivity 
which is to include women- rather than the relationship between subject and 
object.210 This point can be illustrated by considering her analysis of the labour 
contract. She contrasts her theory, derived from Hegel, with accounts derived 
from Hobbes which she views as a deep influence upon the 'libertarian 
perspective adopted by the law and economics literature' .m What is at stake is 
not the question of regulation of the employment relationship but, 
what view of regulation truly promotes individual freedom ... for Hegel state 
regulation is done in the name of the ideal reciprocal symmetry.212 
This ties in with her discussion of the subject, 
208 Cornell (1995) p. 5. 
209 Cornell ( 1995) p. 4. 
21
° Cornell (2000a) p. 85. 
211 Cornell (2000a) p. 97. 
212 Cornell (2000a) p. 97. 
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For He~el, reconciliation with the community in modernity is always mediated by 
the subject who comes to understand her community as a response to her own 
demand.213 
Turning to point 5, recall that the law is called upon to protect access to symbolic 
forms in order to achieve linguistic skills which permit the differentiation of 
oneself from others.214 From this it can be seen that Cornell does have an 
emphasis upon 'centralised control' of a person's actions, rather than the focus 
upon bodily habits or problem solving that characterised the approach of Clark, 
Battersby and Oyama outlined in Chapter 2. What is most important for Cornell 
is the ideal; she defends the notion that we can change our lives as a result of 
imagination. Adopting the approach from Chapter 2, I would argue that this is too 
'top-down' and that it is also necessary to start from an analysis of what we do in 
our daily lives rather than what we imagine ourselves to be. However, I do not 
want to overstate the distinction between these approaches. For example, none of 
the approaches in Chapter 2 deny the importance of ideas and their material 
effects and Cornell would not deny the importance of daily activity. The 
difference lies in their emphasis. 
This point is linked with the argument, discussed in Chapter 1, about the 
relationship between theory and political practice. FoucaultZ15 argues that it is 
possible to envisage a situation in which it is necessary to act, such that practice 
forms a link between different theoretical positions, and conversely that theory 
can provide a move between different practices. Similarly, it is possible to think 
about the relationship between feminist theory and practice in terms that can be 
both 'top-down' - in that ideas promote different practices (as emphasised by 
213 Cornell (2000a) p. 96. 
214 Cornell (1995) p. 4. 
215 Foucault and De leuze (1980) pp. 205-217. 
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Cornell) - and "bottom-up', so that different bodily practices open up different 
theoretical positions. 
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Chapter 4: Tort and the Technology of Risk 
The political imaginary is of a contractual form of justice established no longer of a 
natural order of rights but by the conventions of society, and of an ideal of a society 
in which each member's burdens and shares are fixed by social contract which is no 
longer a political myth but something made real by technical means .... The 
socialisation of risk does not seek to undermine capitalist inequality. Precisely the 
opposite: it is a means of treating the effects of that inequality.216 
I want to tum from Cornell's arguments for the reform of tort law, based upon 
her original reworking of personhood, to consider the way that English tort law 
now operates. This involves examining a different relationship between the 
person and law. To do so I will employ Fran<;ois Ewald's work on insurance and 
risk analysis. Insurance plays a central part in the practical operation of the law of 
tort. This is an aspect of legal practice that is lost if the focus is upon perfecting 
legal tests for liability derived from political philosophy, such as that proposed by 
Cornell. Insurance is now compulsory in all areas in which there is a risk of being 
sued in tort, for example when persons act as employers, producers of products, 
professionals, road-traffic users or home owners. It is the insurance system that 
allows the operation of tort as a system of loss distribution. 
Ewald217 expressly draws upon Foucault's analysis of 'govemmentality' 
from his late lectures, to be discussed below. Analysing techniques of 
government that employ a 'scientific approach' to risk analysis, Ewald considers 
the way in which insurance companies have altered the operation of this area of 
law in France. His work is helpful for thinking about the English law of 
obligations but I want to amend it in two different respects: one empirical and the 
other theoretical. Firstly, he concentrates upon the codified tradition in France 
216 M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage, 1999). 
p. 186. 
217 F. Ewald, 'Norms, Discipline and the Law' in R. Post, ed, Law and the Order of Culture 
(California: University ofCalifomia Press, 1991b) p. 138. 
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which differs in a number of respects from the English common law tradition. I 
will trace the way that the common law has accommodated the operations of 
insurance companies. 
Secondly, I will argue that a feminist critique opens up points that are 
ignored by Ewald. In particular, the insurance industry has assumed a simple 
public/private divide that is complicated by such a perspective. I will start by 
detailing Ewald's arguments in the context of the English common law, rather 
than the French codified tradition of law, then move to a consideration of 
feminist issues that arise from this model. Finally, I will return to Cornell's work 
to consider it in the context of Ewald's historical analysis. I continue to be 
interested in the way in which women occupy an ambiguous position with regard 
to the images of the self. This applies not only to the image of the prudent man 
who insures, but also to the process of becoming such an individual that is 
examined in Ewald's analysis of him. The idea of these actual insurance contracts 
replacing a hypothetical 'social contract' in providing a social means of 
safeguarding a 'commodious life' 218 by technical means will be explored. If 
insurance provides the dream of a 'contractual form of justice' / 19 based upon the 
hope that risks could be shared on the basis of need and not ability to insure, it 
has obviously not been implemented. It has not been an ambition that has been 
extended to women's traditional risks, which occupy an ambivalent position with 
respect to social insurance. 
218 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, E. Curley, ed. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Ltd. 1994b) Ch. Xlll, s. 
14, p. 78. 
219 Dean (1999) p. 186. 
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Ewald's Historical Understanding of 'Risk Analysis' and 
English Law 
In his analysis of insurance, Ewald is not discussing a marginal area of concern 
that could interest only personal injury lawyers. On the contrary, in his historical 
analysis he concludes that, 
At the end of the nineteenth century, insurance is thus not only one of the ways the 
provident person can guard against risk. The technology of risk, in its different 
epistemological, economic, moral, juridical and political dimensions becomes the 
principle of a new political and social economy. Insurance becomes social, not just 
in the sense that new types of risk become insurable, but because European 
societies come to analyze themselves and their problems in terms ofthe generalized 
technology of risk .... Societies envisage themselves as a vast system of insurance, 
and by overtly adopting insurance's forms they suppose that they are conforming to 
their own nature. 220 
This emphasis upon the control of risk becomes central to the construction of 
subjecthood, in Ewald's analysis. He is not describing the employment of 
insurance and risk analysis as a tool used by the state in a 'top-down' manner to 
manage persons. On the contrary, what it means to become a self is informed by 
the regimes of daily life that are dictated by risk assessment, for example 
attention to diet, to exercise, taking preventative medicine at regular intervals. 
Part of being this sort of subject involves looking to the state as protector of our 
hea1th and welfare. 
I will start by outlining the ways in which the technology of risk operates 
within the context of English law of obligations, but first I will set out Ewald's 
analysis of the technology of risk in terms of his explicit adoption of Foucault's 
understanding of 'govemmentality', Foucault's neologism for government 
rationality.221 In his late lecture series Foucault focused upon government as the 
'conduct of conduct'. This covers both daily relationships involving guidance and 
22° F. Ewald 'Insurance and Risk' in G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, eds., The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991a) p. 210. 
221 M. Foucault, M. 'Governmentality' in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller, eds., The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991a) pp. 
87-104. 
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control and relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty. In a 
well known argument, Foucault calls for a move away from analysis of 
governmental institutions to an examination of the processes and techniques of 
power that are used. This entails the view, also argued by feminists, that a theory 
as to what would make sovereignty legitimate does not describe the ways in 
which power actually operates. 
Ewald describes insurance as a technology of risk, which represents a way 
of ordering the world. The insurer 'produces risks' where previously it was 
thought that an event simply had to be suffered. Risk analysis represents a 
technique by which the government is able to both 'individualise and totalise' .222 
In other words, the technique of risk analysis affects everyone in society in a 
manner that focuses upon each and every individual. FoucauW23 traces the ways 
in which the health of the subject is integral to the functioning of power within 
society. He describes the way in which the power of the policing and control 
developed from the ability to kill his subjects through to the governance of life, to 
the health of subjects.224 Ewald's work takes up this history by illustrating the way 
in which the governance of life has developed by employing the technique of risk 
analysis. 
I want to reinforce a point made by Foucault - that 'it is not that everything 
is bad, but that everything is dangerous' 225 - by employing an argument used by 
222 M. Foucault, 'Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason' in S. McMurrin, 
ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Vol. II (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
1991 b) pp. 225-254. 
223 See, for example, M. Foucault, 'The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century' in M. 
Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, C. Gorton, ed., 
(New York: Random House Inc., 1980a) pp. 166-182. 
224 For example the final chapter of M. Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume One: An 
Introduction (London: Penguin, 1976) pp. 135-159. 
225 M. Foucault, 'Technologies of the Self in The Essential Works: 1954-1984 Vol. I, Ethics, 
Subjectivity and Truth, P. Rabinow, ed., (New York: The New Press, 1997a) p. 256. 
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Donna Haraway226 in a broader context. She argues that it is not really possible to 
opt out of engagement with the advance of techno-science, living in a 
technological society. It is not possible just to say 'no' to 'power'; to the concern 
with health or science; or, in this context, to the techniques of risk analysis. I will 
return to the argument below, in the context of insurance of South African 
women, to discuss questions raised by the insurance industry's policies against 
the risk of rape. 
A recognition of the way that English law has changed, considered by 
thinking through these techniques of govemmentality, allows critique to operate 
at a level that does not simply accept law's claims to dictate reality. Daniel 
Defort227 outlines the history of the French state as it begins to act as an insurer 
and to provide no fault compensation for employment injuries. In England, with 
the exception of certain industrial injuries, such as pneumoconiosis which have a 
specific system of compensation, anyone who has been injured or suffered loss as 
a result of another's negligence must sue in the courts for compensation. The 
state is involved in all major areas of civil litigation to the extent that it makes 
insurance compulsory and will ultimately enforce civil court decisions. 
In England, after the scandal over the case of thalidomide (in which those 
suffering deformities as a result of defects in the morning sickness pill were still 
without compensation ten years later), the Pearson Committee228 was set up in 
1972 to consider the arguments for no-fault compensation, as in the French 
226 D.J. Haraway, Modest_ Witness@Second _Millennium.F emaleMan@ _Meets_ OncoMouse ™ : 
Feminism and Technoscience, (London: Routledge, 1997). 
227 D. Defort, '"Popular Life" and Insurance Technology' in Burchell et al. (1991) pp. 211-233. 
228 Lord Pearson (Chair) Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury Cmnd 7054 (London: HMSO, 1978). The Commission recommended a mixed system of 
fault and no fault compensation which was ignored by the incoming Conservative administration 
in 1979. 
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system. Conaghan and ManselP29 have traced the way in which the opportunity to 
view tort law in terms of social insurance rather than individual harm was lost. 
The English common law has been very resourceful in incorporating 
changes and making any transition appear seamless. The common law has been 
absorbed into a broader structure of the system of insurance without altering the 
way in which liability is attributed to individuals. So, this change could not be 
understood by confining the analysis to a consideration of only cases and statutes. 
Whereas employment law is governed by legislation and dealt with in the 
Employment Tribunals, any common law claim of negligence, including 
workplace accidents, will be heard in the courts. Both will look at the 
circumstances of the case in detail. Although the cases express the obligations 
that we owe each other in terms of the individual, it is clear that working behind 
this is a system of insurance. 230 In other words, this method of loss distribution is 
not really about getting someone to apologise and compensate for actions that 
have caused harm. The judiciary may talk in such terms, but the framework of the 
law means that the matter is passed to the defendant's insurers who make a 
commercial decision about settlement. Ewald points out that, 
Insurance is not initially a practice of compensation or reparation. It is the practice 
of a certain type of rationality: one formalized by the calculus of probabilities. 231 
The philosopher Ian Hacking232 traces the history of the emergence and impact of 
statistics upon daily life and illustrates the way in which this use of the 
technology of risk is almost invisible by being ever-present. It would be 
impossible to consider litigation in the area of tort law without statistics. This 
operates at different levels: there is insurance for litigation which is calculated by 
229 J. Conaghan and W. Mansell, The Wrongs ofTort, 2nd edition (London: Pluto Press, 1999) pp. 
105-123. 
230 H. Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal Injury Claims (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
231 Ewald (1991a) p. 199. 
232 I. Hacking, The Taming ofChance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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considering the risk of accidents within a particular industry or area of life; but 
there is also the use of the techniques of assessing risk within the process of 
litigation itself. This can be divided into the problems of assessing liability for 
harm and for assessing the amount of compensation for the harm done. With 
regard to the question of liability, the job of the litigation lawyer in England is to 
estimate the chances of success, an endeavour which does not employ the most 
sophisticated techniques of risk analysis. 
Similarly, the assessment of risk 1s built into the legal principles 
themselves. Judges still talk about the defendant's actions and whether these fall 
below the standard expected of the reasonable man, discussed in earlier chapters. 
The reasonable man, in the guise of the reasonable employer, is expected to 
weigh up a number of factors: the likelihood of an accident, the severity of harm, 
if it does occur, and the sensitivity of any employee. These are to be calculated 
and balanced against a fourth factor: the cost of avoiding the risk. 233 
In addition, the most convoluted statistical analysis is reserved for the area 
of assessment of 'quantum of damage', the expression used to describe the 
strange quasi-science of putting a price on an injury. Damages are broken down 
into different areas: general damages, which are defined as 'not quantifiable', 
such as, 'pain and suffering', 'loss of amenity'; and special damages, which can 
be quantified, such as loss of earnings, or the replacement of blood-stained 
clothing. In the not-too-distant future people may wonder at the macabre 
precision of these calculations, which may be viewed as the remnants of an old 
notion of compensation, and these may be replaced by a more efficient method of 
233 A comparable approach to risk occurs within contract law in which the question of who bears 
the burden of the risk of any particular harm is negotiated as part of the contract. For this reason, 
O'Malley, a legal theorist interested in risk analysis, has argued that the development of contract 
law provides a 'blueprint for government through uncertainty' P. O'Malley, 'Uncertain Subjects: 
Risks, Liberalism and Contract' in Economy and Society Vol. 29, No.4, 2000. 
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loss distribution. At present, the minutiae of the arguments may surprise non-
lawyers. For example, if someone is in a coma she/he cannot claim under the 
head of 'pain and suffering' because this is not applicable (as she/he is not in 
pain) and so must claim under another head of damage, such as 'loss of amenity'. 
The calculation of damages to be paid are ascertained by reading Kemp and 
Mantle234 which details all the cases involving particular awards for injuries. The 
particular injury is compared with the case law, amended to take into account 
inflation between the date of trial and date of calculation. Approximately 98% of 
cases are settled before reaching court235 because of the risk of trial. There is also 
concern that in serious cases the claimanf36 should enjoy the money before 
dying, a factor which allows insurance companies to settle such cases more 
cheaply. 
It is in the area of 'loss of future earnings' where the techniques of risk 
come into their own. This involves the insurer's favourite: the mortality tables. 
These are amended annually and give an up-to-date assessments of the risk of 
death for any age and sex. With the advance of techno-science, especially genetic 
research, these techniques have improved and will be developed further. In the 
Birth of the Clinic, 237 Foucault details the emergence of contemporary medicine 
through the techniques of statistics, amongst other things. As Hacking238 points 
out, the use of these statistics can have positive consequences, such as the 
234 D. Kemp and P. Mantle, Damages for Personal Injury and Death, 7th edition (London: Sweet 
and Maxwell, 1999) This text is subject to updating. Alternatively, lawyers now subscribe to 
\Vww.westlaw.co.uk which updates twice daily. 
235 This is the estimated figure in F. Furedi, Courting Mistrust: the Hidden Growth of a Culture of 
Litigation in Britain (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1999) p. 5. He points out that this is an 
estimate because settlements can involve a confidentiality clause which disguises the figure. See 
also, H. Genn, Hard Bargaining: Out of Court Settlement in Personal Injury Claims (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
236 For ease ofreference, I have employed the nomenclature ofthe Civil Procedure Rules whether 
or not the case in question was subject to these rules at the time. I have therefore consistently 
referred to 'claimant' rather than 'plaintiff'. 
237 M. Foucault, Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York: 
Vintage/Random House, 1975). 
238 I. Hacking, How should we do the History of Statistics?' in Burchell, et al. (1991) pp. 181-195. 
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increase in sanitation. It is not a matter of saying 'no' to this technique but of 
understanding how this operates; the forms that it takes. This involves, not only 
considering the particular use of mortality tables within this peculiar method of 
loss distribution - whose inefficiency probably makes it a dated historical 
compromise239 - but also consideration of the broader implications of the way in 
which this technique is used. 
It is by focusing upon cultural objects such as mortality tables that 
Foucauldian analyses, such as that of Ewald, can be shown to owe some debt to 
the earlier work of Adorno. Although they differ in overall framework, both 
F oucauW40 and Adorno241 share a concern with the way that instrumental 
rationality develops within the West. However, there are clear differences. 
Adorno, as a Marxist, would object to the way in which the morality tables are 
used to calculate the appropriate compensation for an early death, as a way of 
commodifying life, i.e. treating life, and ourselves, as objects that can be 
exchanged in the market place.242 In contrast, Foucault's aim is to trace more 
detailed, specific modes of the operation of instrumental rationality, by which the 
subject is individuated vis-a-vis the totality and makes himself subject to the 
239 There were comments by the Master of the Rolls, in 2001, regarding a move to no fault 
compensation scheme thereby completing the transition to a more efficient system of loss 
distribution akin to the French system analysed by Ewald. It is my argument that the current 
English system fits within this model but in a way that is inefficient within the parameters of the 
system itself. For discussion of these comments: B. Mahendra, 'Revisiting No Fault 
Compensation' in New Law Journal, Vol. 151, No. 6987, 2001, p. 837; for the argument for no-
fault compensation: U. Essen, 'Tort compensation for victims of Medical Accidents' in New Law 
Journal, June 2001, pp. 846-854. 
240 
'I think that the Frankfurt School set problems that are still being worked on. Among others, 
the effects of power that are connected to a rationality that has been historically and 
geographically defined in the West ... ', M. Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with 
Duccio Trombadori, trans., R.J. Goldstein and J. Cascaito (New York: Semiotext( e), 1981) p. 
117. 
241 T. W. Adorno, and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (London: Verso, 1995). 
242 For a discussion ofthe ways in which personal injury compensation may be viewed in terms of 
commodification of the injury see M.J. Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade 
in Sex, Children, Body Parts and Other Things (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001) pp. 
184-205. 
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state.243 Drawing upon Foucault's work, Ewald describes a process in which 
selves become individuated by the way in which their avoidance, and calculation, 
of risk becomes a way of life. 
The courts' image of the 'reasonable man' is that he is the owner of his 
abilities and of his body. These are treated as if they were his property and had a 
price. He requires compensation if those parts of him are negligently damaged. It 
is important to hold onto Adorno's concern with commodification. In this 
context, personal injury litigation is accompanied by the commodification of the 
body, seen as an object that can be given a price. This occurs when, for example, 
one is awarded £10,000 for a broken leg - more if it shows signs of 
oesteoarthritis as a result of the injury. Given that judges feel comfortable setting 
a price upon personal injuries, it could be assumed that anything could be given a 
price. This is not the case. As I will discuss in more detail below, judges are 
squeamish about viewing women's traditional work of child care in such terms. 
In this way, women's traditional work falls outside the framework in which 
abilities are given a price. Whilst this could be viewed positively in that it 
provides an area that is potentially resistant to commodification, it does mean 
that women are not compensated in these cases. I will return to this point in later 
chapters to discuss its historical context and future development. 
Aspects of Foucault's work can be viewed as adding to the Marxist critique 
of the way in which human qualities and abilities are given a price. The 'self-
owning' individual is now one who must insure himself against risk; who must 
regulate himself and be prudent in his daily activities. Neither the Marxist nor 
Foucauldian analysis assume that this 'self-owning' individual is anything other 
than a fiction and both are critical of this position for different reasons, as 
243 'What we have to do is analyze specific rationalities rather than always invoking the progress 
ofrationalization in general' Foucault (1982) p. 210. 
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discussed above. However, neither focus upon the historically ambiYalent 
position of women as part of their critique. It is women's position that I want to 
consider in the context of the use of the technology of risk, below. 
In keeping with Ewald's analysis, the contemporary theorist Robert Castel 
captures the way in which individuation occurs within a society based upon the 
calculation and minimisation of risk in the following terms, 
Thus, a vast hygienist utopia plays on the alternative registers of fear and security, 
inducing a delirium of rationality, an absolute reign of calculative reason and a no 
less absolute prerogative of its agents, planners and technocrats, administrators of 
happiness for a life to which nothing happens. 244 (Italics are added.) 
I want to stress this description of what I am arguing is a contemporary aspect of 
'possessive individualism', because I intend to trace the relationship between 
women and the notion of the possessive individual in the next two chapters. The 
position of women troubles both: ( 1) the model of possessive individuals; and (2) 
Ewald's Foucauldian model that traces, and is critical of, the emergence of such 
subjects. 
With its employment of calculative reason to deal with the risks that we 
pose to each other, the law of tort in England fits within a broadly Foucauldian 
analysis of governmentality. When seen in these terms it is possible to predict its 
future development, in ways that are not available to those who simply analyse 
the legal tests themselves. As a method of loss distribution, the current English 
system of tort is painstakingly inefficient in ways that are reminiscent of old child 
support settlements. To demonstrate this point, it is useful to compare employees 
with women labouring under traditional marriage contracts. Prior to the creation 
of the Child Support Agency in 1993 which oversees distribution of funds for the 
upkeep of children upon divorce, the courts went into similar excruciating detail. 
244 R. Castel, 'From Dangerousness to Risk' in Burchell, et al. (1991) p. 289. 
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The aim of proposed amendments245 to improve the Child Support Agency, has 
been to simplify the calculation. This detailed calculation by the courts still 
occurs with regard to the maintenance of housewives, to be discussed below. 
Similar concerns about the size of the legal aid bill has prompted more recent 
amendments to the civil system with the Access to Justice Act 1999, and the 
removal of legal aid for personal injury litigation. 
To say that the French system of no fault compensation is more efficient 
because it targets the money at those who need it (rather than to the insurance 
companies and solicitors) - whilst true - simply states an argument that would 
improve the English system only in so far as it would bring it into line with the 
French system which is the subject of Ewald's broader critique. To assume that 
this reform would answer criticisms of the system fails to examine how the 
insurance of everything fits neatly within an analysis of govemmentality. It also 
ignores the way in which the traditional risks incurred by women are 
marginalised. Despite the judges' discussions about liability, it is clear that the 
basis of the English system of tort law is insurance and risk analysis. This comes 
as a shock to litigants in, for example, medical negligence cases who are 
interested in receiving an apology and discovering information about negligent 
treatment. Instead, the litigant finds that his or her dispute is dealt with via 
insurance companies who are repeat players in the litigation lottery - and who 
always make commercial decisions about settlemenU46 
245 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act 2000. 
246 Genn (1987). 
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Feminist Concerns 
Although Ewald discusses the way that insurance was viewed as a method of 
producing security for all social classes, it is clear that such security was not 
necessarily going to be achieved in practice. He quotes Proudhon, 
The savings bank, mutuality and life assurance are excellent things for those who 
enjoy a certain comfort and wish to safeguard it, but they remain quite fruitless, not 
to say inaccessible, for the poorer classes. Security is a commodity bought like any 
other: and as its rate of tariff falls in proportion not with the misery of the buyer but 
with the magnitude of the amount he insures, insurance proves itself a new privilege 
for the rich and a cruel irony for the poor.247 
A feminist analysis can point to the ways in which women fail to fit within the 
current system; but must go beyond any such move. Feminists can (rightly) 
complain that insurance is aimed at compensating loss incurred within the 
'public' sphere (i.e. outside the home), and that women in general as poorer paid 
workers cannot always be in a position to benefit. However, whilst this criticism 
- which is basically that of Proudhon - is right, it does not engage at the level of 
Ewald's analysis, since Ewald's more radical point is that the system of insurance 
is part of the way in which individuation occurs. My concern is to explore 
women's ambiguous position with regard to this process of individuation. 
It is worth considering another basic feminist argument as a point of 
departure. Feminists have been (rightly) critical of the way m which the 
public/private divide has been assumed in law. In his historical analysis, Ewald 
ignores the position of housewives. It is clear that women are only parties to 
workers' insurance contracts as employees. Women's position within the home 
can be safeguarded with life insurance (against death of her husband or partner) 
and mortgage indemnity insurance, but there is no insurance against a 
housewife's loss of income upon divorce. In 1942 Beveridge proposed that the 
247 Cited Ewald ( 1991 a) p. 206. 
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benefits associated with unemployment should be extended to cover women who 
had been separated from their (male) breadwinner. His anxiety was that 
housewives who were not 'at fault' may lose their livelihood and be ineligible for 
maintenance. He recognised the different positions of husband and wife in the 
following way: 
If [the needs caused by divorce, legal separation, desertion and voluntary 
separation] are regarded from the point of view of the husband, they may not 
appear to be insurable risks; a man cannot insure against events which occur only 
through his fault or with his consent, and if they occur through the fault or with the 
consent of the wife she should not have a claim to benefit. But from the point of 
view of the woman, loss of her maintenance as housewife without her consent and 
not through her fault is one of the risks of marriage against which she should be 
insured; she should not depend upon assistance.248 
Beveridge's proposal to extend benefits into this new area of risk and to view 
housewives as a new category of persons who could be insured were rejected. In 
1974 the Finer Committee249 proposed a 'guaranteed maintenance allowance' as a 
means of ensuring a regular source of income for women and children upon 
divorce or separation. Again, this was rejected by the government of the day, 
leaving traditional housewives to claim maintenance through the courts with 
welfare benefits as an interim measure. 
It does not require a sophisticated analysis of the emergence of self and 
other though relationality, as discussed in Chapter 2, to recognise the difficulty of 
trying to establish fault in marriage. The writers of one of the main contemporary 
textbooks250 (rightly) note the practical difficulty of attributing blame and also the 
difficulty in reconciling ideals of collective security and individual fault. 
Curiously, they then make the following comment about wives: 
248 W. Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmnd. 6404) (London: HMSO, 1942) 
para. 347. 
249 M. Finer, Report ofthe Committee on One Parent Families (Cmnd. 5629) (London: HMSO, 
1974) 
250 B. Hoggett, D. Pearl, E. Cooke, P. Bates, The Family, Law and Society: Cases and Materials, 
41h edition, (London: Butterworths, 1996) p. 104. 
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In a welfare state, the moral virtue of contributing to a scheme which will provide 
relief against, for example, sickness and unemployment - both your own and vour 
neighbours' -is, one hopes, self-evident. Contributing to a scheme which pro~ides 
relief for the wives in other people's broken marriages, however, is not so easy to 
justify. 251 
If a woman has given up work to bring up a family and is without means because 
of separation or divorce then why is her loss of livelihood not viewed as akin to 
unemployment? The appeal to public sentiment, in the above quotation, is an 
appeal to the public/private divide in which women's work within the home is 
unacknowledged and viewed as natural. Despite the increase in women engaged 
in paid work, the feminisation of poverty upon divorce still makes this an 
important contemporary issue. The question of insurance for the risk of child 
birth, to be discussed in the next section, further illustrates the continuing view of 
women's traditional work of child care as 'natural'. 
Wrongful Birth Cases 
With regard to insurance against child birth, in the nineteenth century this would 
have been viewed as unethical. Now it is simply a bad risk for insurers, such that 
the premiums would be too high. In the last twenty years the so-called 'wrongful 
birth' cases have developed in tort law. In these cases, parents have taken 
negligence claims usually against a health authority or trust, on the basis that a 
faulty sterilisation operation, or incorrect advice, had lead to the birth of an 
unwanted child. The defendant health authority would be covered by insurance 
policies for negligence in these cases. 
I am interested in the 'wrongful birth' cases because of the way in which 
the House of Lords has moved away from standard principles of tort law, as I will 
outline in a moment. The way in which these cases are discussed does raise 
theoretical issues about the way in which tort law applies to issues involving 
251 Hoggett et al. ( 1996) p. I 04. 
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pregnancy and childcare. The cases also open up some broader questions about 
the image of what it is to be a person that is evoked. This is in keeping with the 
tension between the historical position of women and the image of the possessive 
individual, who owns her abilities and must be compensated for work performed. 
The main case in the area is the House of Lords decision in McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board (1999), 252 the only case of this type to come before the 
Lords. They decided that, provided a child is born healthy, awarding 
compensation for the costs of bringing up a child would not be 'fair, just and 
reasonable' .253 However, the pain and suffering and inconvenience associated 
with the pregnancy and birth plus loss of earnings and any medical expenses 
associated with the pregnancy were awarded (with Lord Millett dissenting). This 
overturned a Court of Appeal decision254 from 1985 in which damages had been 
granted based upon the upkeep of the child. It also overturned the lower court's 
judgment, illustrating the ambiguity felt about the issue by the judges. 
In McFarlane v Tayside Health Board, it was the husband who had 
suffered the negligent procedure relating to sterilisation. He was erroneously told 
that his sperm tests were negative so that no other contraception was required. 
This had the foreseeable result that his wife become pregnant. The facts that the 
couple had sex, did not abort or put up the child for adoption were not viewed, by 
the courts, as breaking the causal chain of events. 
The first point to clarify is the question of who is the claimant? When it is 
the woman who has the failed sterilisation then it is clear that the losses are 
consequential upon that operation. Legal problems have arisen, in cases such as 
Mcfarlane v Tayside Health Board, when it is the man who has been 
252 McFarlane v Tayside Health Authority H.L (1999) 3 WLR 1301; (2000) 2 AC 59. 
253 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59 per Lord Steyn p. 82. 
254 Emeh v Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Area Health Authority (1985) QB 1012 CA 
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unsuccessfully sterilised. For example, vasectomies have reversed themselves 
and the claimant is a future partner. In Goodwill v British Advisory Services, 255 a 
woman who had a sexual relationship with Mr. Goodwill three years after his 
faulty sterilisation and had an unwanted pregnancy had her claim dismissed 
because it was held that the doctor could not have had the claimant in mind at the 
time of the operation. Mrs. McFarlane did not have this problem because she was 
married to Mr. McFarlane at the time of the operation and so was held to have 
been in the reasonable contemplation of the doctors, a necessary hurdle in 
making the claim. As outlined above, Mrs. McFarlane successfully claimed 
damages in relation to the pregnancy and birth but both parents, as claimants, 
were unsuccessful in their claim for damages for the cost of child rearing. 
The two main reasons for the decision are as follows: firstly, that the birth 
of a healthy baby was a 'blessing, not a detriment. ' 256 There is something very 
curious about the idea that a defendant can claim that a fault on their part was 
actually a blessing upon the claimant. Prior to the appeal to the Lords, Lord 
McCluskey in the Second Division of the Inner House of Court of Sessions 
pointed out that such an argument is not part of the usual procedure in tort. He 
argued that: 
I know of no principle of Scots law that entitles the wrongdoer to say to the victim 
of his wrongdoing that they must look to their prospective and impalpable gains in 
the roundabouts to balance what they actually lose on the swings. 257 
Emily Jackson258 has pointed out that marriage is usually viewed by the courts as 
a good thing and yet a solicitor who negligently failed to obtain a divorce for a 
client would be liable in negligence. However, the damages in such a case would 
255 Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service (1996) 1 WLR 1397. 
256 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59 per Lord Millett at p. 114. 
257 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board(1998) SLT 307 2 Div. pp. 316-317. The same law applies 
in both England and Scotland on this point oflaw. 
258 E. Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001) p. 36. 
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not be as great as the award of the cost of child care, a concern that also 
motivated the Lords, to be discussed below. 
Secondly, there was an appeal to 'distributive justice' .259 Lord Steyn 
expressed a concern with the distribution of resources in a community. He 
contrasted this with 'corrective justice\ which aims to compensate for harm to 
the individual by restoring her, as much as is possible, to the position she would 
have been in had the negligence not occurred. In other words, he employed the 
term 'distributive justice' to mean that the money would be better left with the 
Heath Board rather than awarded to the claimants. Lord Steyn admitted that on 
the basis of corrective justice the claim should succeed but he argued that this 
should not be the case because of, 
an inarticulate premise as to what is morally acceptable and what is 
not ... Instinctively the traveller on the Underground would consider that the law of 
tort has no business to provide legal remedies consequent upon the birth of a 
healthy child, which all of us regard as a valuable and good thing. 260 
The Lords were clear that the arguments regarding birth being a blessing and the 
question of 'distributive justice' were applicable only to the birth of healthy 
child. Compensation for the extra costs of raising a child with a disability was 
recently awarded in Parkinson v St. James and Seacraft Hospital. 261 Similarly, 
such compensation was awarded in the case of a visually impaired mother and 
healthy child in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust. 262 The view 
was that the extra costs associated with the disability of either child or mother 
should be awarded because this would be viewed as just, fair and reasonable. 
At the root of this decision is a view of women, and women's traditional 
role, which has changed in recent years; linked with the broader question about 
259 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59 per Lord Steyn at p. 82. 
260 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59 per Lord Steyn at p. 82. The 
'reasonable man' has been updated from the 'man on the Clapham omnibus' to the gender 
neutral 'traveller on the Underground.' 
261 Parkinson v St. James and Seacraft Hospital (2002) QB 266 CA 
262 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (2002) 2 All ER 177 CA 
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what tort law aims to do. As stated above, one of the basic assumptions in tort 
law is that we are envisaged as individuals who are owners of our own abilities 
' 
such as our ability to work and our bodies. If anyone negligently injures us or 
prevents us from being able to earn a living we can claim damages because we 
own parts of our bodies and life chances in a way that is analogous to the \vay in 
which we own property. 
As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, this has not always been 
the position of women. With the increase of paid labour outside the home from 
around 1840s, men were viewed as owners of their abilities that are sold in the 
labour market. Wage labour became the usual way for men to make a living. 
However, women's work within the home became seen in more sentimental 
terms, as a natural expression of femininity, a private pleasure, rather than as 
work. This lies at the root of the Lords reluctance to compensate for the 
upbringing of a child. Lord Millett, in particular, dissented from the judgment in 
that he would only award limited damages for the loss of the ability to decide the 
size of their family. He argued against awarding compensation for the pain and 
suffering and other costs associated with the pregnancy by rejecting a comparison 
between pregnancy and sickness on the grounds that pregnancy is a 'natural' 
event. In doing so, he accepted one of the arguments of the Defendant: that there 
could be no cause of action because pregnancy and child care were 'natural' .263 
Whilst unwanted pregnancy and rape are not comparable experiences, it is 
worth noting that sex is viewed (and constructed) as 'natural' but that women's 
consent, if not desire, is now viewed as important. However, the issue of 
women's consent and the way in which women were viewed as able to enter into 
263 The other judges were able to view pregnancy as involving pain and suffering in a way that is 
reminiscent of the comparison between pregnancy and sickness in early sex discrimination cases, 
which are no longer good law. See Haynes v Malleable Working Men's Club (1985) ICR, 705, 
EAT. 
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marriage contracts, which then prevented them from refusing to have sex \\ith 
their husbands, has been subject to feminist critique, discussed earlier. The act of 
categorising pregnancy as 'natural' must be understood in this context. It has the 
effect of allowing the Lords to argue that child birth should be viewed as 'a 
blessing and a joy', something the woman may not have initially wanted (a point 
that is difficult to dispute in these cases of failed sterilisation) but that would 
bring her pleasure. This allows the Lords to refuse to compensate for the 
expenses and work involved in childcare. It is simply not viewed as work but as 
'natural'. 264 
One of the Lords' worries was the problem of putting a value on human life 
and hence commodifying it. In this context, it is interesting to note that the 
traditional work of women in the home including: the provision of housework, 
companionship and sex has been given a price by the courts. Prior to 1982,265 
there was a head of damages in negligence that allowed men to be compensated 
for the 'loss of consortium of a wife'. In 1952, the Lords refused to extend this 
common law claim to a wife whose husband had become impotent as a result of 
the defendant's negligence. Lord Goddard made his view of the historical 
position of wives clear when, in turning down the wife's claim, he stated that, 
The action which the law gives to the husband for loss of consortium is founded on 
the proprietary right which from ancient times it was considered the husband had in 
his wife. It was in fact based on the same grounds as gave a master a right to sue for 
an injury to his servant if the latter was thereby unable to perform his duties. It was 
an action of trespass for an invasion of the property right which, arising from the 
status of villeinage or serfdom, the master had over his servant. 266 
However women were not viewed as the owners of these abilities - which 
historically, under the doctrine of coverture, belonged to her husband. 
264 For a discussion of the way in which the 'natural' and 'biological' is being rethought by Oyama 
see Chapter 2. 
265 The right to damages for loss of consortium was abolished by the Administration of Justice Act 
1982. 
266 Best v Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd (1952) AC 716, per Lord Goddard at pp. 731-732. 
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When a sterilisation operation has taken place privately it can give rise of a 
claim in contract as well as tort law and so it is useful to consider this position 
briefly. Contract law always raises the issue of consent because it is predicated 
upon the idea that individuals should be bound by what they agree to do. 
Whereas the aim of tort law is to try to put the claimant in the position she would 
have been in had the tort not occurred, the aim of contract law is to put the parties 
in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed 
properly. It would therefore be expected that, if a doctor agrees to perform a 
sterilisation operation that s/her will be bound by this agreement. However, in 
Eyre v Measday267 the claimant sued in contract when a faulty sterilisation 
operation resulted in her pregnancy. The Court of Appeal decided that the doctor 
was not liable. They were not willing to hold that there was a warranty that the 
operation would be successful, despite the fact that the doctor told the claimant 
that the operation was permanent and that she would not be able to have children. 
There was no warning of any risk that the operation might not have been 
successful. 
The wrongful birth cases can be viewed within the terms of the 
equality/difference debate. On the equality side of the debate it appears strange 
that the usual rules of tort should be ignored when women's traditional role of 
child rearing is discussed. As Lord Steyn268 admitted, full compensation of the 
costs of child rearing is the result that arises by employing the usual rules of tort 
law. If women, and women's traditional work of child rearing, are to be 'added 
into' tort law on the same basis as men then their claim should not be denied. 
There is a case for arguing that the resources would be better spent on the sick 
but why should there be reference to 'distributive justice' to defeat this claim but 
267 Eyre v Measday (1986) 1 AllER 488 CA. 
268 McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (2000) 2 AC 59 per Lord Steyn at p. 82. 
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not other cases? The claimants were told that a failure on the defendant's part 
was actually a blessing and that its results were 'natural' and therefore good 
whether or not the woman wanted a child. In this respect judges appear to have 
difficulty in viewing women as owners of their capacities, with a right to bodily 
integrity and to payment in full of the damages that arise from this breach of 
duty, providing they are not too remote. 
· However, I think that there is more to be said on this issue and it is useful 
to think about what I have described as the 'difference' argument. From this 
perspective, birth should not simply be subsumed within personal injury, 
although it obviously involves pain and suffering. This is the argument that was 
used by feminists when employer's treatment of pregnant women was compared 
with their treatment of sick men in the early operation of the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975.269 A difference approach would be sympathetic to the difficulty that the 
Lords had in viewing women as atomistic individuals, who are owners of their 
capacities, rather than part of society. Such a view of humanity derives from 
Thomas Hobbes' description in Leviathan, to be discussed below. This approach 
would entail the abandonment of 'corrective justice' (with its focus upon 
individual harm) in favour of an emphasis upon 'distributive justice'. However, I 
would argue that, if this logic is to be pursued then the Lords concern with 
'distributive justice' cannot be limited to areas that are traditionally linked with 
women's unpaid work in the home. It would be unnecessary to assume that, by 
acknowledging the uniqueness of pregnancy, it should follow that a different 
system of tort, or ideals of justice, should apply to women or areas of work 
traditionally linked with women. 
269 lfaynes v Malleable Working Men's Club (1985) ICR, 705, EAT. 
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For the Lords' emphasis upon 'distributive justice' to be consistent would 
require legislation to radically alter the civil justice system in accordance with 
need. In the narrower confines of the case itself this would involve thinking about 
the actual parents' needs. The Lords have been willing to consider the particular 
circumstances of the case when either the child or the mother has a disability. To 
be consistent with Lord Steyn's reference to 'distributive justice' this would have 
to be extended to a consideration of the parents' income and the resources 
nec.essary to bring up a child. A more equitable way of doing this, which would 
take into account the claims upon the health service, would be through social 
insurance rather than the tort system.270 This is preferable because, under the 
usual principles of tort law, the courts calculate compensation based upon the 
amount the parents would be likely to spend on the child. So, for example, there 
would be arguments that if they would normally send a child to a private school 
this should be included in the award. This would mean that the amount of 
compensation would increase with the wealth of the parents and not with their 
needs. 
My aim here is not to detail the many good arguments against current tort 
law as a system of loss distribution but to illustrate the ambivalent position of 
women with regard to risk and to individualism. In specific areas of law it may be 
that women's traditional position, which resists commodification, could 
potentially be used constructively to argue for a more equitable distribution of 
resources. However, given the ease with which the public/private divide IS 
employed in this area this may be over optimistic. 
27° For more detailed arguments on this point see P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the 
Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970); J. Conaghan and W. Mansell, 'From the 
Permissive to the Dismissive Society: Patrick Atiyah's Accidents, Compensation and the Market' 
in Journal of Law and Society Vol. 25, 1998, pp. 284-293; J P. Cane, Atiyah's Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law (London: Butterworths, 1999); D. Harris, D. Campbell and R. 
Halson, Remedies in Tort and Contract (London: Butterworths, 2002) pp. 405-461. 
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Rape 
The insurance industry has recently moved into other areas, as illustrated by the 
offer of insurance to women in South Africa against the real possibility of being 
raped and contracting HIV. The insurance offers them tests and treatment that are 
not available within their impoverished health service. Although I am concerned 
with the operation of the law of obligations in England, this example is relevant 
because it illustrates a similar technique for the management of risk. From the 
view of technologies of risk, we represent different risks to each other. The 
criminal represents a risk as does a doctor or any person who may negligently 
cause injury. The same techniques of risk analysis can quantify them. It may be 
that I would be more upset by the same injury knowing that the person who 
inflicted it did so on purpose, because this could undermine, for example, my 
view of the world. However, for the calculation of risk, this can be viewed as 
'trauma', as an additional part of the injury. This does nothing to undermine the 
possibility of the calculation of risk itself. As Foucault points out, we construct 
ourselves as subjects with the state as protector against sources of risk, including 
each other. 271 Whilst he discusses the construction of the criminal as a source of 
risk, the same reasoning applies to the law of obligations, with the assessment of 
systems - such as safety in factories, the operation of NHS, education - through 
audits that can alter the nature of the activity.272 
From a feminist perspective the horror evoked by the example of South 
African women is important. It brings home the daily fear of these women for 
whom a more long term solution is obviously vital, but it also disrupts the usual 
image of insurance. This disruptive quality becomes available when women's 
271 Foucault (1976). 
272 For a discussion of the 'audit explosion' see, for example, N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: 
Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999b) pp. 153-155; M. 
Power, The Audit Society: Rituals ofVerification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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position- outside the "norm' -is examined. In England, rape is a crime and also 
a tort so that it is possible to sue for an injunction and damages. The ability to 
recompense the victim with money evokes a sense of unease because of its link 
with (involuntary) prostitution. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 
Scheme allows the victim of any violent crime to obtain automatic compensation 
from the state. This is based upon a tariff system.273 Victims can have awards 
rejected or reduced because their "lifestyle' is deemed to put them at risk. 274 So, 
for example, the fact that a woman was a prostitute would be an objection to a 
rape claim. In this instance, the woman is outside the protection of insurance. 
Developments in the Deployment of Risk Analysis 
There are potential developments within the deployment of risk analysis that are 
also relevant to feminist concerns. Castel, like Ewald, discusses contemporary 
developments in France but his general theoretical approach is relevant to the 
English law of obligations. In "From Dangerousness to Risk' 275 Castel argues that 
there has been a change in techniques of social administration such that, 
The new strategies [of social administration] dissolve the notion of the subject or a 
concrete individual, and put in its place a combinatory of factors, the factors of 
risk. ... The essential component of intervention no longer takes the form of the 
direct face-to-face relationship between the carer and the cared, the helper and the 
helped, the professional and the client. It comes instead to reside in the establishing 
of flows of population based upon the collation of a range of abstract factors 
deemed liable to produce risk in generaU76 (Italics are in the original.) 
273 A earlier controversial case was that involving Meah in which he was awarded £45,000 
compensation in a civil court for a road traffic accident which caused brain damage and allegedly 
caused him to engage in sexually aggressive behaviour. (Meah v Creamer (1985) 1 All ER 367). 
This award can be compared with the compensation of two of Meah's victims who sued him for 
sexual assault (award: £6,750) and rape (award: £10,250) Wv Meah, D v Meah (1986) 1 AllER 
935. These cases held that rape was to be classified as a personal injury. They were distinguished 
in Griffiths v Williams CA (1995) (unreported) The Times, 24 November. It was held that views 
of rape had changed and that £50,000 award was not too high. Under the current tariff system of 
the CICA in which 'repeated non-consensual vaginal and/or anal intercourse over a period 
exceeding 3 years' has a tariff of£ 17,500. 
274 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1996 para. 13-16; enabling Act: Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act 1995. 
275 Castel (1991) pp. 281-298. 
276 Castel (1991) p. 281. 
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He details how these new strategies have produced a change in the balance of 
power between administrators and professionals. An example of the way in 
which this operates is relevant to the feminist analysis given by Brown:"7 and by 
Fraser,278 of the way in which the state acts as the 'man in the life' of the women 
raising children as a single parent. CasteF79 points to the French approach for 
detecting childhood anomalies, which involves collecting data on all children. 
This is an administrative task rather than one which involves face-to-face contact 
with 'experts'. It is only when there are sufficient 'risk factors' in a particular 
case that there is an expert dispatched to assess the situation 'on the ground'. 
Among the statistics gathered are questions about the mother, such as whether 
she is married, a minor, of foreign nationality - along with illnesses, 
psychological problems etc. 
This technique means that the probability of risk is deduced by statistical 
analysis, by administrators, before expert intervention. Referring to Foucault, 
Castel argues that this is a new type of surveillance in which the presence of the 
expert is not required. It is made on the basis of an abstract and probabilistic 
existence of risk.280 He is concerned about its effects: '"Prevention' in effect 
promotes susp1c10n to the dignified scientific rank of a calculus of 
probabilities. ' 281 
It is useful to look at crime, momentarily, in order to think about civil law. 
As illustrated in his lecture summary, 'The Punitive Society' ,282 Foucault traces 
the way that this discipline was linked with the industrial revolution; how the 
277 Brown ( 1995). 
278 N. Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1989). 
279 Castel (1991) p. 287. 
28° Castel (1991) p. 289. 
281 Castel ( 1991) p. 288. -
282 M. Foucault, 'The Punitive Society' in M. Foucault, The Essential Works: 19)-/-1984 Vol. I, 
Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, P. Rabinow, ed., (New York: The New Press, 1997b) PP· 23-37. 
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development of manufacturing produced changes which meant that workers 
disciplined themselves throughout the working day: to arrive on time and to 
perform certain acts at certain times. The 'soul' is produced through the 
mechanisms of control. Castel is detailing the development of new techniques of 
such governmentali ty. 283 
Cornell and Ewald 
Whereas Cornell is concerned with the process of 'individuation' in which each 
person takes his/herself as a project - along with his/her equivalent rights to this 
project that are to be protected by law - Ewald discusses the way in which the 
operation of law and social administration produce 'individuation'. This is 
achieved by such techniques as statistical and risk analysis which is understood 
as an example of governmentality, the conduct of conduct, as described by 
Foucault. 284 
I have used Ewald's analysis to show how contemporary English tort law 
employs the techniques of risk analysis and also fits within the broader concept 
of governmentality. By employing this framework, it can be shown that the 
English law could fulfil the same function and develop in ways that are more 
efficient, by moving to the use of no fault compensation. This operation of law 
would undercut the use of Cornell's legal test in such cases because it would no 
longer be necessary to go to court to prove fault, where no fault compensation 
applies. It may be necessary to argue over the amount of damages but it is 
unlikely that Cornell's test was meant merely to ask: would free and equal 
persons agree to this amount of compensation? Tariffs are likely to be set to 
283 For a discussion of these techniques and their development see G. Deleuze, 'A Postscript on 
Control Societies' in G. Deleuze, Negotiations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) pp. 
176-182. 
284 See, for example, Foucault (1991a) pp. 87-104. 
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avoid litigation. Presumably, Cornell would be happy with this method of loss 
distribution, given her position on welfare generally. She could argue that her test 
would apply in other areas. 
Can Ewald account for Cornell's description of a project of becoming a 
person? There is an initial similarity. It could be argued that Cornell's image of 
'the project of becoming a person' sits too comfortably with the image of oneself 
as an enterprise which Ewald discusses within his work on 'insurance as a moral 
technology': 
To calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the future. To conduct one's life 
in the manner of an enterprise indeed begins in the eighteenth century to be a 
definition of a morality whose cardinal virtue is providence.285 
Similarly, Rose discusses the contemporary development of risk technology in 
the following terms that again resonate with Cornell's 'project of becoming a 
person': 
One is always in continuous training, lifelong learning, perpetual assessment, 
continuous incitement to buy, to improve oneself, constant monitoring of health and 
never-ending risk management. Control is not centralized but dispersed; it flows 
through a network of open circuits that are rhizomatic and not hierarchical. 286 
In earlier work, Rose287 links this to a shift in the regulation of risk from the 
'social' arena- by social security, mutual societies- to the domain of individual 
choice in the market place. This is an image which also pervades state provision 
in which the recipient is viewed as a client, 
The enhancement of the powers of the client as consumer - consumer of health 
services, of education, of training, of transport - specifies the subjects of rule in a 
new way: as active individuals seeking to 'enterprise themselves', to maximize their 
quality of life through acts of choice, according their life a meaning and value to the 
extent that it can be rationalized as the outcome of choices made, or choices to be 
made ... . Political reason must now justify and organize itself by arguing over the 
arrangements that are adequate to the existence of persons as, in their essence, 
creatures of freedom, liberty and autonomy. 288 (Italics are added.) 
285 Ewald (1991a) p. 207. 
286 Rose ( 1999b) p. 234. 
287 N. Rose, 'Governing Advanced Liberal Democracies' in A. Barry, T. Osbourne and N. Rose, 
eds., Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of 
Government (London: UCL Press, 1996a) p. 57. 
288 Rose (1996a) p. 57. 
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Cornell can argue that her view of individuation does not define personhood but 
leaves it open for each person to say what it is for her or him to be a person. 
However, her view of the emergence of personhood itself- that it is worked upon 
as a project - represents a way of life that those writing in the area of 
'govemmentality', such as Rose and Ewald, aim to explain and historically 
situate. The practical question becomes whether Cornell's work is cleverly 
pitched to extract concessions for women within this contemporary neo-liberal 
framework or whether it fits too comfortably within it. How radical is Cornell's 
image of 'the project of becoming a person', that will be understood by the courts 
as a project between competing 'possessive individuals', owners of their bodies 
and abilities- save possibly in the area of women's traditional work? 
Cornell's view of personhood does not simply include 'the emergence of 
individuals' but of different ways of living. She can argue that, just because many 
will today view their project of becoming a person in terms of possessive 
individualism (which, I am arguing, is now intimately linked to the deployment 
of the techniques of risk) does not mean that this is all that persons can become. 
This is something that she keeps open - not simply for individuals - but in terms 
of cultural change in the meaning of 'persons' in future generations, hence the 
utopian theme in her work. This is why her view of personhood cannot be 
subsumed into the view of the person as enterprise. 
I do not believe that Cornell's entire framework can be aligned with this 
approach, although this is one way in which potential legislatures/judges are 
likely to view Cornell's legal test. Ewald links the employment of the technique 
of risk to instrumental reasoning. Above, I have said that this evokes the figure of 
the 'possessive individual'. Cornell expressly distinguishes her position on what 
it is to be a person, from that of libertarians, whose image of what it is to be a 
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person, she argues, derives from Hobbes, and which she describes as 'atomistic 
individualism' .289 
To recap my argument, the contemporary view of the 'reasonable man' of 
tort law is one who employs risk analysis as a tool in the operation of 
instrumental reason; who owns his body and its abilities and is traditionally male. 
Until relatively recently, women have not been viewed in this way. The 
traditional housewife has not been viewed as owning her labour power, which is 
characterised by being sold for a wage, because she received housekeeping 
money from her husband. The risks of the traditional housewife have not been 
viewed as insurable. In keeping with this approach, the courts have been 
unwilling to compensate women if they have given birth to a healthy child 
because of negligent sterilisation, for example. There is some evidence that the 
courts are also changing their approach in this area, to the limited extent that 
compensation is awarded for the pain and suffering of pregnancy290 and of the 
upkeep of children with disabilities in the 'wrongful birth' cases.291 To extend this 
technique of calculative reason to women would be in keeping with the move to 
include women as possessive individuals, as owners of their bodies and abilities, 
linked to their increasing participation in paid work and the breakdown of the 
traditional housewife/breadwinner model. In the next two chapters I want to 
consider further the relationship between women and 'possessive individualism'. 
289 Cornell (2000) p. 167 fn.ll. 
290 McFarlane v Tayside Health Authority H.L. (1999) 3 WLR 1301. 
291 Greenjieldv Irwin (A firm) C.A. (2001) WLR 1279; Randv East Dorset HA (2000) 56 BMLJ 
39. 
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Chapter 5: The Sexual Contract 
I will now tum from tort law to the area of contract law in order to further 
explore the anomalous position of women with regard to selfhood, personhood 
and individualism. Contract law focuses attention upon the question of consent 
and, historically, upon an image of persons with an autonomous wilt292 The basis 
of contract law is that it regulates obligations that are entered into by 
'agreement', in contrast with tort law in which the obligations, for example, the 
duty to behave with reasonable care so as not to harm anyone foreseeable 
affected by our actions, are imposed by the courts. There has been much feminist 
analysis of the way in which women's consent has been treated in the operation 
of law, for example, in the areas of rape293 and consent to medical consent.294 Just 
as Marx295 points out that workers were not really free to choose whether or not to 
work, so women could be viewed as historically pressured into the traditional 
marriage contract. The relationship between the employment contract and the 
marriage contract and their relationship with personhood is the focus of this 
chapter. I will then use this analysis to look at 'possessive individualism' in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
In this chapter, I move from a discussion of Ewald's analysis of insurance, 
and its application to tort law, to Carole Pateman's reading of Hobbes' version of 
social contract theory and its relationship to other contracts. This involves 
moving from an analysis of actual insurance contracts, and the way in which they 
292 See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). For an alternative view of the self see Chapter 2. 
293 See for example Smart (1989) pp. 26-49. 
294 See for example, 0' Donovan (1997) pp. 47-64. 
295 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One (London: Penguin, 1976) Ch. 
6, p. 280. 
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can be viewed as 'social', in that these contracts hold out the possibility of 
redistributing risk. Even if this hope of a 'contractual justice' has not been 
fulfilled, these insurance contracts are just as concerned with the questions of 
safeguarding the means to live a 'commodious life' 296 as Hobbes' social contract 
to be discussed below. 
One central argument made by both socialists and feminists has been that 
employment contracts and marriage contracts have little in common with the 
paradigm of a contract as an exchange between two equal 'individuals', that is so 
dominant within political and legal theory. As I will discuss below, Carole 
Pateman explores the way that an exchange between two persons - in which one 
must exchange something, such as his/her ability to work, which cannot be 
separated from his/her body - is characterised by his/her subordination. She 
draws out the relationship between subordination (and hence the possibility of 
exploitation) under the marriage contract and compares it to subordination under 
the employment contract, discussing the ways in which they differed but were 
interrelated. I will argue that aspects of her rethinking of this relationship 
between marriage contracts and employment contracts are still useful even 
though, as she acknowledges in an article written in 1996, 
The patriarchal structures with which I was concerned have been considerably 
weakened, and the heyday ofthe worker/breadwinner was from 1840-1970.297 
Nevertheless, I agree with her later comments that, 
Women and men alike are now being drawn into a global division of labour, and 
assessments of which women may gain or lose, and whether new forms of 
subordination are developing, are, necessarily, enormously complex and difficult 
when the restructuring is gathering pace. I believe my arguments in The Sexual 
Contract can throw light on the course of some recent developments, but to 
examine the issues would require another, very different, book.298 
296 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XIII, s. 14, p. 78. 
297 C. Pateman, 'A Comment on Johnson's Does Capitalism Really Need Patriarchy?' in Women's 
International Forum Vol. 19, No 3, 1996a, p. 204. 
298 Pateman (1996a) p. 205. 
122 
At a time when the UK government has stated that it aims to try to facilitate a 
'new relationship' between work and family life' ,299 thereby taking the radical 
step of recognising the unspoken relationship between work both within the 
home and outside the home,300 it is worth returning to Pateman's historical 
analysis to understand the paradoxical position of women with regard to 
personhood and individualism. Pateman argues that it was contract - the legal 
device - that played an important role in women's subordination because it was 
the existence of contract that produced both married women and workers, as 
parties to the marriage and employment contracts. As she puts it, 
Contract does not merely 'legitimise' or 'facilitate' certain relationships. Relations 
that constitute central institutions in modem civil society, notably marriage and 
employment, are created through contract. 'Husband' and 'wife' or 'employer' and 
'worker' come into being through the mechanism of contract.301 (Italics are in the 
original.) 
I want to examine her theoretical arguments in detail and to look at their 
implications for the contemporary English law of obligations and for the 
paradoxical position of women. Hutchings302 has argued that Pateman's position 
has strength despite holding onto the concept of the 'sovereign individual'. Here, 
the 'sovereign individual' is used as a 'composite term' which includes the 
'possessive individual' :303 
I am using the term to cover what is variously referred to in the literature as the 
possessive, the autonomous, the abstract, the disembodied or the unitary subject of 
traditional/ liberal/ modernist political and moral theory, or sometimes as the 
Cartesian, the Hobbesian or the Kantian subject/ agent/ individuaU04 
299 http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/faimess/fore.htm 
30° For a discussion of this point and assessment of the legislation and initiatives see, J. Conaghan, 
'Women, Work and Family: A British Revolution?' in J. Conaghan, R.M. Fischel and K. Klare, 
Labour Law in an Era of Globalisation: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
301 C. Pateman, 'Contract and Ideology: A Reply to Coole' in Politics Vol. 10, No. 1, 1990, p. 30. 
302 K. Hutchings, 'The Death of the Sovereign Individual' in M. Griffiths and M. Whitford, 
Women Review Philosophy (Nottingham: Nottingham University Press, 1996) pp. 1-25. 
303 Hutchings (1996) p. 2. 
304 Hutchings ( 1996) p. 2. 
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I will discuss some feminist responses to Pateman's The Sexual Contract in this 
chapter but will defer a more thorough analysis of the 'possessive individual' 
until the next chapter. 
Hobbes' Story 
Pateman describes Hobbes as 'the most brilliant and bold of the contract 
theorists. ' 305 I want to concentrate upon Hobbes because, for Pateman, he is 
instrumental in replacing 'classical patriarchy' with 'modem patriarchy', a shift 
which is at the core of Pateman's thesis to be discussed in detail below. In 
addition, Hobbes is one of the few Western philosophers to identify the 
subordination of women as a political matter: as a matter of convention, rather 
than as a natural condition. Hobbes' analysis was soon superseded by that of 
Locke who reverted to the view of women's position as naturally subordinate. As 
Pateman puts it, 
Hobbes was too revealing about civil society. The political character of conjugal 
right was expertly concealed in Locke's separation of what he called 'paternal' 
power from political power and, ever since, most political theorists, whatever their 
views about other forms of subordination, have accepted that the powers of 
husbands derive from nature and, hence, are not political. ' 306 
Feminist scholars have undertaken some very revealing and exciting work on the 
classic texts of political theory, but little attention has been paid to Hobbes, whose 
writings are of fundamental importance for an understanding of patriarchy as 
masculine right. 307 
The narrative of the social contract initially told by Hobbes warned of the potential 
dangers which could occur if the English civil war resulted in a breakdown of law. 
It was based upon some supposed 'facts' about human nature, which was conceived 
of as selfish, competitive, acquisitive and rational. Individuals' selfishness makes 
life in the state of nature, in which there are no laws, 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
305 C. Pateman, '"God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper": Hobbes, Patriarchy and Conjugal Rights' 
in M.L. Shanley and C. Pateman Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1991) p. 59. 
306 Pateman ( 1991) p. 69. 
307 Pateman (1991) p. 54. 
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and short' .308 However, individuals' ability to reason allows them to recognise that it 
is in their long-term interests to escape the state of nature by means of the social 
contract. Their agreement to give up their freedom to the sovereign then allows the 
sovereign to enforce the law, which includes the enforcement of contracts. 
Importantly for Pateman' s rereading of the social contract, this includes the 
sovereign's enforcement of marriage contracts. 
In Hobbes' state of nature, there could be no marriage contract and hence it 
would only be the mother who could (possibly) say who had fathered her child.309 
In the state of nature, Hobbes argues, it would be up to the mother to either let the 
child die or look after it. If she protected it then she would be the head of the 
family. As the following quotation makes clear, her child's obedience would be 
obtained by consent and in exchange for protection, not owed to parents per se. 
In Leviathan, Hobbes states that dominion can be acquired in two ways: 
[4] Dominion is acquired two ways: by generation or conquest. The right of 
dominion by generation is that which the parent hath over his children, and is called 
PATERNAL. And is not so derived from generation as if therefore the parent had 
dominion over the child because he begat him, but from the child's consent, either 
express or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to generation, God hath 
ordained to man a helper, and there be always two that are equally parents; the 
dominion therefore over the child should belong equally to both, and he be equally 
subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two masters. And 
whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, as being of the more 
excellent sex, they misreckon in it. For there is not always that difference in 
strength or prudence between the man and the woman as that the right can be 
determined without war. In commonwealths this controversy is decided by the civil 
law, and for the most part (but not always) the sentence is in favour of the father, 
because for the most part the commonwealths have been erected by the fathers and 
not by the mothers of families ... 
[5] lfthere be no contract, the dominion is with the mother. For in the condition of 
mere nature, where there are no matrimonial laws, it cannot be known who is the 
father unless it be declared by the mother. .. 310 
Hobbes is therefore unique amongst the social contract theorists, in starting with 
an image of the state of nature in which women are viewed as being equal with 
men. This is because each individual is equally able to kill the other: 
308 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C.B. Macpherson, (London: Penguin books, 1968) Ch. XIII. p. 186. 
309 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XX, p. 129. 'It cannot be known who is the father unless it be declared by 
the mother'. 
310 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XX, pp. 128-129. 
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For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, 
either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others that are in the same 
danger with himself.311 
There is often an ambiguity as to when the use of the term "men' is actually meant 
to include women within political theory. This is not easily resolved by "adding in' 
women, because this ambiguity itself performs a role in that it allows women to 
appear as individuals who can take part in the social contract at certain times and 
not at others. Pateman describes the way in which women are held to be 
"individuals' as part of the social contract and yet are outside it- as objects of the 
sexual contract. As outlined above, Hobbes is less guilty than the later social 
contract theorists because his rigorous application of individualism to both men and 
women leads him to view women as equal to men in the state of nature. However, 
this leads Pateman to ask why they would give up this state to enter into a civil 
society in which they were subordinate to men. 
By a careful reading of the social contract theorists, Pateman argues that 
within these texts is hidden a 'sexual contract'. This claim involves a complex 
analysis of the way in which she views change in, but also a continuation of, 
patriarchy. Pateman describes this in terms of the overthrow of 'classical patriarchy' 
- which was based upon a model of sovereign power as analogous to the 'natural' 
power of the father within the household3 ' 2 - with modem patriarchal power which 
is based upon the sexual contract. 
Pateman3 ' 3 points to inconsistencies in Hobbes' story that result from his 
view that everyone is equal in the state of nature. Why should they agree to give 
up their freedom and equality to enter into a society governed by laws which did 
311 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XIII. p. 74. 
312 For a detailed historical analysis of different theories of classical patriarchalism see, G.J. 
Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought (Bristol: Basil Blackwell, 1975). Also, J.P. 
Sommerville, ed., Filmer: Patriarchia and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991 ). 
313 Pateman (1991) pp. 53-73. 
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not treat them as equal? At the level of story-telling, this question raises the 
paradoxical issue of women's consent.314 Under the doctrine of coverture, women 
were viewed as being persons who could consent to the marriage contract. which 
then took away their legal personhood and their ability to make further contracts. 
Pateman315 traces through possible amendments to the social contract 
narrative to try to remove this inconsistency within Hobbes' story. So, she 
discusses the likelihood that women could all have been 'captured' within the 
state of nature because they are weakened by bringing up children.316 She does 
raise the question of how this could apply to all women, not all of whom would 
choose to have children, especially if this increased their risk of capture. She also 
discusses the possibility that women would agree to enter into civil society on 
lesser terms than men in order to gain the benefits of civil society. However, 
without assuming that women are unequal within the state of nature it is difficult 
to see why such an agreement should take place. 
In Hobbes' state of nature there could be no contract - as none can be 
enforced- and therefore no marriage contract. Within Hobbes' story, one of the 
reasons for entering into civil society by means of the social contract, is to 
empower the sovereign to enforce contracts between his or her subjects. The 
social contract in Pateman's retelling of the story involves a deal that is struck 
between males to have a sovereign who will guarantee the marriage contract. 
Hence, their access to women's bodies and labour will be enforced. 
314 See, for example, Pateman (1980) pp. 71-89. 
315 Pateman (1988) pp. 43-50. 
316 Hobbes does say that a woman can decide whether or not to raise a child and if she does then 
the child is deemed to contract with her to obey her as its head of household. Hobbes assumes that 
once a contract is made it should not be breached, even if it was made under duress. However, he 
introduced limitations upon sovereign power such that the point of moving from the state of 
nature was to preserve life. If the sovereign threatens your life, you have the right to disobey. 
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Her rereading of the transition from the state of nature to civil societv 
borrows from Freud as well as from Hobbes. In Freud~s317 myth of the primal 
horde the patriarchal father is able to have sex with all women in the group and 
the overthrow of the father involves a shift from the rule of the father to the rule 
of the brothers~ who then have sexual access to women. In Pateman~ s reworking 
of the move from classical patriarchy to the 'fraternal contract' the state 
guarantees husbands~ conjugal rights. The marriage contract, enforced by the 
state, is therefore central to her story: 
[the sexual contract] both establishes orderly access to women and a division of 
labour in which women are subordinate to men. 318 
The first question to be considered is the actual status (and meaning) of the 
sociaVsexual contract itself. Pateman makes clear that, like Hobbes, she does not 
really believe that there was such a contract. Pateman is examining the stories that 
were, and are, told to explain and justify the existence of law. It is important to 
consider the way in which such stories are understood by Pateman to avoid being 
absorbed into a discussion that takes the social contract too seriously as a historical 
fact. Pateman says that, 
The political fiction of the original contract tells not only of a beginning, an act of 
political generation, but also of an end, the defeat of (the classical form of) 
patriarchy. Moreover, the story is not merely about ends and beginnings, but is used 
by political theorists and, in more popular versions, by politicians, to represent 
social and political institutions to contemporary citizens and to represent citizens to 
themselves. Through the mirror of the social contract, citizens can see themselves 
as members of a society constituted by free relations. 319 (Italics are added.) 
This is evocative of the image of the mirror that Irigaray uses, in Speculum,320 to 
draw attention to women's ambivalent position within male-centred political 
theory. Both argue that it is the failure of women to fit within the political system 
that allows it to operate. Both explore symbolic systems or narratives in which 
317 S. Freud, Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages 
and Neurotics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950) pp. 141-146. 
318 Pateman (1988) p. 119. 
319 Pateman (1988) p. 221. 
320 Irigaray ( 1985). 
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women are not themselves subjects but are necessary to reflect men, to allow men 
to attain subjecthood. Irigaray's321 miming of Marx, for example, evokes the way in 
which women can be viewed as objects of exchange and has the effect of 
positioning men as subjects amongst each other. Pateman, in a different register, 
produces a similar analysis.322 Pateman is at pains to stress that she is simply 
discussing the stories that have been told to explain or justify the origins of the state. 
In certain respects, Pateman' s stated aim is similar to that of Adriana 
Cavarero323 (whose work owes an explicit debt to Irigaray): to appropriate male 
stories and to unravel them by illustrating how weak they are when the anomalous 
position of women is considered. Cavarero' s is also a constructive project in that 
there is a move to rework the patterns themselves; to produce different images of 
women. Although Pateman is dealing with stories, The Sexual Contract is different, 
not only in its refusal of the narrative style, but also in the centrality that is given to 
this particular story.324 It involves a close reading of the texts of, amongst others, 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel to argue that the 'sexual contract' operates as 
an unstated assumption within these texts themselves. This story is said to be 
important because of its use within contemporary political rhetoric. 325 By drawing 
this analogy between Pateman and both Irigaray and Cavarero, I am interested in 
what is opened up by this analysis in terms of the image of the female subject. 
Pateman uses the social contract theorists' own words and method against 
them, to disrupt their work by focusing upon the anomalous position of women 
321 L. Irigaray, 'Commodities among Themselves', in This Sex which is not One (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1985c) pp. 192-197; L. Irigaray, 'Women on the Market' in This Sex 
which is not One (New York: Cornell University Press, 1985a) pp. 170-191. 
322 See also Wittig's reading of the social contract which focuses upon enforced heterosexuality, M. 
Wittig 'On the Social Contract' in The Straight Mind and Other Essays (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992) pp. 33-45. 
323 See, for example, Cavarero ( 1995) p. 8. 
324 Cavarero has also written about Hobbes in 'Pace e Iibert nel pensiero politico di Thomas 
Hobbes', in Per lafilosofia Vol. 9, pp. 73-79, 1987; and Locke in La teoria politica di John 
Locke (Padova: Ed. Universitarie, 1984 ). 
325 Pateman (1988) p. 221. 
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within it. This method has been subject to criticism, in that she appears to take 
the narrative of the social contract too seriously. In a generally sympathetic 
review, Hutchings argues that, 
It is in her readings of the actual omissions, ambivalence and sometimes explicit 
misogyny in these texts that Pateman at her most convincing. However, her use of 
hypothesis to fill the gaps in the social contract story, her claims about links 
between that story and historical realities and the inconsistencies in her arguments 
are more difficult to defend. 326 
I think that Pateman' s work is important and has contemporary relevance as a 
critique of contract. As Hutchings327 acknowledges, the way in which Pateman 
employs the technique of 'retelling stories' should not detract from her 
demonstration that women have an ambivalent status with regard to 
individualism. Whilst I agree, I think that the importance of Pateman's work, 
linked with this analysis of possessive individualism, is her attack upon the daily 
subordination that takes place in different, but historically complimentary ways, 
within marriage and employment. This background is useful in order to think 
about the ways in which contract continues to be employed today. 
Defending Pateman 
There have been a number of criticisms328 of Pateman that focus upon her 
reworking of Hobbes' story to argue that Hobbes did not envisage women's 
capture and subordination in the state of nature. In his recent translation of 
Leviathan, Curly,329 for example, argues that women's subordination in the state 
of nature does not fit with Hobbes' acceptance of women as sovereigns. He cites 
Hobbes' discussion of ecclesiastical powers330 in which Hobbes states that a 
326 Hutchings (1996) p. 18. 
327 Hutchings (1996) p. 18. 
328 For example, Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XIII, p. 78; D. Van Mill, Liberty, Rationality and Agency in 
Hobbes' Leviathan (New York: State University ofNew York, 2001) pp. 198-200. 
329 Hobbes (1994b) p. 78. 
330 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XLII, p. 372. 
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female sovereign can appoint someone to speak on her behalf as head of the 
Church, because - even though women are forbidden to speak in church - she 
can appoint someone by her authority: "For authority does not take account of 
masculine and feminine'. 331 Similarly, Van Mill332 argues that men would not risk 
putting themselves in danger in order to subjugate anyone in the state of nature. 
I have two responses to this line of criticism of Pateman's reading of 
Leviathan. Firstly, I think that the abstract discussion of the state of nature needs 
to be inverted to explain what is at stake in this story, to be discussed below. 
More importantly, as mentioned above, criticisms aimed at Pateman's rewriting 
of the sexual contract miss their mark because Pateman' s work does not rely 
upon the credibility of this particular aspect of her reworking of a fictional 
narrative. Her speculation about the implied capture of women within Hobbes' 
state of nature can be viewed simply as a device to illustrate her attacks upon 
contractarian belief. 333 
My first point involves inverting the temporality of Hobbes' story. Hobbes' 
description of the social contract was a cautionary tale to show what would 
happen if the English Civil War resulted in a breakdown ofthe rule of law. It was 
not an historical analysis, not something that had already happened, but a state of 
affairs that could pertain at some future point. From this perspective, the 
cautionary tale can be applied to women. When the temporality of this is 
reversed, it could be argued that this is a warning to women that rebellion could 
produce a breakdown in law and that they would fair worse in the state of nature 
331 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XLII, p. 372. 
332 Van Mill (2001) pp. 198-200. 
333 This is supported by the focus of Pateman's most recent work in which she drops the 
discussion ofthe 'sexual contract' but continues to analyse the subordination that occurs through 
thinking of 'property in the person' or 'self-ownership' as implying that one's labour power can 
be alienated. C. Pateman, 'Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a 
Tale of Two Concepts' in The Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 10, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20-53. 
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than in civil society. However, this assumption is based upon Hobbes· image of 
the universality of possessive individualism, that can itself be challenged by 
considering the historical position of women, a point to which I will return in the 
next chapter. 
The second point is related to the first. As I will discuss in detail in the next 
chapter, Pateman's work is an exposition of the way in which any contract for the 
'exchange' of a human ability that is not separable from the worker's body, 
produces daily subordination through the use of a fiction that there is a free 
exchange. This derives from, but also amends, Marx's334 analysis of the exchange 
of labour power for a wage and the exploitation that results when both are treated 
as commodities. Pateman draws together an analysis of marriage contracts as 
well as employment contracts, prostitution contracts335 and surrogacy contracts to 
show how these operate in practice. Her stress is upon daily subordination. This 
does not rely upon a rereading of Hobbes such that women are to be viewed as 
prisoners within a hypothetical state of nature. Pateman' s move allows her to 
emphasise the political nature of the marriage contract itself and to trace its 
development alongside the employment contract. As she recognises, the marriage 
contract is no longer central to the lives of women. Later in this chapter I will go 
on to develop her analysis of the marriage contract and employment contract, 
discussing the use of implied terms in contemporary English law. This raises the 
question of how to reconceptualise the position of women who are now 
constructed as 'dependant' 336 not upon men but upon the state. Pateman also 
334 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1954). 
335 For Pateman's analysis of prostitution contracts see also C. Pateman, 'Defending Prostitution: 
Charges Against Ericsson' in Ethics Vol. 93, 1983, pp. 561-565. 
336 For an analysis of the politics of the term 'dependency' that is also applicable to English law, 
see, N. Fraser and L. Gordon, 'A Genealogy of 'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. 
Welfare State' inN. Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition 
(London: Routledge, 1997). 
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raises questions about the meaning of self-ownership, and the rights of dominion 
over others, that will be the subject of next chapter. 
A further possible objection to Pateman's work should also be considered 
at this point. Foucault attacked the idea that 'political power obeys the model of a 
legal transaction involving a contractual type of exchange.' 337 Foucault's work 
serves as a warning against discussions of family, civil society and state as 
monolithic entities. He describes his analysis of power as the opposite of Hobbes' 
Leviathan: 
In other words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his 
lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, 
progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, 
forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grasp subjection 
in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. This would be the exact 
opposite to Hobbes' project in Leviathan, and of that, I believe of all jurists for 
whom the problem is the distillation of a single will- or rather, the constitution of a 
unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty - from the particular 
wills of multiplicity of individuals. 338 
Whilst it may appear that this criticism must apply to Pateman: that she has failed 
to 'cut the head off the sovereign' and views sovereignty, or the law, as that 
which instantiates the sexual contract, I want to defend the usefulness of her 
analysis of contract law. This includes the way in which she links her critique of 
the marriage contract with that of the employment contract and of the story of the 
social/sexual contract. It is possible to highlight central themes in Pateman's 
work on the marriage contract and employment contract in a manner that goes 
beyond an analysis of sovereignty. Although these contracts are enforced by law, 
her work can be viewed as focusing upon the daily lives of women who are 
subject to the marriage contract (and of workers subject to employment 
contracts). Whilst it is possible to agree with Foucault that the intricacies of such 
relationships cannot be caught by a simple analysis of the contract, a point which 
337 M. Foucault, 'Two Lectures' in Foucault (1980a) p. 88. 
338 Foucault (1980a) p. 97. 
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Pateman would acknowledge, Pateman is right to point out the role that contract 
plays in creating wives and employees.339 
It is useful to consider what Pateman wants to achieve by telling the story of 
the sexual contract. She concludes by indicating that its retrieval does not provide a 
political programme but opens up a new perspective from which to assess political 
possibilities.340 In this respect her aim is constructive. Just as Irigaray reworks 
masculinist stories to allow something different to emerge, so Pateman wishes to 
problematize, 
[N]ature, sex, masculinity and femininity, the private, marriage, and prostitution ... work 
and citizenship. 341 
This link between the operation of marriage contracts, employment contracts and 
citizenship is also illustrated in her recent article 'Self-Ownership and Property in 
the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts' .342 Pateman is 
consistent with her earlier work when she argues that subordination within the 
workplace and the home prevents both men and women from developing the 
personal attributes necessary for 'active citizenship' .343 
A further criticism is levelled at Pateman by Moira Gatens. Gatens344 points 
out that, despite the useful detailed readings of the social contract theorists, 
Pateman' s model is underpinned by a view of women as sexually vulnerable to 
men. For Pateman, the social contract is set up as allowing men 'sexual access to 
women'. Pateman works with an image of men's mastery over women. Similarly, 
339 Hindness argues that, within contemporary society, contract can be viewed as itself providing a 
technique of power, for example as a process that produces the 'job seeker' who views 
him/herself as an individual who is contracting with the state. This is a change from the role of 
contract within liberal theory and will be discussed in Chapter 6. B. Hindness, 'A Society 
Governed by Contract?' Davis et al. (1997) pp. 14-26. 
340 Pateman (1988) p. 233. 
341 Pateman (1988) p. 233. 
342 Pateman (2002) pp. 20-27. 
343 Pateman (2002) p. 34. 
344 M. Gatens, 'Contracting Sex: Essence, Genealogy and Desire' in Gatens (1996) pp. 76-91. 
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Fraser345 argues that this does not adequately describe the relationship between men 
and women. However, Pateman's image does include the possibility of change. 
Pateman concludes positively arguing that, 
Men have a vested interest in maintaining the silence about the law of male sex-
right, but the opportunity exists for political argument and action to move outside 
the dichotomies of patriarchal civil society, and for the creation of free relations in 
which manhood is reflected back from autonomous femininity. 346 
Pateman does not flesh out her view of 'autonomous femininity' and does not rely 
upon her image of what it is to be a self to support her important political critique of 
contract or her attack upon possessive individualism. This critical aspect of her 
work is therefore consistent with the image of selfhood that was discussed in 
Chapter 2, even if this is not a view of self that she employs. 
Whilst Pateman does acknowledge the changing nature of the family,347 it is 
Brown348 who tries to further this analysis by shifting her focus to the dichotomies 
within liberalism itself, rather than the contract, per se. Although she criticises 
Pateman, Brown's analysis is similar to Pateman's in a number of respects. To 
examine these, it is useful to move away from the social contract itself and to detail 
Pateman' s analysis of two particular contracts: the marriage contract and the 
employment contract. 
The Relationship between the Social Contract, Marriage 
Contracts and Employment Contracts 
Before considering these contracts separately it is worth briefly discussing their 
relationship with the social contract. Gatens349 argues that Pateman' s analysis of the 
345 N. Fraser, 'Beyond the Master/Subject Model: On Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract' in 
Fraser (1997) pp. 225-235. 
346 Pateman (1988) p. 233. 
347 C. Pateman, 'Beyond the Sexual Contract?' in G. Dench, Rewriting the Sexual Contract: 
Collected Views on Changing Relationships and Sexual Divisions of Labour (London: Institute of 
Community Studies, 1997) pp. 1-9. 
348 W. Brown, 'Liberalism's Family Values' in Brown (1995) pp. 135-165. 
349 M. Gatens, 'Contracting Sex: Essence, Genealogy and Desire' in Gatens (1996) pp. 76-91. 
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social contract sits uneasily with her consideration of the marriage and emplo)ment 
contracts. Again, I want to defend Pateman on this point. Whilst the social contract 
is employed by theorists as a heuristic devise, this theoretical move does stem from 
and, to some extent, perpetuates the same cultural beliefs as other uses of contract 
' 
i.e. it employs a contractual framework through which to consider social relations. 
In the story of the social contract as told by Hobbes,350 it is the social 
contract that allows other contracts to exist, by producing the conditions under 
which their enforcement can be guaranteed. However, it is possible to reverse 
this argument. What we understand by 'contract' is not fixed. It is being created 
by the way in which the term 'contract' is used, for example the way in which the 
law of contract is understood in the courts when dealing with specific types of 
contract, such as marriage contracts and employment contracts. This meaning of 
contract can then be read back into the story of the social contract. 
Similarly, images of the story of the social contract can colour the meaning 
of 'contract'. The question of when (and whether) the weaker party can end a 
contract continues to be subject to argument in both the social contract theory and 
in the courts' analyses ofemployment contracts and marriage contracts. Hobbes 
argued that the sovereign should enforce contracts, including the social contract, 
even if those subject to it had been forced into agreement by the use or threat of 
violence. The only time a subject could reject the social contract would be if 
heri'his life were to be threatened. This is a necessary exception for Hobbes, in 
order to be consistent with his argument that the subject's motivation for giving 
up his freedom is to survive. This is central to Hobbes' image of 'human nature'. 
If the sovereign could kill one of his subjects then the subject would have been 
better off taking his or her chances in the state of nature. As I will discuss below, 
350 As discussed above, Hobbes is important for Pateman because he is not typical of the social 
contract theorists who viewed women's subordination within the family as natural. 
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if an employer threatens an employee's life then this would certainly be viewed 
as a fundamental breach of contract. The employee would be able to treat the 
contract as already ended. Importantly, the same is not true within a marriage 
because court action is required before either party can end the contract. 
Workers who suffer poor working conditions know that they have to endure 
them because the other options are worse and they are not persuaded that the use of 
contract spells equality. Similarly, married women may well not consider the 
contractual nature of marriage unless attempting to escape a violent man or 
divorcing. Nevertheless, this does not mean that to criticise contract is to criticise a 
fetish, as Brown argues against Pateman.351 Further, the courts are willing to read 
an employment contract into a relationship which complies with the courts' tests 
as to whether the person working is an employee rather than an independent 
contractor. 352 Contractual terms are implied into the contract irrespective of the 
parties' intentions or whether they had complied with the law by signing a 
written contract of terms and conditions. The mechanism used within 
employment law is therefore to decide that there is a contract and then to imply 
terms into this contract. 
Compare this legal mechanism to the law relating to women who are 
mothers and cohabiting, but are not subject to a marriage contract. In a traditional 
relationship, in which women work in the home and have not contributed money 
or monies worth to the purchase of the house, the unmarried woman is in a less 
secure position with regard to financial claims if the relationship ends. However, 
the law will imply obligations upon men with regard to the upkeep of children. 
351 W. Brown, 'Liberalism's Family Values' in Brown (1995) pp. 135-165. 
352 This distinction stems from the Beveridge Report which replaced the nineteenth century terms 
of independent contractor, casual worker, servant, labourer and workmen. See S. Deakin, 'The 
Many Futures ofthe Contract of Employment' in Conaghan et al. (2002) p. 179. 
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This now operates through the Child Support Agency/53 which imposes an 
obljgation upon the father to support the child that operates in an analogous 
manner as the imposed obligations upon employers, discussed above. Whether 
the father's obligations to the child are viewed as an implied contract, entered 
into upon the birth, or through another mechanism, does not necessarily make 
much difference to the outcome. The position of gay couples has also moved 
from a position of not being recognised by the law, with those ensuing 
advantages and disadvantages, to one of increased regulation. 354 
Once the courts were willing to extend the use of implied terms in 
contracts, in order to protect the weaker party, the nineteenth century laissez faire 
image of two persons making an agreement was lost.355 The mechanism by which 
contract operates is therefore little different between mothers who are unmarried 
women, whose partners the courts treat as having assumed to have agreed to pay 
for the child by virtue of being its father, and employees, whose employer tries to 
claim that he is simply hiring an independent contractor to avoid employment 
legislation. Through the use of protective statutes, the law will impose 
obligations upon the stronger party in each case. This also impacts upon the 
weaker party in unpredictable ways 'on the ground', for example, fathers may 
view payments as an exchange that allows him to maintain contact with both the 
child and the mother. The discussion of contract is important because it still 
occurs, even though the relationship between status and contract is ambiguous. 
353 This is not an endorsement of the Child Support Agency. See for example, M. Freeman, 
'Divorce: Contemporary Problems and Future Prospects' in M. Freeman, Divorce: Where Next? 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996) pp. 1-8. Freeman argues that 'It is as unsurprising as it is 
unfortunate that the moral panic engendered around the CSA should concern its impact upon 
men ... rather than on the plight of one-parent female-headed households or the feminisation of 
poverty'. Freeman (1996) p. 2. The rejection of the Beveridge proposal to include housewives as 
a class to be insured against marital breakdown was discussed in the last chapter. 
354 See D. Bell and J. Binnie, 'Sexual Citizenship: Law, Theory and Politics' in J. Richardson and 
R. Sandland, Feminist Perspectives on Law and Theory (London: Cavendish, 2000) pp. 167-186. 
355 For an extended discussion ofthis point see Atiyah (2000). 
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Pateman' s strength is in drawing these two together. For the last two sections of 
this chapter I will consider Pateman's work in the context of contemporary 
English marriage contracts and employment contracts. 
The Marriage Contract 
Pateman gives an historical account of the legal ambiguity of women's position 
within the marriage contract, brought out by comparing it with the slave contract 
and the employment contract. She raises a number of legal issues that are not of 
contemporary relevance and yet provide an important background to cultural 
understandings, and contemporary legal deliberations, about marriage. She avoids 
the trap of treating law as an ideal form that needs to be consistent. It is often 
inconsistent because 'legal reasoning' tends to provide a post hoc justification for 
the decision reached. 356 
Both Nancy Fraser357 and Wendy Brown358 provide useful responses to 
Pateman' s position, with regard to a contemporary understanding of the marriage 
contract, at a time when the nuclear family is breaking down. Fraser focuses upon 
one aspect ofPateman's work: her reading of the relationship between the parties to 
the contract. As mentioned above, she argues that Pateman views this relationship 
in terms of 'master/subject' 359 which does not adequately describe the marriage 
relationship. Fraser holds onto the importance of considering women's position 
within society as a whole - in order to make the simple point that marriage involves 
more than male sex-right within the marriage itself. She draws upon the work of 
356 For support see, for example, Mossman (1991 ); Griffiths (1997). 
357 N. Fraser, 'Beyond the Master/Subject Model: On Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract' in 
Fraser (1997) pp. 225-235. 
358 W. Brown, 'Liberalism's Family Values' in Brown (1995) pp. 135-165. 
359 This is a difficult phrase for Fraser to use. Although this is not discussed, the reason that the 
common terms 'master/slave' or 'master/servant' -which is still a feature of employment law texts-
is avoided is clearly because Pateman draws out the difference between these situations. One of the 
strengths of Pateman's work is her historical analysis of the employment contract that derives from 
consideration of the position of wives- rather than vice versa. 
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Okin360 to produce an argument that appears relevant to the position of women in the 
UK as well as the US, 
If marriage still too often resembles a master/subject relation, this is due in large 
measure to its social embeddedness in relation to sex-segmented labor markets, 
gender-structured social-welfare policy regimes, and the gender division of unpaid 
labour ... .In general, then, although the legal reform of marriage remains 
significantly incomplete, the institution in the United States today is probably better 
understood as an unequal partnership in which 'voice' correlates inversely with 
opportunities for 'exit' than as a master/subject relation.361 
She also argues that the relationship of 'master/subject' may provide an 
interpretative framework for some couples but not for others. I think this is right, 
but also that this does not generally undermine Pateman' s analysis of the social 
contract theorists nor upon the different types of subordination historically attached 
to the marriage contract and employment contract. 
In contrast, Brown's concerns do focus upon Pateman's project as a whole 
and attempt to supersede it. Brown362 draws an analogy with the work of Weber to 
illustrate her argument that Pateman's position is historically correct but is no 
longer relevant. Weber, she argues, illustrated the way in which capitalism relied 
upon a Protestant work ethic and then pointed to the fact that a work ethic is no 
longer needed for the maintenance of capitalism. This Protestant work ethic is now 
only reproduced in certain aspects of the culture. Similarly, she argues that Pateman 
correctly outlines the historical role of contract in women's subordination, but that 
Pateman fails to see that contract is no longer necessary for its continuation. To 
continue to fight against contract, Brown argues, would be like attacking 
Protestantism in the hope of undermining capitalist exploitation. 
360 Okin (1989) cited N. Fraser, 'Beyond the Master/Subject Model: On Carole Pateman's The Sexual 
Contract' in Fraser (1997) p. 228. 
361 N. Fraser, 'Beyond the Master/Subject Model: On Carole Pateman's The Sexual Contract' in 
Fraser (1997) p. 228. Whilst her reference is to the US, these arguments are relevant to the current 
discussion of marriage in England. 
362 W. Brown, 'Liberalism's Family Values' in Brown (1995) pp. 135-165, p. 135. 
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This argument is more applicable to marriage contracts than to employment 
contracts. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Pateman has admitted 
that, 
The patriarchal structures with which I was concerned have been considerably 
weakened, and the heyday ofthe worker/breadwinner was from 1840-1970. 363 
Nevertheless, Pateman argues that the sexual contract still provides a useful tool for 
contemporary analysis. Brown goes on to develop her own position which draws 
upon Pateman. At a basic level, she argues that Pateman' s attack on the marriage 
contract cannot account for the position of single women, with or without children. 
Women are no longer forced into the marriage contract for survival or even for 
social recognition. Brown ignores legal change in the nature of marriage itself and 
seems to regard these as largely irrelevant. Here, it must be emphasised that Brown 
is writing in the context of US law and not English law. It is arguable that, in 
England, there has been a shift away from the last vestiges of the doctrine of 
coverture. The House of Lords decision in R v R (1991Y64 (that women could no 
longer be legally forced to have sex with their husbands) is a move towards the 
courts seeing marriage in terms of contract and away from status - although this is 
as yet not fully realised in England. For example, the bar on gay marriages means 
that the parties to the contract must be male and female, i.e. based upon status in 
this regard. 
There is a split between the ways in which the English courts deal with 
marriage - and, where possible, incorporate the position of cohabitees within their 
remit - and popular views of marriage. A stark example of the way in which the 
courts reason when viewing marriage through the framework of contract is 
provided by the case of R v R (1991 ). In the High Court, at first instance, the 
363 Pateman (1996) p. 204. 
364 R v R (1991) 4 All. ER 481. 
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discussion of rape within marriage in this case centred upon a consideration of 
implied terms within the marriage contract. This will be examined below but the 
contractual framework employed must be borne in mind whilst considering 
Brown's argument that contract is no longer important in women's subordination. 
As I will discuss below, there is an argument within employment law that the 
increase in the use of implied terms (in part through an increase in protective 
legislation in such areas as health and safety) has resulted in a shift away from the 
traditional image of contract. 365 As Pateman rightly points out, the problem with the 
marriage contract (and employment contracts) is that the contracting parties enter 
into relationships of subordination because the weaker party purports to contract 
something which cannot be separated from her/his body. Whether or not this body 
is female may well be relevant to the service that is to be provided and cannot be 
abstracted away from any analysis. 
Brown's central argument is that, 
the legacy of gender subordination Pateman identifies as historically installed in the 
sexual-social contract is to be found not in contemporary contract relations but in 
the terms of liberal discourse that configure and organize liberal jurisprudence, 
public policy and popular consciousness.366 (Emphasis is in the original.) 
So, Brown, advocates a move away from the sexual contract and towards an 
analysis of the liberal discourse that is premised upon it. Given that Pateman' s 
sexual contract takes the form of a reworking of a story, it is initially difficult to 
understand how Brown's move can be useful. Some of Brown's analysis in 
illustrating how 'liberal ontology is fundamentally and not continently gendered' 367 
covers very similar ground to that of Pateman, particularly Pateman' s earlier work 
on the problematic nature of women's consent. 368 However, Brown's work is helpful 
365 A. Thompson, 'The Law of Contract' in I. Grigg-Spall and P. Ireland, eds., The Critical 
Lawyers' Handbook (London: Pluto, 1992) pp. 69-76. 
366 W. Brown (1995) p. 138. 
367 W. Brown (1995) p. 150. 
368 This links with criminal law and the many debates around the problem of the role of consent in 
rape law and its relationship to citizenship. See Pateman (1980) pp. 71-89. This point is also 
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in broadening Pateman' s analysis - in a manner similar to that of Fraser _ to 
consider the breakdown of the family. This involves recognising that the marriage 
contract as such is not required for women's subordination. This does not 
undermine Pateman's argument so much as move forward to consider the position 
of women for whom the state is increasingly 'the man in their lives' .369 As discussed 
above, the law in this area could be conceived as contractual because the courts are 
willing to impose some obligations upon unmarried fathers- just as they impose 
obligations upon employees without a written employment contract. This involves 
blurring a distinction between status and contract that is already present in both 
employment and marriage contracts, to be considered in more detail below. 
In Brown's discussion of the way in which women's bodies are viewed as 
vulnerable to rape, she considers a link between the image of women as being 
unable to defend the boundaries of the state and as being unable to defend their own 
body boundaries. The role of the female body - and its supposed vulnerability to 
rape - is then considered within myths of origin of the state, including the story of 
the sociaVsexual contract. These myths of origin justify law as necessary to protect 
women from their so-called 'natural' vulnerability to rape. It is this unquestioned 
assumption that women are naturally susceptible to rape that Gatens370 accuses 
Pateman of maintaining. By considering the social contract within the context of 
other myths of origin, Brown avoids emphasising 'contract' per se.371 Women are 
taken up by Ngaire Naffine in Naffme (1998); with regard to medical consent and subjectivity by 
Katherine O'Donovan in O'Donovan (1997) pp. 47-64. For Brown's discussion on consent see 
Brown (1995) pp. 162-4. 
369 This is also the concern of Fraser who has analysed the political meaning of need and dependency. 
See, for example, N. Fraser, 'Women, Welfare and the Politics ofNeed Interpretation' and 'Struggle 
over needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late Capitalist Political Culture' in 
Fraser (1989) pp. 144-187; 'A Genealogy of'Dependency': Tracing a Keyword ofthe U.S. Welfare 
State' in Fraser (1997). This is the area that is missing from historical (1840-1970) discussions ofthe 
marriage and employment contracts in The Sexual Contract but which is addressed in Pateman's later 
work. See C. Pateman, 'The Patriarchal Welfare State' in J.B. Landes, ed., Feminism: the Public and 
Private (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 241-274. 
370 M. Gatens, 'Contracting Sex: Essence, Genealogy and Desire' in Gatens (1996) pp. 76-91. 
371 Brown's discussion, which also includes a discussion of Freud, resonates with the move that 
Whitford makes in linking the social contract with the 'symbolic contract'. See also M. Whitford, 
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positioned as being vulnerable to rape and the law is viewed as being their 
protector, a set-up which Brown describes as a 'protection racket' .372 This can be 
viewed as an inversion of what has actually happened. As Pateman illustrates, law 
did not protect women. It created a realm, the 'state' of marriage, in which women 
could be forced to have sex legitimately. To draw on Marcus,373 these stories about 
law (and the legal proceeding themselves) perpetuate an image of woman's body as 
already raped and men as naturally potential rapists. This is to view these stories, 
not as perpetuating a false consciousness, but as an inverted description of the way 
in which social relations operated in a society at a particular time. To make this 
move does not entail an assumption that these social relations are fixed. 
To illustrate this, it is useful to consider the case of R v R (1991). The 
precedent that a husband can legally force his wife to have sex dates from Sir 
Matthew Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736),374 
But the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful 
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract. 
This was applied in the ecclesiastical courts in Popkin v Popkin (1794) in which 
Lord Stowell said that, 
The husband has a right to the person of his wife but not if her health is 
endangered. 375 
This is a noteworthy use of the term 'person' given that women were not viewed 
as 'persons' until the courts declared that they had achieved personhood in the 
Persons Case. 376 
'Irigaray, Utopia and the Death Drive' in C. Burke, N. Schor and M. Whitford, eds., Engaging with 
Irigaray (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) pp. 379-400. 
372 Brown (1995) p. 188. 0 0 
373 So Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape PreventiOn' m 1° 
Butler and JoWO Scott, edso, Feminists Theorize the Political (London: Routledge, 1992) ppo 385-
4030 
374 Mo Hale, Hale's History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736) Vol. 1 Cho 58 po 629 cited in HoL. R v R 
(1991) 4 AllER 481 at po 6040 
375 Cited R v R (1991) 4 AllER 481, at po 6040 
376 Edwards v Attorney General ofCanada (1930) AOCO 1240 This is discussed in Chapter 3° 
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The discussion in R v R ( 1991) centres upon the legal framework of 
contractual implied terms. This is the same framework in which employment 
contracts are discussed and the use of the implied term within these contracts is 
strikingly similar. This mechanism has allowed the courts to alter contracts 
according to their own - usually conservative - beliefs. 377 A quotation from Owen 
J., the trial judge at first instance, illustrates how the framework of contract is used. 
In this case, Owen J. is saddled with the contractual legal framework through which 
the law views marriage, but, in a climate influenced by feminism, he also seeks to 
mitigate against the misogyny of earlier decisions: 
What, in law, will suffice to revoke that consent which the wife gives to sexual 
intercourse upon marriage and which the law implies from the facts of the 
marriage? .. .lt must be sufficient for there to be agreement between the parties. Of 
course, an agreement of the parties means what it says. It does not mean something 
which is done unilaterally .... As it seems to me, from his action in telephoning her 
and saying that he intended to see about a divorce and thereby to accede to what 
she was doing, there is sufficient here to indicate that there was an implied 
agreement to a separation and to a withdrawal of that consent to sexual intercourse, 
which the law, I will assume and accept, implies.378 
Whilst, for the majority of the population, contract may not provide a conceptual 
framework through which to consider rape, it does provide such a frame of 
reference for judges- even if it is only evoked to justify a decision that is made on 
the grounds of public policy. Here, the trial judge is discussing the implications of 
the husband's act of telephoning his wife to say that he intended to seek a divorce. 
Owen J., the trial judge, can be understood to be posing the following question: was 
this telephone call sufficient to indicate an implied agreement to divorce which 
would be sufficient to revoke the wife's implied consent to sex within the marriage 
contract? 
Owen J. refers to the principle in contract that an agreement is not something 
that can be made unilaterally. This point can be examined using an example from 
377 For a detailed analysis see, for example, Griffiths (1997). 
378 R v R (1991) I AllER 747, at p. 754 discussed by the Lords in R v R (1991) 4 AllER 481, at P· 
606. 
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employment law. If there is a fundamental breach of contract by one of the parties, 
the other party can assume that, because of this action in itself, s/he is no longer 
bound by the contract. So for example, if my employer hit me I could walk out and 
claim unfair dismissal. The violent action alone would be taken to mean that the 
employer no longer intended to maintain the employment contract and, therefore, 
that I was released immediately from my obligations under the contract. If I ignored 
this behaviour then I would be deemed to have accepted the employer's breach of 
contract and the contract would be deemed to continue. Married women are in a 
worse position than employees in this respect because there is no violent act, short 
of murder, that can automatically release them from the marriage contract. 
Ironically, in this sense, employment contracts are more 'private', as they can be 
ended without the intervention of the courts. 
Further, the position of women within marriage can be compared to that of 
women who were sexually harassed at work, prior to the landmark case of Porcelli 
v Strathclyde R.C. (1984).379 Before this decision, women had to show that an act of 
sexual harassment was linked to some other contractual disadvantage, for example, 
being demoted or dismissed, in order to claim damages for a breach of Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975. In Porcelli, the Court of Sessions decided that sexual 
harassment was to be treated as a detriment in its own right and so it was no longer 
necessary to show any further detriment. This can be compared with the situation 
pertaining under the marriage contract. In the case of R v R (1991), Owen J. did not 
assume that the rape alone, as an act in its own right, could demonstrate even a 
willingness to end the marriage contract. This had to be demonstrated by the 
telephone call in which divorce was discussed. 
379 Porcelli v Strathclyde R.C. (1984) ICR 177. This Scottish case is now part of English law. For a 
summary of current law on sexual harassment, see S. Johnson and M. Rubenstein, 'Sexual 
Harassment and the Law' in Equal Opportunities Review No. 102, February, 2002, pp. 16-17. 
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Implied terms have become important within the employment and 
matrimonial contracts because they regulate relationships of subordination. The 
demands of these relationships cannot be dictated in sufficient detail by the 
contract itself, and therefore the courts are willing to imply extra terms into the 
contract. Within the twentieth century this has also been a mechanism by which 
protective legislation has been implemented. The temporal sequence of these 
contracts needs to thought through, to understand their effects, in order to consider 
whether Brown is right in her argument that contract is no longer important in 
women's subordination. Whereas an employment contract may be the subject of 
negotiation between employer and employee (or his/her trade union)380 during the 
course of the relationship, the same framework of negotiation may not occur within 
marriage - although informal daily negotiation may well occur. 381 The courts are 
normally involved only after the relationship has broken down. Therefore, the 
implied term arises later. However, this provides a framework through which the 
relationship can be viewed by the parties and which can provide leverage when a 
relationship is breaking down. This is particularly the case when legal advice is 
sought within the duration of the relationship. 382 
Linked with this point, Elizabeth Kingdom383 has argued in favour of the 
adoption of cohabitation contracts, for both married couples and cohabitees, 
detailing clauses such as the question of who will care for the children if they fall ill. 
380 There has been a shift in the role of trade unions away from that of collective negotiation to 
that of monitoring and enforcing individual members' legal claims. See Deakin (2002) pp. 193-
194; H. Collins, K.D. Ewing and A. McColgan, Labour Law: Tests and Materials (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001) pp. 56-58. 
381 See, for example, R. Lister and C. Callender, 'Income Distribution within Families and the 
Reform of Social Security' in Journal ofSocial Welfare and Family Law Vol. 21, No.3, 1999 pp. 
203-220. 
382 In a Kafkaesque manner, myths abound as to what is law, especially amongst people wh? are 
afraid to seek legal advice. I had a client who thought that her children would be taken away If she 
instigated divorce. In these circumstances, the myths can be even ~or~ conservative than the l_aw., . 
383 E. Kingdom, 'Cohabitation Contracts and the Democrat1zatwn of Personal RelatiOns m 
Feminist Legal Studies Vol. 8, 2000, pp. 5-27. 
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Whilst it is useful to focus upon such issues at the start of the relationship, Okin' s 
arguments are relevant, here. Okin384 points out that the family systematically 
produces vulnerability through women's disproportionate contribution to child 
care. Here, the comparison between marriage (or cohabitation) contracts and 
employment contracts is helpful. Whilst negotiation in both situations may be 
useful, more radical change is required in order for this to be democratic, a point 
that Kingdom acknowledges. 385 
Returning to the case of R v R ( 1991 ), the case proceeded to the Court of 
Appeal and the House of Lords, both of which decided to take what the Court of 
Appeal called 'the radical solution' 386 : that there was no longer to be a marital 
immunity to rape. This was described as the 'removal of a common law fiction 
which has become anachronistic and offensive. ' 387 The Lords did not attack the use 
of a contractual framework through which to think about marriage. On the contrary, 
they employed a contractual framework but held that a particular contractual term 
(that a woman could be assumed to consent to sex with her husband) could no 
longer be implied into the marriage contract. This leaves open the possibility that 
further regulation of marriage contracts could occur through the courts' use of 
implied contractual terms. 
Pateman' s analysis of the marriage, civil slave and employment contracts 
draws out the complexities of trying to view long term relationships within this 
contractual frame. 388 Brown discusses this in terms of an ideological moment in 
which the exploitative nature of the relationship is obscured when contract is 
384 Okin (1989) pp. 167-169. 
385 Kingdom (2000) p. 23. 
386 C.A. R v R (1991) 2 WLR 1065 and H.L. R v R (1991) 4 AllER 481. 
387 C.A. R v R (1991) 2 WLR 1065 and H.L. R v R (1991) 4 AllER 481. 
388 This has been recognised by contract lawyers as well as by employment lawyers (who are 
unable to avoid noticing this point). See I. MacNeil, The New Social Contract (Yale: Yale 
University Press, 1980). 
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portrayed as a free exchange between equals - in keeping with Pateman~ s analysis 
and that of Marx. For Brown, there is also a discursive moment in which identities 
are created. My rereading of Pateman makes Brown's move unnecessary. Pateman 
herself argues that the contract produces wives and employees. It is possible to 
rework Pateman's analysis in a manner that plays down the moments when she 
assumes that women's vulnerability is fixed. I will deal with this further in the next 
chapter. 
Brown attempts to supersede Pateman by focusing upon the way in which 
liberalism produces dichotomies: equality/ difference, liberty/ necessity, autonomy/ 
dependence, rights/ needs, individual/ family, self-interest/ selflessness, public/ 
private, contract/ consent. 389 This is a useful analysis, which draws out dichotomies 
which are already implicit in Pateman' s own work. Brown is right to argue that 
there is a move away from the predominance of the marriage contract itself- if by 
this she means that marriage is no longer central within the subordination and 
exploitation of women compared with the time when marriage served as a legal 
disability. However, the case of R v R (1991) illustrates the way in which contract is 
still applied within the courts. In addition, there is still an appeal to contract, 
particularly in terms of the growing areas of surrogacy, reproductive technology and 
debates around cohabitation contracts as well as employment contracts. 
The Employment Contract 
Against Brown, I will argue that contract is still prevalent within the way in 
which employees think about their position. Whereas Pateman's earlier work390 
considered the problem of 'political obligation' in terms of questions of 
389 W. Brown 'Liberalism's Family Values' in Brown (1995) p. 152. 
390 For exam~le, C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1985). 
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obligations to obey the state, in The Sexual Contracf91 she is concerned with 
civil contractual obligations. In other words, Pateman is concerned with 
obligations between individuals and between individuals and companies.392 Her 
Marxist argument regarding the employment contract resolves a problem that is 
still discussed within contemporary employment law text books and employment 
case law. It is worth considering this because it is relevant to the way in which a 
worker is viewed as having property in his person, to be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
The problem for the courts is that it is difficult to draw up a distinction 
between employees and independent contractors if it is assumed that the 
employment contract is a contract for a particular piece of work. There are a number 
of tests employed in this area. 393 One way in which this problem is avoided is by 
dividing the employment contract into two stages: firstly, the exchange of work for 
wages; and, secondly, the creation of an expectation that the same exchange will 
occur again in future. This can be illustrated by the following quotation from 
Freeland, an employment lawyer: 
[T]he contract has a two-tiered structure. At the first level there is an exchange of 
work and remuneration. At the second level there is an exchange of mutual 
obligations for future performance. The second level -the promise to employ and 
be employed - provides the arrangement with its stability and with its continuity as 
a contract. 394 
This glories in the title of 'mutuality of obligations test' and has been used in 
cases395 to consider the question of whether to classify a worker as an employee 
(with employment rights) or an independent contractor (with even fewer rights). 
391 Pateman (1988). 
392 Companies have legal personality. In other words they are treated as if they were men- even when 
women were not viewed as 'persons'. 
393 S. Deakin and G.S. Morris, Labour Law (London: Butterworths, 2001) p. 148. 
394 M. Freeland, The Contract of Employment (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1976) p. 20. 
395 Hewlett Packard Ltd v O'Murphy No. EAT/612/01; (2001) WL 1135163; the argument has 
been used to exclude non-traditional workers (disproportionately affecting women) from 
employment rights, see O'Kelly v Trust House Forte (1984) QB 90. 
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This problem only arises for liberal employment lawyers because they view the 
employment contract as being an exchange of labour - rather than labour power 
(i.e. the capacity to labour) - for money. The difference is important because the 
exchange of labour for money would imply that all labour was paid for, i.e. that 
employees received the value of the goods they produced. As Marx396 argued, if this 
were true then there would be no valorisation of capital as a result of the extraction 
of surplus value. In other words, the worker would be paid for all of the working 
day and not simply a part of it. 
Pateman also details the way in which the employment contract differs from 
the marriage contract. As Whitford397 points out, Pateman covers similar ground to 
lrigaray, whilst concentrating upon an historical perspective. This part of The 
Sexual Contract does not fit exactly with Irigaray' s rereading of Marx and yet raises 
similar issues relating to the relationship between women's subordination and 
capitalism. Both want to keep hold of important aspects of Marx's analysis whilst 
refusing to privilege the employment contract. Pateman points to four main ways in 
which the 'free' labour of employees differs from 'unfree' labour of married women 
(and slaves): workers are paid a wage rather than provided with 'protection'; the 
employment contract is limited in time whereas married women have an open-
ended obligation with regard to housework; the worker is not deemed to contract 
out himself(or 'person' as Lord Stowell put it in Popkin v Popkin (1794), discussed 
above) but his labour power - part of the property in the person; the worker stands 
on an equal footing with the employer as a 'juridically free and equal citizen'. With 
regard to this last point alone, regarding formal equality, married women have 
achieved the same status as men. The fact that married women were not viewed as 
having property in their person is another way of saying that only men were 
396 Marx (1954) p. 172. 
397 M. Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991) pp. 169-191. 
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traditionally viewed as possessive individuals, or as having self-ownership, to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
The peculiarity of the employment contract can be brought out by 
Pateman' s398 comparison between three different versions of the relationship 
between workers and 'property in the person'. If is it assumed that one's ability to 
work can be treated as a commodity and can be alienated completely, this results in 
a slave contract. There are no limitations upon the work and this is associated with a 
difference in status between master and slave. The current situation is that the 
worker's labour power is sold in accordance with a contract on a more piecemeal 
basis and both employer and employee are viewed as juridically equal. This 
represents a middle path for Pateman. The third alternative is to deny that human 
abilities can be removed from the person. The employment contract really requires a 
worker to tum up and be told what to do. Pateman's third alternative is therefore to 
question why 'the renting of persons' is viewed as compatible with political 
equality. Her focus is therefore upon subordination and the interrelationship 
between marriage and employment contracts and the welfare state. As she puts it, 
But if democratisation is to take place, property in the person must be left behind 
with civil subordination. Two of the most important questions are whether the right 
of self-government should continue to be (partially) alienable, and whether the 
renting ofpersons should be deemed compatible with democratic citizenship. 399 
It is useful to illustrate the difference between the employment and mamage 
contracts by returning to the question of the termination of the contract. To recap, 
whereas the domestic sphere - as compared to civil society and the state - was 
viewed as 'private', as soon as the question of termination of the contract arises 
the marriage contract can be viewed as more 'public' than the employment 
contract. It is necessary to be careful about the use of the terms: public/private. In 
398 Pateman (2002) p. 31. 
399 Pateman (2002) p. 52. 
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law, to describe a case as involving 'public' law means that the state is involved. 
'Private' law therefore covers any litigation between individuals and/or 
companies that, by definition, have legal personality. However, here I simply 
mean that employment contracts can be severed without court involvement 
whereas the termination of a marriage must be read out in open court, i.e. made 
public in the broader sense of the term. It is impossible to repudiate a marriage 
contract without the involvement of the courts. So, in the example mentioned 
above, if an employer hits an employee then this constitutes constructive dismissal 
and the employee can accept the breach of contract, and can leave and claim 
damages for unfair dismissal. However, wife beating will not be taken as 
repudiation of the marriage contract. 
Further, it is useful to consider why only damages are available in these 
circumstances within the employment scenario. Reinstatement is not awarded when 
the employment relationship is judged by the employment tribunal to have broken 
down. In this way, the courts discuss the employment relationship in the same terms 
as a divorce, in which irretrievable breakdown of the relationship400 must be 
demonstrated. The personal nature of the employment contract is also viewed as 
important within other legal tests. For example, there is deemed (by the courts) to 
be an implied term of 'mutual trust and confidence' in all employment contracts. In 
considering this, the courts have, on occasions, applied a psychological test. It has 
been argued that the implied existence of the 'mutual trust and confidence' term 
means that not only must the employee have trust and confidence in her/his 
employer, s/he must also be able to believe reasonably that the employer has trust 
and confidence in her/him. For example, an employer requesting that an employee 
take a psychiatric examination was deemed to have breached this term because this 
400 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 sl(l) 
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behaviour 'objectively' 401 implies that the employer does not have trust and 
confidence in the employee. 402 
Brown's critique ofPateman must be considered in the context of the courts' 
wide ability to imply terms into employment contracts. In this case, the relationship 
is still viewed in terms of 'contract' but this contract is far from the paradigm image 
of an exchange between two equal individuals. The marriage contract has changed, 
dropping some of its 'brutal origins' ,403 and at the same time is becoming less 
relevant, as it shifts, to some degree, away from status. Pateman' s critique of 
contract illustrates why this is not a solution for feminists, however. Women would 
not be better off if they could 'freely' negotiate the marriage contract, as I will 
discuss below. The employment contract is becoming more akin to a device for 
dealing with a status relationship, through the use of implied terms and protective 
legislation. 
Brown should not be so confident that 'contract' has lost its pulling power. In 
a book review of The New Contractualism?404 To be discussed in the next chapter, 
Dickenson has argued that, 
What is wrong with the sexual contract, and its expression in marriage, is not that it 
is a contract but the fact it is sexual. Critics like Pateman ... tend to confuse the 
historical circumstances which prevailed at the time liberalism got under way -
specifically the massively inegalitarian doctrine of coverture in marriage - with the 
essence of contract itself .405 
Dickenson406 argues that contractual relations can ensure mutual recognition and 
respect between equals. But where are these (non-sexual) egalitarian contracts that 
she takes as the standard of comparison here? In The New Contractualism? Marcia 
401 In law, the term 'objective' is used to describe the courts' decisions. 
402 Bliss v South East Thames Regional Health Authority (1985) IRLR 308. 
403 J.S. Mill, 'The Subjection of Women' in Essays on Sex Equality, ed. A.S. Rossi (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970) p. 130 cited Pateman (1988) p. 119. 
404 Davis et al (1997) cited in Dickenson (1998) pp. 108-111. 
405 Dickenson (1998) p. 110. 
406 Dickenson (1997). 
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Neave407 expresses her doubts that a move to allow couples to negotiate the marriage 
contract by way of pre-nuptial agreements would increase women~s freedom and 
autonomy, detailing the factors - derived from women's customary unequal role 
with regard to child care - that make women less able to negotiate on equal terms 
with men. 
When Dickenson argues for 'egalitarian' contracts, is she really thinking of 
employment contracts? I have illustrated the way in which courts have used the 
device of implied terms to construct (in different ways) both marriage contracts and 
employment contracts after the relationships have ended. These result in contracts 
that have little in common with the idea of simple exchange or even the voluntary 
assumption of responsibilities. 408 Perhaps consumer contracts - in which we should 
be free to buy genetically modified foods from international companies - provide 
Dickenson with her ideal of equal exchange? If the (non-sexual) egalitarian contract 
is not to be found in practice then perhaps it is an ideal. Another question arises: is 
the model of equal persons that these egalitarian contracts employ a useful feminist 
ideal? It may be that the best example that can be found of such an idealised form 
of exchange contract is the trading that occurs between equal sized companies. But 
does such an account take the position of women as typical or as aberration? I will 
continue to consider these questions in the next chapter on 'possessive 
individualism'. 
407 M. Neave, 'The Hands that Sign the Paper: Women and Domestic Contracts' in Davis et al, 
The New Contractualism? (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1997) pp. 71-86. She cites Pateman 
approvingly at pp. 77-78. 
408 For a discussion of contract law which highlights this point, see A. Thompson, 'The Law of 
Contract' in I. Grigg-Spall, and P. Ireland, eds, The Critical Lawyers' Handbook (London: Pluto, 
1992) pp. 69-76. 
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Chapter 6: Possessive Individualism 
Possessive individualism encompasses both a view of the self and normative 
political claims, some of which were touched upon in the last chapter. It also 
represents a point of tension and an area of political struggle at this point in time. 
The tension and political opportunities for change occur as a result of the 
breakdown of the traditional breadwinner/ housewife model. At issue is the 
question of the extent to which women are treated as having self-ownership or 
property in their person or whether other (better) models can be adopted. 
The position of women is a blind spot in the concept of possessive 
individualism. As an ontological concept it can be shown that we do not 'spring 
up like mushrooms' .409 We are not individuals from the start. In Chapter 2 I 
discussed contemporary theories from different areas of philosophy which detail 
the emergence of selves; processes that are not envisaged as complete after 
childhood. Whilst these start from a position in which women are the norm, they 
also give a much better account of what it is to be a self for men, as well as for 
women, than does possessive individualism. 
However, the concept of possessive individualism is also normative. It is 
possible for proponents of this view to argue that we should be treated as if we 
were owners of our own abilities in order to have autonomy or to be treated 
justly. This is Nozick's410 argument when he evokes Kant to argue that self-
ownership is necessary if that we are to be treated as ends and not means.411 In 
409 T. Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), ed. B. Gert (Indiapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1998) Ch. VIII, p. 205. 
410 Nozick (1974) p. 32-33. 
411 The form of this argument has some parallels in Cornell's radical rereading of Kant: that any 
legislator/judge should address the question of whether we would agree to the 
legislation/judgment if we were to be treated as free and equal persons. This cashes out with ver;. 
different political consequences. For a discussion of the relationship between Cornell and Nozick 
see Chapter 3. 
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this chapter I want to deal with these arguments. Again, I believe that this 
framework depends upon a failure to consider the position of women. Both 
Pateman and Okin illustrate the incoherence that arises when women are treated 
as possessive individuals. This theoretical analysis is important at a time when, as 
illustrated by the wrongful birth cases in Chapter 4, there is some ambiguity 
amongst judges over whether the courts should view women as owners of their 
abilities. It is also a view of the self that is assumed by proponents of 'law and 
economics',412 which is influential within legal theory. 
In order to look at the meaning possessive individualism in more detail I 
will consider the work of Crawford Brough Macpherson, which Tully describes 
in the following terms: 
Initially a challenge to the perceived wisdom, it soon became the re1gnmg 
orthodoxy and then it was subjected to intense and sustained criticism.413 
I will then discuss self-ownership by looking at some of the arguments of 
analytical Marxist Gerald Cohen and consider the ways in which both Pateman 
and Okin demonstrate that any view based upon possessive individualism 
depends upon its exclusion of women for its coherence. 
As discussed above, by ignoring the position of women, proponents of 
possessive individualism also ignore the development of selves. At the end of the 
chapter I look at Anna Yeatman' s414 reaction to Pateman and her arguments that 
men were trained to view themselves as possessive individuals. The current 
training of persons to view themselves as possessive individuals is then 
considered, along with the gendered implication of Hindness' 415 argument that 
contract is now employed as a technique of control within the welfare state. 
412 For example, R.A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1992) cited and 
discussed in Radin (2001) p. 3-8. 
413 J. Tully, 'After the Macpherson Thesis' in J. Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: 
Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p. 71. 
414 Yeatman (1997). 
415 Hindness (1997). 
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Possessive Individualism/ Self-Ownership/ Property 1n the 
Person 
The term 'possessive individualism' is associated with the work of Macpherson. 
Macpherson416 draws upon Marx to argue that men were treated as possessive 
individuals in the work Hobbes, amongst other philosophers,417 because this 
describes the behaviour of men within the emerging market economy and liberal 
tradition. The paradox of women's position is ignored by Macpherson. 
Pateman argues that Macpherson's phrase 'possessive individualism', 
brilliantly encapsulates the character of the attributes that are presented as 
belonging 'naturally' to individuals. When the attempt is made to see individuals in 
complete abstraction and isolation from each other, to see them as 'ineluctably 
separate units', they necessarily appear as 'naturally' free and equal with each 
other. They also appear to be possessors of property, including the property they 
own in their personal attributes and capacities.418 (Emphasis is in the original.) 
In The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, 419 
Macpherson attacks the roots of the liberal democratic state, which he finds in 
English seventeenth-century political thought. Whilst recognising that Hobbes' 
arguments in support of a monarchy - whose power is restricted only by his 
subjects' need to resist anyone who threatens their survival - is hardly liberal, 
416 Macpherson (1962). 
417 He includes in his analysis the following: Hobbes, The Levellers, Harrington, Locke, Hume, 
Burke, Bentham and James Mill. The first four are analysed in Macpherson (1962), Hume is 
discussed in C.B. Macpherson, 'The Economic Penetration of Political Theory: Some 
Hypotheses' in Journal of History of Ideas Vol, 39, 1978, pp. 101-118; Burke is dealt with in 
C.B. Macpherson, Burke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) and the utilitarians are 
discussed briefly in C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977). For critical summaries of this work see D. Miller, 'The Macpherson 
Version' in Political Studies Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1982, pp. 120-127; Tully (1993) pp. 71-95. The 
many criticisms of Macpherson's thesis centre around the historical analysis as to when 
possessive individualism occurred. As I am interested in contemporary analysis of women's 
ambivalent position with regard to possessive individualism, and since it is not denied that 
persons are treated as having property in the person, i.e. as possessive individuals, I am not 
detailing this historical debate. 
418 Pateman (1985b) p. 25. This is a discussion about Hobbes and I extend Pateman's analysis to 
include Nozick, below. As discussed in Chapter 3, both Rawls and Cornell make a move that 
involves thinking about 'free and equal persons'. However, neither Cornell nor Rawls adhere to a 
view of possessive individualism or self-ownership as I will define it in this section, i.e. the view 
that one's labour (and the fruits of ones labour) should be viewed as one's own property. Both 
want a greater distribution of resources than can be derived from this position. For further 
discussion ofthis point see Chapter 3. 
419 Macpherson (1962). 
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Macpherson argues that the individualism that influenced subsequent theory 
starts with HobbeS.420 The difficulty with the original seventeenth-centurY 
.; 
individualism lay in its 'possessive quality': 
Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the 
proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them .... The 
relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically 
important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing 
their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The 
individual, it was thought, is free in as much as he is proprietor of his person and its 
capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the will of others, 
and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal 
individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what 
they have acquired by their exercise.421 
Macpherson's definition of 'possessive individualism' as the image of 
individuals who own their person or capacities, is very similar to that succinct 
definition of 'self-ownership' proffered by the contemporary analytic Marxist, 
Gerald Cohen:422 
to own oneself is to enjoy with respect to oneself all those rights which a slave 
owner has over a complete chattel slave.423 
'Possessive individualism' or 'self-ownership' both provide an image of 
individuals as free to sell their labour power as a commodity, a defining feature 
of a capitalist mode of production. Marx424 points out that workers are 'free' in 
both senses of the term. They are 'free of' the means of production. In other 
words, they do not own the means of production, and so have to work for those 
who do own these. They are also 'free' because they are treated as owners of their 
own labour power and are therefore not compelled to work for one particular 
'master'. A society in which workers are treated as possessive individuals 1s 
therefore defined not only against a slave society, but against a feudal society. 
420 Macpherson (1962) pp. 1-2. This point is also made by Cornell, discussed in Chapter 3 · 
421 Macpherson (1962) p. 3 
422 Cohen (1995). 
423 Cohen (1995) p. 214. 
424 Marx (1976) Ch. 6, p. 280. 
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Possessive individualism - or self-ownership - appears to describe a 
relationship between a subject and an object that it owns. To clarify this point, it 
is worth considering the way in which this view of ownership has arisen. 
Macpherson425 has traced the way that this view of property arose historically_ 
illustrating the point that property ownership entails a regulation of relations 
between persons, not the relationship between a person and a thing. Cohen adds 
the following to his discussion of self-ownership: 
Note that what is owned, according to the thesis of self-ownership, is not a self, 
where 'self is used to denote some particularly intimate, or essential, part of the 
person. The slaveowner's ownership is not restricted to the self, so construed, of the 
slave, and the moral self-owner is, similarly, possessed of himself entire, and not of 
his self alone. The term 'self in the name of the thesis of self-ownership has a 
purely reflexive significance. It signifies that what owns and what is owned are one 
and the same, namely, the whole person. There is, consequently, no need to 
establish that my arm or my power to play basketball well is a proper part of my 
self, in order for me to claim sovereignty over it under the thesis of self-
ownership.426 
Although Macpherson discusses the possessive individual as 'owing nothing to 
society' this does not contradict Cohen's definition of 'self-ownership', which I 
am arguing is synonymous with it. Cohen' S427 analysis takes the form of an attack 
upon the concept of self-ownership generally and the implications of it that are 
drawn by Nozick, in particular. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 (with respect to 
Cornell's legal test), N ozick argues that we should be treated as if we have those 
rights over ourselves that would belong to a chattel-slave owner in a slave 
society. Therefore, we should not have our labour appropriated by taxation, 
above that necessary to sustain a minimal state. 
425 C.B. Macpherson, 'Liberal Democracy and Property' in Macpherson (1978b ). 
426 Cohen (1995) pp. 68-69. The definition becomes relevant to his arguments ag~inst Nozick- ~s 
illustrated by the reference to the basketball play, discussed as a thought expenment about W1lt 
Chamberlain by Nozick in Nozick (1974) pp. 161-163. It should be noted that my discussions of 
'self in earlier chapters do not refer to an intimate part of the person but to the whole ~f the 
'person' as Cohen uses the term, here. I have reserved the term 'person' in relation to legal Issues 
whereas self is used as an ontological concept. 
427 Cohen (1995). 
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In attacking Nozick, Cohen claims that self-ownership (or possessiYe 
individualism, as I have discussed it) cannot be easily dismissed by Marxists 
because they make a similar move. When Marx claimed that the extraction of 
surplus value involved 'theft' from workers, the claim is based on the assumption 
that workers should own the fruits of their own labour, i.e. be treated as 
possessive individuals (or as having self-ownership). Nozick makes exactly the 
same move in attacking taxation on the grounds that possessive individuals 
should have the right to the fruits of their labour. Cohen illustrates that the 
premise of self-ownership can be dropped and that without it Marxism has the 
resources to argue against Nozick, by arguing that the laissez-faire liberalism, 
that would result from Nozick's possessive individualism, would reduce the 
autonomy428 of the working class. 
To illustrate his use of the term further, Cohen goes on to criticise James 
Tully429 for Tully's argument that in order to talk about self-ownership it would 
be necessary to separate selves from their abilities. Cohen adds, 
For the existence of 'selves' is not required by the thesis of self-ownership, and if 
ownership requires separability of what owns from what is owned, then self-
ownership is impossible.430 
It is this point and its implications that bring out what is central to Pateman's 
work. For Pateman, contracts in which one party agrees to use part of his/her 
body or an ability that cannot be separated from the body will necessarily involve 
subordination: 
The employer obtains right of command over the use of the bodies of workers in 
order, unilaterally, to have power over the process through which his commodities 
are produced. 431 
428 Cohen defines 'autonomy' as having a range of choice. G.A. Cohen, 'Once more into the 
Breach of Self-Ownership: Reply Narveson and Brenkert' in The Journal of Ethics Vol. 2, 1998, 
pp. 86. Whether or not Nozick defines autonomy in this way does not affect Cohen's ~rgume~t 
that self-ownership would reduce the range of choice of the working class in such a society. This 
is discussed in Cohen (1998) pp. 86-87. 
429 J. Tully, 'Review ofGrunebaum' in Ethics, Vol. 98, 1987, pp. 851-854. 
43° Cohen (1995) p. 69. 
431 Pateman (1988) p. 215. 
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Pateman recognises, or course, that an ideal situation for both employer and 
husband is that the subordinate party regulates his or her self. Part of the work of 
both wives and employees is to try to predict the 'needs' of the husband or 
demands of the employer. Pateman432 prefers to use the term 'property in the 
person' derived from Locke433 because she is concerned that recent debates in 
political theory around the more popular term 'self-ownership' tend to play down 
the 'ownership' aspect of the term. Like Cohen, she objects to the way in which 
'se~f-ownership' is often employed as synonymous with 'autonomy'. 
In order to think about Pateman's emphasis upon subordination it is useful 
to return to my discussion of agency in Chapter 2, which brings together the work 
of the philosopher of science, Oyama with Battersby's feminist metaphysics and 
Andy Clark on cognition. The relationship between employer and employee and 
husband and wife is negotiated. This process of negotiation can be envisaged in 
terms of the emergence of relationships in which the self is not passive but 
neither is she completely free. The image of a self that is most consistent with 
this is of one which emerges through relations with others, which is shaped and 
shapes her daily circumstances. 434 
432 Pateman (2002) p. 22. 
433 'Every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.' J. 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) Book II, Ch. V, p. 287. . . . 
434 For details of the experience ofthis negotiation, which is obviously aided by those m a similar 
situation, see, for example, S.L. Bartky 'Feeding Egos and Tending Wounds: Deference and 
Disaffection in Women's Emotional Labour' in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the 
Phenomenology of Oppression (London: Routledge, 1990) pp. 99-119; R. Pringle, Secretaries 
Talk: Sexuality, Power and Work (London: Verso Books, 1989). These make clear the extent to 
which isolated women are in a much weaker bargaining position. 
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'Kettle Logic' 
In her critique of Pateman, Diana Coole435 describes Pateman's arguments in The 
Sex.ual Contract as analogous to 'kettle logic'. According to Freud, 'kettle logic' 
involves the following arguments: 
I never borrowed your kettle. 
And it was in perfect condition when I returned it. 
Anyway, it was damaged when I got it. 
She argues that it presents women with the same inconsistencies: 
Women have never been treated as possessive individuals. 
When they are it is a patriarchal trap. 
Anyway, the whole concept is a fiction. 436 
Coole's accusation that Pateman is guilty of 'kettle logic' can only be addressed 
by considering women's ambiguous position with regard to both contracts and to 
possessive individualism. The logic of her objection raises the question of 
whether possessive individualism is necessarily assumed when a contractual 
framework is employed. To clarify this involves considering Pateman's analysis 
of contract in more detail. Pateman distinguishes between different types of 
contract. Firstly, it is possible to enter into contracts in which two things are 
swapped or in which parts of the human body which can be detached (such as 
sperm or kidneys) are exchanged. There may be concerns about the way in which 
parts of the body are treated as commodities sold by desperate persons in a black 
market437 but this is not at issue in Pateman's analysis of the marriage and 
employment contracts. She is interested in contracts in which one's abilities are 
viewed as a commodity. To view oneself as owning one's abilities is central to 
the. definition of a possessive individual, or 'self-ownership' or 'property in the 
person'. 
435 D. Coole, 'Patriarchy and Contract' in Politics Vol. 10, No. 1, 1990, pp. 25-29. 
436 D. Coole (1990) p. 25. · 
437 See, for example, Radin (2001); N. Scheper-Hughes, N. 'The Global Traffic m Human 
Organs' in Current Anthropology Vol. 41, No.2, 2000, pp. 191-224. 
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The logic of Coole's criticism can be unpacked in the following way. If 
Pateman is arguing that all contracts for the use of a person's abilities are 
necessarily envisaged as occurring between possessive individuals then she must 
claim that either: the marriage contract is not really contractual or that women are 
'added in' to this contract as possessive individuals. Pateman points to the way in 
which the marriage contract is an odd sort of contract because of the 
inconsistency of women's position. Historically, women could 'consent' to the 
marriage contract but then lost their right to enter into further contracts. Unlike 
workers, they were not viewed as owning their ability to work, hence the struggle 
between husbands and employers over women's labour, to be discussed below. 
Wives were viewed as agreeing to provide consortium, i.e. sex, companionship 
and housework, which was exchanged upon marriage. So, to the extent to which 
wives were said to own and exchange their ability to give consortium it could be 
argued that the should be viewed as possessive individuals and marriage can be 
viewed as a contract. However, this is not a satisfactory way of looking at the 
marriage contract because the definition of possessive individualism is that you 
are the owner of your abilities, such that you can sell them in a market place. The 
paradigm case of this is the employment contract in a capitalist society. Labour 
power is commodified in a manner that housework and sex within marriage were 
not. So, women fall outside 'possessive individualism' in the traditional marriage 
contract. 
This then opens Pateman to the argument that the traditional marriage 
contract is more akin to a relationship based upon status, a throwback to 
feudalism. She resists this move because it fails to capture the historical 
uniqueness of the marriage contract and its intimate relationship with the 
employment contract between 1840-1970. The traditional marriage contract is 
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more akin to a civil slave contract because upon entry rights were lost, including 
the ability to be viewed as the owner of one's labour power. At stake in this 
historical analysis is the possible response of Pateman to contemporary 
arguments by feminists such as Dickenson438 that women's position will be 
improved by the further use of contract. 
Another way of thinking about this ambiguity produced by the position of 
women is to question whether it is possible to envisage a contract that does not 
assume that the parties are possessive individuals. The possessive individual is 
onl~ a product of a capitalist society, by definition. Prior to the repeal of the 
Master and Servant Legislation in 1875, workers were not viewed as owners of 
their abilities which they could freely trade on the market.439 
Coole's accusation of kettle logic also refers to the idea of possessive 
individualism as a legal fiction. Again, I think that Pateman's analysis, derived in 
part from Marx, is correct. We cannot separate our abilities from our bodies and 
exchange them for money. What this fiction amounts to is the subordination of 
one party. Pateman's critique ofthe fiction of possessive individualism therefore 
directs her to a radical attack, not only upon traditional marriage but upon 
contemporary employment practices. Both produce persons who are told by 
others what to do on a daily basis, which undermines the possibility of 
democracy. 440 
438 Dickenson ( 1997). 
439 For a discussion of this see A. Edie, I. Grigg-Spall and P. Ireland, 'Labour Law: From Master 
and Servant to the Contract of Employment' in I. Grigg-Spall and P. Ireland, The Critical 
Lawyers' Handbook (London: Pluto, 1992) pp. 106-113. The Employers and Workmen Act 1875 
removed the magistrates' criminal jurisdiction for breach of employment contract. 
440 Deakin points out that the employment contract set limits upon the power of e_mployers but that 
their prerogative, derived from the master and servant relationship, remained ~ the form of an 
implied duty to obey. The limits upon the employment contract have been Imposed through 
protective legislation. Deakin (2002) p.180. 
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This provides Pateman with a potential response to Miller· s~4 ' argument 
that Macpherson's emphasis upon the 'possessive individual' in readings of the 
social contract theorists emphasised the 'economic' at the expense of the 
'political'. Miller argues that Macpherson's analysis of the social contract 
theorists was incorrect because the social contract theorists were concerned with 
questions of legitimation of the law rather than the alienation of labour power. 
This is a false distinction because the treatment of labour power as a commodity 
is not simply a matter of exploitation but of daily subordination. This is clearer in 
Pateman' s writing than it is in that of Cohen, for example, because she is focused 
upon the relationship between employment contracts, marriage contracts and the 
arguments around the social contract. By considering the position of women the 
question of subordination rather than economic exploitation is fore grounded. 
Against Miller, the question of 'alienation of labour power', with its image 
of possessive individualism is a political question because it produces selves who 
are told what to do on a daily basis. At this point, it is possible to move beyond 
Pateman's conception of what Hutchings terms 'the sovereign individual'. 
Pateman's attention to daily relationships makes this aspect of her analysis 
compatible with an approach to the self that is more akin to those discussed in 
Chapter 2. It does not rely upon a view of women as natural victims. On the 
contrary, the aim of her political analysis is to attack and change women's 
position. The fact that she holds together the marriage contract, the employment 
contract and the social contract to raise questions about democracy strengthens 
her analysis. 
441 Miller (1982). 
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Pateman/Marx: 'Old Issues Reconsidered' 
In 'Does Capitalism Really Need Patriarchy?: Some Old Issues Reconsidered·. 
Carol Johnson argues that Pateman's analysis of The Sexual Contract is an 
attempt to subsume an analysis of capitalism within patriarchy, which she defines 
as, 
a system of male domination that involves the subordination of women. Patriarchy 
takes different forms in different societies and different historical periods. It 
interacts with other forms of oppression, such as class, race and sexuality, in very 
complex ways.442 
Johnson returns to a debate that took place in the 1970s and 1980s in which 
feminists discussed how to employ Marx's analysis of capitalism whilst rejecting 
crude reductions of women's oppression to issues of class.443 This was superseded 
by the influence of poststructuralism and concerns about the sweeping use of 
term 'patriarchy' which is viewed as universalising the position of women, 
thereby ignoring differences between them such as race, sexuality, disability and 
class. In Chapter 1, I emphasised the need for historical and cultural sensitivity to 
such issues. 
By drawing upon Barbara Taylor's444 detailed analysis of the historical 
treatment of women, Johnson illustrates the conflicts over women's labour that 
took place between capitalists and husbands. For capitalists, women were a 
source of cheap labour that could potentially be used to undercut men's wages. 
This conflicted with husbands' concern to control both women's unpaid labour 
within the home and labour outside the home. Johnson rightly argues that these 
442 C. Johnson, 'Does Capitalism really need Patriarchy?: Some Old Issues Reconsidered' in 
Women's Studies International Forum Vol. 19, No.3, 1996, p. 201. 
443 See, for example, H. Hartmann, 'The Unhappy Marriage of Marxis~ and Fe~inism: Towards 
a More Progressive Union' in L. Sargeant, ed., Women and Revolutzon: A Drscusszon of the 
Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism (London: Pluto Press, 1981 ). . 
444 B. Taylor, Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and Feminism in the Nmeteenth Centw?' 
((London: Virago, 1983). See also L. Davidoff, M. Doolittle, J. Fink and K. Holden, The F amrly 
Story: Blood Contract and Intimacy 1830-1960 (Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1999). 
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conflicts drop out of any analysis that views patriarchy and capitalism as 
intertwined. 
In her response, Patemall445 agrees with the historical analysis provided by 
Johnson, that there have been conflicts between employers and husbands over 
women's labour. Pateman disagrees with Johnson's assertion that, in The Sexual 
Contract, she views capitalism as a type of patriarchy. Instead, she argues that 
her analysis of contract is compatible with Johnson's position. Her concentration 
on contract was intended to show the way in which patriarchy, from the 
seventeenth century, was contractual in form. It developed along with capitalism 
and helped to shape it: 
I emphasised that there were significant differences between the employment 
contract (capitalism) and the marriage contract (patriarchy). Husbands were not like 
capitalists, nor were wives like workers. The marriage and employment contracts 
both gave rise to different types of civil subordination, but the respective 
subordination of workers and wives took different forms. When I argued that the 
employment contract presupposed the marriage contract, or stressed the mutual 
interdependence of two contracts, I was not 'collapsing' one into the other. I was 
drawing out the logic ofthe relationship. 446 
As discussed above, I agree with Pateman' s argument that the historical 
subordination of workers and of wives took a different form and grew up 
together. This history needs to be understood in order to comment upon the 
contemporary paradoxical position of women. For example, the debate about the 
granting of 'special rights' for women in order to promote equal opportunity 
constructs women as those in need of extra help whilst playing down the way in 
which men continue to have 'special rights' by virtue of women's 
disproportionate work within the home.447 Here, the term 'special rights of men· 
is doing the same work as 'the sexual contract' in Pateman's earlier work in 
referring to the extent of women's unpaid work within the home. 
445 Pateman (1996a) pp. 203-205. 
446 Pateman (1996a) p. 203. 
447 See for example, C. Pateman, Democracy, Freedom and Special Rights (Swansea: The 
University ofWales Swansea, 1985a). 
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Okin's Attack upon Possessive Individualism/ Self-
Ownership/ Property in the Person 
In a compelling argument, Susan Moller Okin448 pushes a theoretical framework 
derived from possessive individualism to an absurd conclusion by considering 
the position of women. If Cohen can be viewed as akin to Macpherson, in that he 
engages with possessive individualism from a (useful) Marxist perspective but 
tends to ignore the position of women, then Okin's approach can be aligned with 
that of Pateman. Whereas in The Sexual Contract Pateman gives a detailed 
reading of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Hegel, Okin focuses upon the work of 
Nozick. Okin argues that if the position of women is considered then Nozick's 
image of society, derived from possessive individualism, would actually become 
a slave society with mothers as owners of their children! This is not a conclusion 
that he would endorse. Indeed, this conclusion renders his position incoherent 
because it is impossible to be both a slave and a possessive individual at the same 
time. Whilst Nozick449 does not argue against possessive individuals being able to 
enter into slave contracts, this transaction would assume that the slave started out 
as a possessive individual and sold the rights in his/her self. Okin shows that, if 
the position of women is taken into account, nobody would acquire such rights 
over themselves in the first place, unless given them by their mothers. 
Okin's argument is based upon the breadth of Nozick's450 definition of 
'production', from which he derives his arguments for a minimal state. This is 
therefore central to his theoretical position. He argues that, if the means to 
produce goods are justly acquired, the producer should be entitled to the product, 
448 Okin (1989) pp. 74-88. 
449 Nozick (1974) p. 331. He explains that the idea o~ selling off r~g~ts in oneself c?uld produce 
slavery, although the aim of the discussion is to constder a non-mmtmal state, NoZick (1974) P· 
283. 
450 Nozick (1974) p. 160. 
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irrespective of the needs of others. Whilst altruism would be a good thing it could 
not be compelled by the state because this would be tantamount to theft of the 
'holdings' (goods) from the individual producer. As Nozick puts it 
Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held resources 
used in _the ~rocess _(transfe~ing_ so~e of his holdings for these co-operating 
factors) IS entitled to It. The Situation IS not one of something's getting made, and 
there being an open question of who is to get it. Things come into the world already 
attached to people having entitlements over them.451 
Okin shows how reproduction, the labour involved in pregnancy and in the 
traditional childcare performed by women, fits the criteria of production within 
Nozick's analysis. In Nozick's terms, women can be viewed as the producers of 
children. They acquire and use sperm as part of the production process. This 
sperm can usually be viewed as 'justly acquired' as a gift and hence the legal title 
of both the sperm and the product (the child) passes to the woman. Alternatively, 
sperm could now be purchased over the Internet. Nozick is happy with the idea 
that whatever a person is given or buys belongs to him/her, as does the product of 
that individual's labour upon these materials. He explicitly dismisses the idea 
that someone would need to have complete control over (and understand) the 
process of production of something in order to become its owner because this 
would preclude the ownership of other 'products', such as trees.452 Okin 
concludes that when the position of women is considered within Nozick's 
framework then women can be viewed as owning their children. 
In a thought experiment, about the possibility of everyone holding shares in 
each others lives, Nozick briefly deals with the question of children being owned 
by their parents but does not reach a conclusion.453 As Okin illustrates, Nozick's 
gender neutral language at this point allows him to ignore the position of 
451 Nozick (1974) p. 160; cited and discussed Okin (1989) p. 78. 
452 Nozick (1974) p.288. 
453 Nozick (1974) p. 287. 
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women.
454 There is a contradiction between the fact that Nozick's framework 
leads to ownership of the child by the mother but depends upon the idea that 
individuals can be viewed as owning their capacities and the fruits of their 
labour. He also ignores the more consistent position of Hobbes on the question of 
whether possessive individualism necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
individuals should be viewed as owning their children. As discussed in the last 
chapter, for Hobbes, it is not the generation of children, but their protection. 
which allows one of the parents to have dominion over the child by virtue of an 
implied contract.455 Hobbes, being more thorough in thinking through the 
implications of his individualism, argues that children are to called 'free men' 'by 
the natural indulgence of the parents' .456 
Although Okin does not mention Marx it is useful to think about her 
position as the corollary of Marx's analysis of reproduction. Her argument 
reverses the priority that Marx gives to production when he analyses the 
reproduction of children in terms of its work for capital, i.e. as reproducing the 
labour force as a commodity. He considers this by arguing that the cost of labour 
as a commodity includes the cost of its reproduction - a point taken up by 
Marxist feminists. 457 As Marx puts it, 
The labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear and death, must be 
continually replaced by, at the very least a fresh supply of labour-power. Hence the 
sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour- power must 
include the means necessary for the labourer's substitutes, i.e. his children, in order 
that this race of peculiar commodity-owners may perpetuate its appearance on the 
market. 458 
454 Okin (1989) p. 80. 
455 Hobbes (1994b) Ch. XX, pp. 128-129. . . 
456 T. Hobbes, De Corpore Politico' in The Elements of Law (Oxford: Oxford Umverstty Press, 
1994a) Ch. XXIII, p. 133. 
457 For discussions of the domestic labour debate and Marxist feminist debates in the 1970s and 
early 1980s see, for example, J. Brenner and M. Ramas, 'Rethinking Women's Oppression' in J. 
Brenner, Women and the Politics of Class (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000) PP·. 11-58; 
L. Sergeant, ed., Women and Revolution: A Discussion ofthe Unhappy Marriage ofMarxrsm and 
F em in ism (London: Pluto Press, 1981 ). 
458 Marx ( 1954) Ch. 6, p. 168. 
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In contrast, Okin459 prioritises an analysis of reproduction to show that possessiYe 
individualism is incoherent once women's labour in reproducing children is 
included as production. Both are attacking a view of selves as ·peculiar 
commodity-owners' or possessive individualism. 
Okin's illustration of the blindness ofNozick's theory to women leads to a 
discussion of the relationship between self and other. Whether the proponent is 
Hobbes or Nozick, the idea that the possessive individual owns himself and his 
labour and owes nothing to society for them becomes an acute source of tension 
when reproduction and education is considered, a point that I will discuss in 
detail in the next section. 
The Education of 'Possessive Individuals' 
One of the peculiarities of Hobbes' and Nozick's vision of selves as possessive 
individuals is the way in which they are not envisaged as children who gradually 
develop. Neither is there any sense that individualism, with its split between self 
and other, is a diminished view of selves at any age- as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Whilst Hobbes does discuss the role of the family as inculcating political 
values,460 what is central in Hobbes' image of selves is that they are individuals 
from the start. 
In Yeatman's461 reading of Pateman's The Sexual Contract,461 Yeatman 
points out that the sons of property-owning households, within the seventeenth 
century, were trained to view themselves as possessive individuals. One aspect 
459 Okin (1989) p. 80. 
460 In teaching obedience to the family, the parent is teaching obedience to the state. Hobbes 
(1994b) Ch. XXX, p. 223. For a discussion ofthe education of children in both the state of~a~u:e 
and civil society see R.A. Chapman, 'Leviathan Writ Small: Thomas .Hobb~s on th.e Family m 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, 1975, pp. 76-90. Repnnted m P. Kmg, Thomas 
Hobbes: Critical Assessments III (London: Routledge, 1993) pp. 629-656. Chapman reads 
Hobbes as claiming that parents teach children to 'consent' to obey them. 
461 Yeatman (1997) pp. 39-56. 
462 Pateman ( 1988). 
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of the sons~ education involved training them to think of themselves as owners of 
their own abilities and as having been born with them. Part of the son's training 
would therefore involve teaching them to act as if they had not been receiYed 
such lessons on how to behave. 
Yeatman links her point that sons were educated to view themselves as 
possessive individuals with a discussion of Maine~s463 famous statement that 
modernity is characterised by a transition from status to contract. She points to 
the status element that takes place within a society governed by contract to 
emphasise that these sons had a status (linked with being positioned as a 
possessive individual) that allowed them to enter into contracts - a position 
denied to married women. In this way, she shifts Hobbes~ and Pateman's 
philosophical stories into a historical description of a way of life: 
Contract is the device which enables sons, once they are old and educated enough 
to assume the capacities of a rationally orientated individual will, ... to set up their 
own households. It is clear from this that the education of the son is conceived 
precisely in terms of the cultivation of this individualised, rational will. ... By being 
constituted as wills of their own, the sons assume their own dominium. The 
individualisation of dominium is expressed in their status as wills of their own with 
independent householder status .... Classical liberal contractualism, then, is 
predicated on the individualisation of patrimonial dominium. The structure of 
classical liberal thought follows from this.464 
In a footnote, 465 she says that this approach 'jibes' (clashes) with Pateman's 
discussion of a fraternal contract. Yeatman is considering individual families in 
the seventeenth century rather than the story of the sexual contract, to emphasise 
that the sons had to be trained to view themselves as a possessive individuals. 
She reads this back into Pateman~s story to argue that Pateman ignores the fact 
that the sons in her tale of the fraternal contract and the overthrow the patriarch 
would also have to be trained to view themselves as possessive individuals. She 
463 H. Maine, Ancient Law (London: J.M. Dent and Sons) p. 100. 
464 Yeatman (1997) p. 44. 
465 Yeatman (1997) p. 56. 
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attributes this in part to the role of the father - curiously not to the mother or 
servant. 466 
Yeatman's move of thinking about the historical ways in which sons were 
educated to view themselves as possessive individuals, and as propertied heads of 
household, is useful. It informs her consideration of the way in which training to 
view oneself as an individual takes place today. In particular, she is concerned 
with the way in which women are encouraged to take part in 'empowerment' 
training and their treatment in the context of the welfare state, a point to which I 
will return below. The relationship between being a possessive individual and 
being a head of household is also important. It is not mentioned in the definition 
of possessive individualism given by Macpherson, nor by Cohen's definition of 
self-ownership, because both ignore the position of women and deal only with 
employment. The reference to 'heads of household' as one of the features of 
possessive individualism fits within Pateman's discussion of the relationship 
between marriage contracts and employment contracts. 
As discussed in the last chapter, I do not think that readings of Pateman 
which dwell upon her rhetorical rewriting of Hobbes in terms of the sexual 
contract hit their mark. This is because I downplay the extent to which Pateman 
relies upon Freud and also take Pateman at her word that she is merely retelling a 
story.467 This reading is consistent with the way in which her work has developed 
since The Sexual Contract.468 Yeatman's criticism leaves undisturbed what I 
value in Pateman' s work: her analysis of the problems of possessive 
individualism and of contract. It is a little harsh to accuse Pateman of failing to 
question the way in which the sons in her story are trained to become possessive 
466 Yeatman (1997) p. 44. 
467 Pateman (1988) p. 219. 
468 See, for example, Pateman (2002). 
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individuals when her analysis of contract is aimed at undermining this image of 
the self as a possessive individual - by showing the subordination that results 
from it. Nevertheless, Yeatman's switch to historically situating an aspect of the 
story provides what Hobbes fails to give: an analysis of the emergence of the self 
that views itself as a possessive individual as a result of emerging with and 
through his relations with others. Yeatman is able to do this by historically 
situating possessive individualism rather than viewing it as a universal statement 
about human nature. In making this move she has more in common with Pateman 
(and with Macpherson) than she acknowledges. 
New Contractualism; Old Problems? 
The image of a social contract, in different guises, has been a thread that has run 
through this thesis: Cornell's question of what free and equal persons would 
agree to, detailed in Chapter 3; Hobbes' social contract and the way in which this 
is rewritten by Pateman, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Ewald's analysis of loss 
distribution through the techniques of risk analysis and insurance contracts, 
discussed in Chapter 4, could even be viewed as 'social contracts', albeit of a 
different type. Whilst, like Hobbes' social contract they are concerned with 
security, they differ in that they are actual contracts employing a technique that 
potentially could be used for social distribution of loss. I will now look at another 
closely related 'social contract': the 'new contractualism' that has been discussed 
by a number of Australian theorists including Yeatman. 469 
Many women now rely upon the state rather than a man to provide income 
when they are performing the unpaid labour of child care and are hence 
constructed as 'naturally dependent'. Therefore, analyses of the operation of the 
469 Yeatman (1997). 
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welfare state represent a contemporary extension of Pateman~ s concerns in The 
Sex.ual Contract. Many Australian theorists, in particular, have analysed the way 
in which the relationship between the welfare recipient and the state has been 
construed as a 'social contract'. This needs to be considered in detail because it is 
unlike the standard story of the social contract and extends the meaning of the 
terms 'social contract' and 'possessive individual'. 
The question of what it is to be a self, person or individual is deeply 
implicated in this 'social contract' between welfare recipients and the state. To 
predicate this upon an image of the 'possessive individual' appears to be a 
strange move as the possessive individual on welfare can only be described as 
potentially owning his or her ability to work. I want to return to contemporary 
analyses in the area of governmentality, first discussed in Chapter 4, to trace the 
way in which the 'unemployed' are encouraged to view themselves as owners of 
their abilities. Given women's history of being excluded from possessive 
individualism - as not being owners of the abilities that could be sold in the 
market place - this can include strategies of 'empowerment' for those, 
predominantly women, who are recipients of welfare. 
O'Malley,470 draws upon governmentality analysis to argue that, 
'Empowerment' thus appears as a strategy of neo-liberal governance, creating 
'techniques of the self which fold into the new subject such central characteristics 
of political rationality as the changed relations of expertise and the revised 
autonomy of the individual. Such enterprising individuals, in their tum, are 
enjoined to enter into - a form of new contractualism - in which the 'social 
contract' is displaced by a myriad of 'partnerships', 'charters', relationship~ of 
'customer and provider' and 'involvements of stakeholders'. They are formed mto 
imaginary voluntaristic and mutually beneficial agreements between whole _new 
classes of equals: in which empowered subjects contract with each other and wtth a 
state that now presents itself as fragmented into a myriad of 'market actors' .471 
470 http://law-crime.rutgers.edu/omalley l.html 
471 http://law-crime.rutgers.edu/omalley6.html 
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There are a number of points within this quotation that I want to unpack below. 
0 'Malley references the work of Rose472 to explain which aspects of 
contemporary society he is referring to by the rubric of 'neo-liberal governance· 
and 'advanced liberalism'. O'Malley distinguishes contemporary liberalism from 
nineteenth-century liberalism by arguing that in the nineteenth century the 
'market' and 'state' were viewed as separate realms. Contemporary 'neo-
liberalism' is characterised by the way in which techniques employed in the 
market are adopted by the state, for example: the use of outsourcing, competitive 
tendering by state and non-state agencies, cost-benefit analysis, 'reinventing' 
bureaucrats in the image of entrepreneurs. These techniques are applied, not only 
in the market, but also within state government itself and in other contexts, such 
as within universities and the daily lives of individuals. 
· Similarly, Rose473 details developments in the twentieth century in which 
the privacy of the employment contract was weakened as governments accepted 
that pay and conditions should be regulated for social peace. He details the ways 
in which the family wage was viewed as a way in which males were to be linked 
into the social order. 474 In these circumstances, the state took on the management 
of risk for (male) workers through social insurance, for example: unemployment 
benefit, accident insurance, health and safety legislation. As discussed in Chapter 
4, Rose describes a shift in the treatment of risk, away from the use of mutual or 
friendly societies and the state towards individual market choice, for those who 
can afford to purchase security. Whilst the state envisaged risk and welfare in 
terms of families, to women's detriment, now risk has been taken into the market 
and has been aimed at both women and men - if they can pay for it. Given the 
472 N. Rose, 'The Death of the Social? Re-figuring the Territory of Government' in Economy and 
Society Vol. 25, No.3, 1996b, pp. 327-356. 
473 Rose ( 1996b) 
474 Rose (1996b) p. 338; See also Deakin (2002). 
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pay differential between men and women, of course, fewer women are m a 
position to pay for such private insurance. 
Employing the same broadly F oucauldian analysis, Hindness475 produces an 
up to date supplement to Foucault's 'The Punitive Society' ,476 by tracing the 
techniques by which the unemployed are encouraged to constitute themselYes as 
self-governing individuals who can fit within society, by being viewed as 
'customers/consumers' of welfare who must optimise their ability to join the 
marketplace. Whereas the social contract, in its different forms, has been used as an 
argument in support of the law, Hindness argues that contract is now a technique 
linked with self-government. 
To explain this, it is useful to show Hindness' (unattributed) link with 
Pateman. Like Pateman, Hindness links the social contract of liberal theory with 
marriage contracts and employment contracts. He argues that in all cases there is an 
agreement on behalf of whose entering into the contract to regulate their own 
behaviour. In liberal theory, this has meant that the governed should behave as if 
there were a social contract. In marriage and employment this self-regulation 
extends beyond what could be written down. The extension of the use of 'contract' 
to the 'unemployed', which includes increasing numbers of women-headed 
families, is viewed by Hindness as a way in which both men and women come to 
view themselves as self-governing individuals. 
The theme of contract and welfare is taken up by O'Malley,477 He outlines the 
'new contractualism' as characterised by the way in which government services 
in Australia, and in Britain and the US, are allocated in terms of a 'contract' 
between the welfare claimant and the state. Often this means that the services are 
475 Hindness (1997) pp. 14-26. 
476 Foucault (1997b) pp. 23-37. 
477 http://law-crime.rutgers.edu/omalley6.html 
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supplied by private tender. He argues that this is merely a way of controlling the 
limited resources given, whilst appearing to empower individuals. This argument 
fits comfortably with Pateman's analysis of the marriage contracts that it often 
replaces. Again, the woman is a party to the contract and yet is in a weaker 
position with regard to the actual operation of the contract because she is 
construed as dependent if she performs unpaid childcare. 
In addition, the way in which women are encouraged to see themselves is 
of interest in the development of the meaning of 'possessive individualism'. In 
the above quotation, O'Malley refers to the way in which the techniques of 
governmentality use the idea of empowered individuals. I want to expand upon 
this, focusing upon the position of women, to argue that this fits within a possible 
shift towards the treatment of women as possessive individuals and within the 
increased commodification of the domestic sphere. This is in keeping with my 
case analysis relating to marriage that show some move towards contract rather 
than status.478 
There has been analysis of the techniques of 'empowerment' which I also 
want to link with the development of possessive individualism. Cruikshank,479 
describes the 'self esteem movement' which was spear-headed by the 'California 
Task Force to Promote Self-Esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility' in 
1983. This views the idea ofworking on oneself(Comell's project ofbecoming a 
person?) as a social obligation rather than a matter of private satisfaction. By 
taking courses in self-esteem the unemployed are trained to view themselves as 
478 In Australia this has also been linked with a move to change legislation so that couples can 
' negotiate potential divorce settlements prior to the marriage. For a discussion of how women are 
potentially in a more vulnerable position if this further shift to contract occurs see Neave (1997) 
pp. 71-86, discussed in Chapter 5. . 
479 B. Cruikshank, 'Revolutions Within: Self-Government and Self-Esteem' m Barry et al. (1996) 
pp. 231-251. 
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individuals as 'j o bseekers', 480 who can take up the offers that are open to them by 
the market. Hindness points out that the idea of the social contract was 
'individualistic' but not 'individualising', i.e. the emphasis was upon the ·free 
and equal individual' but no account was taken of the individual circumstances. 
In contrast, 'new contractualism' is tailored to individual circumstances and is 
therefore also individualising. 
Similar points are made by both Mitchell Dean481 in 'Governing the 
Unemployed Self in an Active Society' and by Yeatman482 in 'Status. Contract 
and Personhood', drawing upon their experiences in Australia to make points that 
are more generally applicable. Yeatman argues that contract does not free the 
individual from society but 'reshapes the status of the person in society so as to 
become an individualised one. ' 483 As discussed above, she compares the way in 
which propertied sons who were to be male heads of household were educated to 
view themselves as possessive individuals. This training has now been broadened 
to include women, but, importantly, without the assumption that these 'heads of 
household' will have access to traditional wives. 
In Chapter 4, I claimed that the work on risk analysis shows that the 'self-
owning' possessive individual is now encouraged to employ cost-benefit analysis 
to calculate risk and act in order to minimise harm. The worker who owns the 
rights over himself, his abilities and the fruits of his labour characterises Hobbes' 
'possessive individual'. In neo-liberalism, the instrumental reason that he (and, 
more recently, she) now employs includes an analysis of risk, with investment in 
pensions and insurance provided on the market. 
480 The term is employed in the UK in the Jobseekers Act 1995 in which welfare ben~fit: rna~ be 
tied to the claimant's willingness to retrain. See also A New Contract for Welfare: Pnnc1ples mto 
Practice (Cmnd. 4101) (London: HMSO, 1998). 
481 Dean (1995) pp. 559-583. 
482 Yeatman (1997) pp. 39-56. 
483 Yeatman (1997) p. 43. 
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Pateman's analysis of women's position in terms of contract, rather than as 
a feudal relic, can be brought to bear to think about ·new contractualism'. There 
has been a shift in liberal theory from the Hobbesian image of that we ·spring up 
like mushrooms' 484 as possessive individuals to an assumption that possessive 
individualism represents an ideal image of free and equal persons that we (men 
and women) can be encouraged to be, as consumers. This includes the 
consumption of the means of securing against risk, which has moved from 
mutual societies and the state to individual market choices at a time when women 
are potentially being 'added in' as possessive individuals. Whereas Yeatman (and 
other feminists such as Dickenson) view this as an important step because there 
are advantages to women in being treated as possessive individuals, the work of 
Pateman warns against such a sanguine approach to contractualism. 
484 Hobbes (1998) p. 205. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The question addressed by this thesis is: what is meant by the terms "self, 
'person' and 'individual'? The operation of the law of obligations has provided 
the context in which this question has been considered. I have argued that it is 
unnecessary to move from a 'modem' to a 'postmodem' view of the self. both of 
which are based upon the image of males as the paradigm case. It is possible to 
think about universals, the category of women, without such universals being 
'global', i.e. relating to the species as a whole. Deconstruction is inadequate to 
this task, as is illustrated by Spivak's' 485 concern that she could not be a pure 
deconstructionist and attack sexism. This is not a problem inherent to all 
philosophy, but with a type of philosophy that is currently popular within 
feminist legal theory. One of my aims has been to illustrate that there are better 
theoretical approaches that do not produce such dissonance. 
In the introduction, I expressed my sympathy with the argument made by, 
for example, black women, lesbians, women with disabilities and working-class 
women that feminism considers women as a universal category in such a way 
that their voice and situation is marginalised. 486 This is a strong argument, 
particularly as the same move has been applied by feminists to mainstream 
political theories to show the effect of women's exclusion by the discussion of 
selves, individuals and persons in a manner that takes male bodies and lifestyles 
as the norm. However, the argument that calls for sensitivity to difference has 
become mixed up with the claim that it is impossible to consider what women 
have in common in our culture at this point in time. Conaghan487 has warned 
485 Spivak (1990) p. 12. 
486 Seep. 17. 
487 Conaghan (2000) p. 367. 
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against this fear of talking about women as a group, which has the potential to 
constrain feminist legal theory. 
Rather than focusing upon poststructuralism, I have drawn from broader 
resources in philosophy to address this question of feminists' ability to talk 
about, and make claims on behalf of, women as a group. Linked with this 
question is what Scott488 has described as the paradoxical position of women, 
which arises when men have positioned themselves as the finest example of the 
universal category of persons. In order to intervene politically, women have had 
to argue that they are like men, for example equally rational, and yet this neglects 
the fact that both theoretical frameworks as well as institutions have been 
constructed to fit with the traditional male lifestyles and bodies. In feminist legal 
theory this has been termed the equality/difference debate. 
In Chapter 2, I addressed this problem by bringing together diverse areas of 
contemporary philosophy that offer a different way of thinking about the self, that 
does not assume the position of males as the norm against which women are 
measured. Oyama, writing within the philosophy of science, rethinks the 
complexity of the relationship between nature and culture, such that it is not 
'construction' all the way down. This does not involve a denial of the fact that we 
need language in order to discuss what it is to be a self, or a woman, nor that the 
question of power is implicated in these claims. Oyama, with other contemporary 
philosophers of biology,489 are thinking about the relationship between nature and 
culture in a manner that avoids viewing these as separate streams. This involves, 
for example, changing the image of what is self and not-self; challenging the idea 
that there is a strict, fixed boundary between them; and undermining the idea that 
they are manipulated by a central controlling mechanism. 
488 Scott ( 1996). 
489 Oyama et al (200 1 ). 
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Battersby and Oyama write from within completely different areas of 
philosophy and do not discuss each others work. However, they share common 
ground regarding their treatment of the question of agency; an area that is 
relevant to the law of obligations. Both describe the way that the self develops in 
a ~anner that is active but not dependent upon a supposed autonomous will of 
the subject. So, Oyama490 stresses that development should not be viewed in terms 
of genes that can organise 'raw materials' into human beings nor by describing an 
environment that shapes and selects, but by thinking about organisms that 
manipulate and seek out particular environments, just as they are shaped by them. 
Similarly, Battersby9 ' talks in terms of 'feedback loops' between the 
environment and the self. In common with the work of Andy Clark, Battersby's 
model should not be viewed as a simple feedback between an individual and 
environment. As Battersby argues, both self and not-self are carved out gradually 
through their modes of relationality. For Clark, this is demonstrated by the way in 
which it becomes impossible to separate the self from the environment which is 
part of its cognitive process, just as a dolphin creates eddies in order to swim 
faster than it would otherwise be able to do. 
This image of what it is to be a self, or to develop as an orgamsm, 
illustrates the paucity of the image of the possessive individual, discussed in the 
last chapter. Of course, it would be open to those adopting a political theory 
based upon possessive individualism, such as that of Hobbes and Nozick, to 
make a normative claim that we should be treated as if we were possessive 
individuals. It is then necessary to look at the contradictions produced by such a 
490 Oyama (2000a) p. 95. 
491 Battersby (1998a) p. 12. 
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claim when the position of women is highlighted by political theorists such as 
Pateman492 and Okin.493 I will return to Pateman and Okin below. 
Oyama and Battersby, in very different ways, pay attention to the 
development and emergence of the self to challenge the way it is viewed as 
constituted by being split from what it 'outside' it, either other selves or its 
environment. Battersby poses the question of what it would be to think of 
women's bodies and lifestyles as the norm rather than as an aberration. From her 
radical rereading of Kant, she also suggests a different understanding of 
'essence'. To rethink essence in this way allows feminists to talk about women as 
a group without committing themselves to the assumption that they are 
discussing a fixed underlying entity. In doing so, Battersby challenges the 
Aristotelian view of 'essence' as something fixed in the world that all of a 
universal group have in common. It is Aristotle's view of essence that is assumed 
by those feminists, such as Spivak,494 who then need to employ 'strategic 
essentialism' to justify discussions about women as a category. Battersby avoids 
this move by arguing that the way in which we view this grouping alters with 
shifts in the schemata through which we understand the world. This assumes that 
there is more than simply discourse that constructs the world and our 
understanding of it - in a top-down manner - but recognises that the world is not 
divided into pieces that we simply perceive. Our schemata or frameworks -
through which we understand the world - change the way in which we view it 
but can also be changed in a bottom-up manner by the world of which we are a 
part. This is relevant to law because it opens up the possibility of making claims 
on behalf of women which avoids the pitfalls of either employing a fixed idea of 
492 Pateman (1988). 
493 Okin (1989). 
494 Spivak (1990) p. 12. 
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what it is to be a woman (as presupposed by Aristotelian essentialism) or of 
appealing to 'strategic essentialism'. 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the way in which Cornell provides a different 
answer to the problem of making legal claims for women as a group. This time 
the focus was upon legal personhood rather than the self. For Cornell, what it is 
to be, or have, a self in this culture, is to have legal rights. Her answer to the 
equality/difference problem, that women have had to show that they are 'like 
men' in order to claim the same rights but that this approach neglects areas of 
difference, is to move beyond it. Cornell argues that women should be viewed as 
joining the legal community as persons but that the definition of what it means to 
be a person is to be kept open. She thereby aims to avoid the trap of seeing 'the 
person' as paradigmatically male. This is a more compelling argument than 
proposals that women should be treated in law as women with specific rights 
pertaining to being female, such as those suggested by Irigaray.495 Cornell's aim is 
to keep open space in order to transgress 'who we are' rather than to appeal to 
what we have been. 496 
Cornell's version of personhood allows her to attack liberals for their 
'atomism', quoting Charles Taylor.497 She adopts the liberal idea that the law 
should not define what it is to be a person - or adopt a perfectionist image of the 
good - which has tended to look back wistfully to earlier times when women 
were not even viewed as persons. Instead, Cornell's definition of personhood 
looks forward to the possibility of women being treated as free and equal 
495 For example Irigaray (1993b). . . 
496 She explains that she was attracted to Irigaray's earlier work because of Its utoptan move, 
which Irigaray labels as 'the feminine'. Cornell views this as doing the same work as the 
imaginary domain. Cornell is critical of Irigaray's later work on feminine .rights whic~ appeal to .a 
historical feminine, which Cornell views as conservative. Cornell descnbes her attitude on this 
position as arising out of discussions with Butler in 1995. See Cornell (1998) p. 21. 
497 Taylor (1985). 
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persons. Cornell radicalises contractarian justifications of the state when she 
argues that, for the state to be legitimate, it must address the question of v;hether 
it acts in ways we would agree to if we were free and equal persons. 
Whilst I am sympathetic to Cornell's stated socialist, feminist aims, one of 
my concerns with her work is with the efficacy of the legal test that has been 
derived from her philosophical framework. As her hypothetical legislator/judge I 
would find her arguments compelling. However, I would vote with her anyway. 
This is the problem; the test of what 'free and equal persons would agree to' is 
empty. Nozick, with his view of what it is to be free and equal would certainly 
evoke her test to vote against us.498 Cornell is driven to add more content to her 
test, as she does when addressing particular torts. My main concern is that the 
openness of the image of the 'free and equal person' will mean that, in a 
capitalist society, such a person will be understood to be a possessive individual 
- a term the meaning of which I explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Whereas Cornell argues that in our culture we view ourselves as persons 
with rights, Ewald has argued that one aspect of our lives that is now central to 
'who we are' is shaped, in part, by our daily employment of the techniques of risk 
analysis. This is related to 'government' in the broadest sense of the term, not 
only a technique employed by the state but a way of conducting one's life. In 
Chapter 4, I adapted Ewald's analysis of insurance and govemmentality to 
English law to continue to address the question of the anomalous historical 
position of women. Rather than proposing a different way of thinking about the 
equality/difference debate, as in the previous two chapters, this chapter considers 
contemporary developments: the extent to which women are actually now treated 
498 I am assuming that Cornell and I would have a vote. Given that Cornell's test is to be applied 
by either the legislature or the judiciary this is too optimistic. 
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as possessive individuals, owners of their abilities and owing nothing to society 
for them. 
I have argued that the image of the possessive individual, owner of his 
abilities, can now be viewed as someone who can safeguard his "property in the 
person' through insurance and the technology of risk, upon which the operation 
of tort law is based. The owner of his abilities is to be compensated if these 
abilities are damaged and is to act in a prudent manner in order to safeguard such 
"property', such as his ability to earn a living, through private insurance. By 
virtue of their increasing participation in paid work, increasing numbers of 
women are being treated as such possessive individuals (as workers) at a time 
when such insurance is viewed more as a market decision than as social security 
provided by the state. For those without paid work or in low paid employment, 
the breakdown of the family has resulted in the feminisation of poverty. 
Insuring against risk has traditionally been subject to a public/private split, 
with the risks associated with women's traditional lives, such as income upon 
divorce and the costs associated with childbirth generally being excluded. 
However, with the increase in women workers and the influence of feminism, it 
may be that there is a move to view women in terms of possessive individualism. 
This is not clear cut and remains an area of tension and struggle. The feminist 
attack upon the public/private divide is important at a time when the marriage 
and employment contracts are altering with the breakdown of the 
breadwinner/wife model (amongst other factors, such as the ability of global 
capital to move and the gendered workplace model of distinguishing between 
core workers and peripheral workers, who are on temporary and short term 
contracts). 499 
499 Deakin (2002). 
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The anomalous position of women can be seen in the varied approaches of 
the different courts on the question of the award of damages for the cost of child 
care. I looked at the example of the "wrongful birth' cases to illustrate this. The 
House of Lords500 refused to view childbirth as anything other than ·a blessing' 
and hence refused to award damages for the care of children that are born as a 
result of negligent sterilisation. However, they were willing to quantify the pain 
and suffering associated with pregnancy and to award damages for this. 
What these cases also highlight is the double bind that women find 
themselves in. If women claim property in their person then areas of their lives 
are open to commodification. Alternatively, they are not paid at all. In the 
wrongful birth cases, for women to be treated as possessive individuals has the 
advantage that they would receive compensation. Child care would be treated as 
an extra job that had been imposed by another's negligence. To be treated as the 
owner of one's abilities appears to offer respect but, as Pateman points out, has 
historically entailed within it a different type of subordination, that of the worker 
who is viewed as exchanging labour power for a wage. 
For women to be treated as possessive individuals also opens up the 
possibility of commodifying areas of life that were previously resistant to such 
commodification. A stark example of this is Dickenson's argument that payment 
for surrogacy entails the recognition of the woman's ability to birth in that she is 
being paid for it. She claims that: 
The 'good news' about contract motherhood is that it implies a recognition that the 
mother has something to transfer or sell. 501 
500 McFarlane v Tayside Health Authority H.L (1999) 3 WLR 1301; (2~00) 2 .AC 59. . . 
501 Dickenson (1997) p. 162. However, she gives a more nuanced discussiOn on this pomt to 
illustrate the limitation of contract whilst advocating that surrogacy is viewed in terms of payment 
for the woman's pain and suffering in pregnancy and labour. I am ~o-inting out wom.en·s 
ambivalent position with regard to possessive individualism rather than giv~ng a full analysis of 
the arguments for and against payment for surrogacy contracts. For pragmatic arguments see, for 
example, M. Freeman, 'Does Surrogacy Have a Future After Brazier?' Medical Law Review Vol. 
7, Spring, 1999, pp.1-20. 
189 
In comparison with Dickenson, Radin502 has pointed out that in the case of child 
surrogacy the possibility of payment for a child does raise the question of what a 
child is worth. 503 She asks an empirical question: at what point does the 
introduction of an area of commodification start a slippery slope effect wherebv 
members of the population then view human abilities or bodies in terms of 
mop.ey, and hence view themselves as having a common measure?504 She raises 
the spectre of a society in which children could grade themselves in accordance 
with the price they would have achieved on the open market. This is particularly 
relevant in law, given the influence of the school of law and economics which 
views all abilities in terms of commodities in a market place. 
To distribute wealth does not necessarily involve the treatment of human 
attributes as objects. So, for example, the award of money to help with child care 
in the 'wrongful birth cases' could be viewed in terms other than those of 
commodifying human life. It could be viewed as questioning the way in which 
the burden of child care falls upon women. This would be better administered 
through the welfare state rather than through the litigation lottery, not merely 
because of efficiency but because the tort system would calculate an award in 
inverse proportion to need, by basing their calculations upon what the parents 
would be expected to spend on their child. 
In terms of commodification, there 1s a huge difference between 
distribution of resources through welfare and a surrogacy contract. The 'wrongful 
birth cases' could be viewed ambiguously in this context. They were only seen in 
502 Radin (200 1 ). . 
503 Note that it is not the ability to work that is exchanged and hence the surrogate mother ts not 
told what to do on a daily basis - save with regard to issues relating to risk to the foetu~, sue~ ~s 
smoking. On this point see D. Lupton, 'Risk and the Ontology of Pregnant 
0 
Embodtmenot m 
Lupton, D. Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectzves (Cambndge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) ppo 59-85 ° 0 0 
504 For the seminal discussion of how different items come to be vtewed as havmg a common 
measure see Marx (1954) ppo 43-960 
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terms of commodification within the analysis of individual cases rather than as 
part of welfare scheme based upon loss distribution. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I then drew out the ambivalent historical position of 
women with regard to possessive individualism by returning to the work of 
Hobbes. Hobbes is unusual as a social contract theorist in his consistent 
application of possessive individualism to women as well as men. He is therefore 
a useful theorist to consider when discussing the developments and tensions in 
the current relationship between women and possessive individualism. So, for 
example, in Hobbes' hypothetical state of nature women can decide what to do 
with their children, who are then assumed to consent to obey them if they have 
been allowed to survive. 
Hobbes' attempt to think about the behaviour of 'free and equal persons' in 
the state of nature must import his views about how individuals actually behave 
to avoid simply being an empty abstraction. In this respect there are similarities 
to Cornell's analysis, save that she aims to avoid evoking individualism by her 
conception of personhood. Macpherson argues that Hobbes actually describes the 
behaviour of men within Hobbes' own emerging capitalist society. This is the 
image of the possessive individual that I am concerned will be read into Cornell's 
image of personhood. Whilst Macpherson's work has been subject to sustained 
attack for his historical analysis, 505 and whilst he ignores the position of women, 
his work is useful for focusing criticism upon possessive individualism, self-
ownership or property in the person. 
Pateman's work can be viewed as taking up Macpherson's analysis to 
consider the way in which the possessive individual, the owner of his labour and 
the fruits of his labour, has been understood as paradigmatically male. Pateman's 
505 See, for example, Miller (1982); Tully (1993). 
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analysis serves as a warning against a legal fiction, that an ability to work can be 
separated from a person. Hence, she attacks workplace subordination, as well as a 
different type of subordination within the traditional marriage contract. 
Importantly, her work stresses the historical relationship between these contracts 
in a manner that is now discussed by a few labour lawyers506 but does not feature 
within much contemporary analyses of 'self-ownership' within political theory.507 
The sexed body of the person concerned may be relevant to the contract, as 
is clear in the examples that Pateman uses, such as marriage, the prostitution 
contract, etc. The caselaw on sexual harassment in the workplace and the position 
of gendered work such as the role of the secretary508 also strengthens her point. 
Pateman' s analysis of contract, the central theme of her work, does not rely upon 
an assumption of the natural vulnerability of women, which appears occasionally 
in The Sexual Contract. Pateman provides a critique of possessive individualism 
(and of contract) based upon the subordination it produces. As she does not rely 
upon an alternative view of the self, I believe that Pateman's critique of 
individualism is consistent with the analysis of the self discussed in Chapter 2. 
506 For example, L.A. Williams, 'Beyond Labour Law's Parochialism: A Re-envisioning of the 
Discourse of Redistribution' in Conaghan et al. (2002) pp. 93-114. However, this is exceptional. 
For the argument that issues that traditionally affect women workers are still viewed as 
'specialised topics which do not touch the "essence" of labour law' see J. Conaghan, 'Feminism 
and Labour Law: Contesting the Terrain' in A. Morris and T. O'Donnell Feminist Perspectives 
on Employment Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1999b) p. 14. 
507 For example, Cohen (1995). Whilst Cohen does not bring together the marriage contract with 
the employment contract, he does provide a useful sustained attack on self-ownership. Many 
commentators simply accept self-ownership as meaning something akin to autonomy, rather than 
possessive individualism or property in the person. See Pateman (2002) p. 20. For example, 
Pateman cites Will Kymlicka in W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) p.112 cited Pateman (2002) p. 23. This is 
kept in the updated edition: W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, 
2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 116. To be fair, in his later edition he does 
outline Okin's arguments against Nozick, commenting favourably upon them, Kymlicka (2002) 
p.126. This is an interesting example because, between 1990 and 2002, Kymlicka integrates 
feminist theory into arguments on self-ownership, rather than dealing with it mainly in the chapter 
dedicated to feminist political philosophy. He does not discuss Pateman (1988) but will have to 
discuss Pateman (2002) in any next edition. 
508 Pringle (1989). 
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The criticism of a 'male sex right' with respect to women~s labour is also 
of relevance where there is no marriage contract but cohabitation takes place on 
the same terms. As Conaghan509 points out, there has been recent recognition of 
the extent to which the marriage contract (or now cohabitation) and employment 
contracts interrelate in government concerns regarding the 'work/life balance'. 
There is still a struggle over whether women~ s unpaid labour in the home is to be 
acknowledged or to be viewed in terms women~s 'special needs~ and 
'dependency~. With middle-class women 'outsourcing~ housework, this also 
raises questions of differences between women. 
In the workplace, part of this struggle is played out in the discourse of 
'human resource management' in which there has been a shift in language from 
'equal opportunities' to 'managing diversity~. Although the conceptual positions 
differ, this resonates with the broad call to 'respect the other' within aspects of 
poststructuralism. I am not suggesting a simple causal relationship but am 
detecting approaches which conflate the term 'otherness~ or 'diversity~, meaning 
anyone who is not white, male, middle-class, able-bodied and heterosexual.510 
There have been arguments that 'managing diversity~ tends to individualise 
issues of gender and race which were previously viewed as social issues. 511 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I discussed the ways in which consideration of 
women~s position undermines the philosophical frameworks premised upon an 
image of possessive individualism. Pateman~s rereading of Hobbes and the social 
contract theorists and Okin's rereading ofNozick both show the difficulties that 
arise for claims based upon possessive individualism when women~ s position is 
considered. The concept of the possessive individual, self-ownership or 'property 
509 Conaghan (2002). 
510 See Brown (1995) p. 65-66. . . 
511 For a critical appraisal of 'managing diversity' see, for example, J. Webb 'The Politics of 
Equal Opportunity' in Gender, Work and Organisation Vol. 4, No.3, 1997, pp. 159-169. 
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in the person· has as its paradigm case the position of the employee in a capitalist 
society. The (male) worker was the owner of his ability to work that is Yiewed as 
a commodity for which he is paid a wage. Women under traditional marriage 
contract were not paid, did not alienate their abilities by the hour and were not 
always juridically equal with men hence they could not be described as 
possessive individuals. They were viewed as exchanging their persons upon 
marriage rather than as exchanging their ability to work. In keeping with this 
analysis, Deakin512 outlines the way in which the employment contract had two 
aspects: to limit the extent of the employer's right of command and to regulate a 
relationship that worked as a vehicle for channelling risk, by the welfare the state 
for (male) employees. 
The attacks upon possessive individualism by Pateman and Okin greatly 
strengthen the arguments of Cohen,513 who points to the impact of an unrestrained 
capitalism on the working class, and of Charles Taylor,514 who argues that 
Nozick's position is based upon an acceptance of freedom as an ideal and yet 
would undermine the social possibility of any such shared ideals flourishing in 
any future society. Indeed, the position of women produces such additional 
ammunition for these arguments that its omission now appears curious in recent 
debates about self-ownership. 515 
With the breakdown of the breadwinner/housewife model, any successor to 
Pateman' s analysis of The Sexual Contract would be concerned with the 
developments within state provision of welfare. Here, the arguments of Yeatman 
and Hindness provide a sequel to the discussions about women's ambiguous 
position with regard to possessive individualism. In particular. Hindness 
512 Deakin (2002) p. 181. 
513 Cohen (1995). 
514 Taylor ( 1985). 
515 See Pateman (2002). 
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describes the use of 'contract' as a technique of governance, operating such that 
the so-called consumer or customer of welfare is assumed to enter into a contract 
with state agencies. This new 'sexual contract' is then viewed as a contract 
between the state and the woman who is then trained to view herself as the owner 
of her ability to work and to 'take advantage' of training to be a 'job seeker'. This 
is a training in viewing oneself as a possessive individual, the owner of one's 
abilities. 
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